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ART. I.—GEORGE CANNING, THE CATHOLICS AND THE HOLY SEE.

SOME years ago Mr. Shane Leslie, in reviewing my book on *The Foreign Policy of Canning* in the DUBLIN, regretted that I had no word about his relations with the Holy See. The fact was that, owing to the *Praemunire* statute, there were no direct relations, and evidence is difficult to find and still more difficult to verify. Now, however, some materials, guaranteed on the authority of Lord Burghersh as to Canning's views, are to hand. In addition, the Earl of Harewood has permitted access to Canning's private *Journal* giving his early views on the question of Catholic Emancipation.* It is therefore possible to relate the story of his attitude towards the Catholic question and the Holy See with much more confidence than heretofore.

Grattan and O'Connell are doubtless the greatest figures in the Catholic question from a purely Irish point of view. On the English side Pitt, Burke, Canning, Castlereagh, Peel and Wellington were the chief actors. It is worthy of note that of the two pure Englishmen, Pitt was for, and Peel against, Emancipation. Of the four Irishmen, Castlereagh and Canning both favoured Emancipation, so did Burke, but with more qualifications. Even Wellington favoured it on religious grounds, though opposing it for political ones. It is safe to say that even a little Irish blood helped to a generous solution of the problem. Canning had a good deal, for his father and mother were Irish. He was brought up in English Whig circles, but retained strong Irish sympathies and connexions. Thus he speaks in his *Journal* of entertaining "the Irish Club": "A club consisting chiefly of merchants such as Borrowes, Higginson, Patrick, etc.—

* I owe these references to Miss Dorothy Marshall—who is studying the *Journal*.

the rule of it is this ; that they meet alternately at each other's houses to supper and play whist and sup, and there is nothing hot but potatoes—this was my night—and so I gave them a grand entertainment" (Dec. 15, 1793).^{*} He writes this about six months after he entered Parliament. He had already decided to support Catholic Emancipation.

The *Journal* shows that the Irishmen Higginson and Borrowes were his chief sources of information on Irish affairs and may have influenced his decision. His views were at least ardent. The recall of Lord Fitzwilliam from the Lord Lieutenancy brought all the calamities on Ireland. Borrowes seems to have asked Canning to appear at a dinner to protest against the recall. "I am not sure that I shall like going through the ceremony. A delegate, hot from our dear country, with all his passion and prejudices in a state of inflammation and irritability must be rather a formidable person to meet at dinner." (*Journal* March 15, 1795). He wonders if they will "tar and feather" the new Lord-Lieutenant, Camden. "He would look well so."[†]

Canning thus was still passionately pro-Irish. But his conversion to other views began when Lord Fitzwilliam issued a public justification of himself. He thought this, "idle and intemperate".

"It is very possible to think with Lord F [Fitzwilliam] that a complete removal of all the remaining restrictions on the Irish would be a wise measure. I am, myself, inclined to be of that opinion. But, wise or unwise in itself, there are a thousand reasons for wishing to avoid the discussion of it in times of ferment and danger." He has begun to suspect Fitzwilliam. "It appears, by his acknowledgment, that his whole administration was one *combined* job, covered with the pretence of punishing jobbers. To get rid of the Beresfords was his pretext—to bring in the Ponsonbys his object. As for the Publick good—let those believe him to have cared about that who please."[‡]—(*Journal*, April 10, 1795.)

The news that the Irish Parliament had thrown out Catholic Emancipation by 155 to 84 completes his disillusion. Fitzwilliam

^{*} Harewood MSS.

[†] Harewood MSS.

[‡] Harewood MSS.

must have been either grossly misled or indeed inclined grossly to mislead.—(*Journal*, May 9, 1795).*

At this interesting and critical moment Canning had an interview with Pitt, in which he discussed his own future career. Pitt said :

There was one Remedy indeed, in his power, which he should be happy to apply, if I approved of it. It was *office* . . . Was there any particular situation . . . upon which I had fixed my choice more than on another ? . . . I answered that if I were to say what office of all others it was, that I had the greatest desire to fill, not immediately indeed, but at a distance of some little time, and when I might have prepared myself for it in some degree by official habits and application—it was that of Secretary in Ireland. I am afraid he would think that I looked very high to have that office even at a distance in my contemplation.—(*Journal*, June 16, 1795.)

The Olympian informed the young man that he saw “nothing improper or extravagant” in these aspirations. But he could not “*promise*” an office which had been just new filled by Pelham.† Pitt thought “he should have some office here more immediately.” ‡ And he kept his word, for, on January 5, 1796, he made him Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Thus was Canning’s destiny determined. It was a strange destiny, too, for Castlereagh, his subsequent rival as Foreign Secretary, became Chief Secretary for Ireland on March 29, 1798.

This fact did not prevent Castlereagh from outstripping his rival, but it did definitely divert Canning from Irish affairs. His interest in them he preserved to the end, but his power to influence them, or even his knowledge of what was going on, was extremely limited. His few utterances at the time of the Union struggle are singularly naïve and, in themselves, proof that he knew little of the quagmire of shame and corruption through which Pitt and Castlereagh waded. It is singular that Pitt did not, in this one instance, confide in his favourite

* *Harewood MSS.*

† Appointed March 31st, 1795. Afterwards Earl of Chichester.

‡ *Harewood MSS.*

pupil. The only piece of direct evidence comes from Canning himself. But, as such, it seems clear enough.

I well remember, as well as if it happened only yesterday, Mr. Pitt's showing me a letter from Lord Cornwallis, stating that he thought he might carry the Union, but not Catholic Emancipation; in the presumption of youth I exclaimed, "Then abandon the Union!" Mr. Pitt rebuked me as I deserved to be rebuked.*

We do not quite know the date of this conversation, probably some time in 1800. Certainly at the crisis Canning did not know the secrets of that policy which carried the Union.

The "presumptuous youth", who wanted to bracket the Union with Emancipation, may have been right after all. At any rate, Pitt resigned because, after carrying the Union, he failed to carry Emancipation also. His defeat, mainly due to George the Third, was vital and decisive. The cunning old man found an argument even from his fits of insanity. He suggested that any further hint of Emancipation would bring on his malady again. This hint was so effective that Pitt renounced all idea of carrying Emancipation, as did his successor Fox. When Fox was dead, the "rump" of his Ministry tried a small measure of Catholic Relief, and promptly found themselves out of office. George the Third was able to block further Catholic Relief so long as he was of sound mind.

II

The *pax Georgica* held. So long as George the Third retained his sanity, he prevented his ministers from doing anything material for Catholic Emancipation. But his madness returned in 1809 and became permanent in 1810. A Regency was established, and it was believed that the Prince of Wales was an Emancipator. A truce continued for a time until it was clear that the Regent

* March, 1827. *Speeches* ed Therry [1830] VI. 170. These speeches are of great importance because, with the exception of those of 1827, they were all most carefully revised by Canning himself.

(the future George IV) would do nothing himself. At last the Emancipators began to move in Parliament. On June 22, 1812, Canning proposed a resolution in the Commons in favour of Catholic claims. This was perhaps the only occasion on which he, or anybody else, used new arguments in this old case. He confounded his opponents by pointing to the map of Europe.

A study of it disproved, said he, the old idea that Catholics generally refused to tolerate other needs or declined to unite with other religious bodies to resist a common enemy. In Hungary 'A Roman Catholic establishment, co-existing with a Greek hierarchy, amid a Protestant population; yet all offices, civil and military, were open to everybody.' When Napoleon appealed to Hungary to rebel against Austria, she refused to do so. 'The offer of 'a free exercise of several forms of worship' was no temptation to her, for she possessed it already. In Russia, the Czar was waging war against Napoleon aided by 'a schismatic Arch-Chancellor, a Roman Catholic Secretary, and a Protestant General'. (In Spain the religious policy was intolerant indeed. But perhaps Spain, when we have been recommending to her the practice of liberality and toleration, might have retorted upon, not wholly without justice, and asked whether Ireland, adult and mature Ireland, now a co-ordinate part of the United Kingdom, ought still to be governed on those principles, an active remnant of those principles, which were applied, justly perhaps, in former times, to the population of a conquered state, or to an insignificant and rebellious colony ?)*

We see here the argument, reinforced from Europe, of "abandon the Union or carry Emancipation!" This time the Commons carried Emancipation by the largest majority ever known to favour Emancipation until the measure became law seventeen years later. This time the motion was wrecked in the Lords. The political conditions of 1812 were very uncertain, and twice during the year Canning and the Marquis Wellesley were approached by the Regent to form an administration. On two occasions they failed. Canning said the terms were inconsistent "with my personal honour". His honour was bound up with Catholic Emancipation. His devotion to the cause was real. It meant a refusal

* *Speeches* III. 325-6.

of the seals of office twice within six months, an exclusion from the Cabinet for five years more, and—what he valued even more—abandonment of all hope of representing the University of Oxford in Parliament.

Never till this hour, have I stated, either in public or in private, the extent of this irretrievable sacrifice ; but I have not felt it the less deeply. It is past, and I shall speak of it no more.*

During the remainder of Canning's life the cause of Emancipation went backward rather than forward. The prime causes were two. In the first place, the Liverpool Administration, as eventually formed in 1812, was formed on the principle that members were free to vote either way on this crucial question.† They did so freely—Castlereagh—the leader of the Commons—along with Canning, who joined the Cabinet in 1816—regularly voted for Catholic Emancipation whenever it came up. The Prime Minister, Liverpool—and Wellington who appeared in 1817—regularly opposed it in the Lords. The lesser members of the Cabinet voted almost half and half on the question. This compromise prevented the Catholic Emancipation from ever becoming a Government question, and hence discouraged its promoters. There was little hope of carrying it until the crisis became so grave as to unite all parties, as actually happened in 1829. Secondly, the people of England were a great deal more anti-Catholic than their representatives. But from 1815 onwards popular influence increased and this was manifested in the division lobbies. In the last motion on the subject in the Commons, in which Canning took part, the motion was lost by four votes.

This was in the year 1827. A similar motion had been carried by 129 fifteen years earlier.

Canning's accession to power, for a brief hundred days during 1827, was received with great excitement, for Canning was the first pro-Catholic prime minister

* Feb. 15, 1825. *Speeches* V. 379.

† It was rather amusing to see that this precedent was forgotten in the discussions last year (1932) as to whether "Free Trade" could remain an open question for members of the Cabinet in the present government. Liverpool's Ministry lived fifteen years on this principle.

since the Liverpool compromise had been adopted. O'Connell suspended his agitation in Ireland. Not only Catholics there, but the Protestant party in England, declared that Canning meant to carry Emancipation by tearing up the "Liverpool compromise" and making it a Government measure. This charge can be countered by the opposite one—due to Lord Lyndhurst—that Canning promised the King secretly to abandon the Catholic cause on becoming Prime Minister. Both charges are obviously untrue, and refute one another. The King can be quoted in evidence. In his early days George the Fourth had been a Whig and an Emancipator, but he had given up any ideas of this sort ever since he became Regent. He was now exceedingly anxious to pose as the "Protestant" King. During and after the ministerial crisis he told all his secrets to the Austrian Ambassador. He would certainly have told Esterházy that Canning had promised to abandon the Catholics, if he had ever offered to do so. For that would have been a great testimony to the regal influence. But George steadily declared that Canning took office "according to the system of Lord Liverpool". This system was for the members of the cabinet to vote freely on the Catholic question.*

There can be no doubt that this is the true view. In spite, therefore, of all his sacrifices Canning's premiership had done nothing to make Catholic Emancipation more probable in the future. Two years later it was achieved, because of O'Connell's agitation, and not because of an alteration in the balance of English party politics.

III

So far for the genesis of Canning's ideas on Catholic Emancipation and for his failure, despite so much devotion and sacrifice, to carry the cause in Parliament. What we now wish to know is what the practical policy of this man really was, how he intended actually to regulate

* See my article in *Eng. Hist. Review*, July 1930, pp. 426-7, and the evidence from the Vienna Archives quoted there.

the relations of England first to the Catholics of Ireland and next to the Holy See itself. To answer this question we must study his speeches, before revealing his indirect negotiations with the Papacy. Canning's conception of the Catholic problem in England, and indeed everywhere, was primarily political. No man was more vigorous in denouncing this "accursed system, which had long congealed and benumbed a nation". He compared the bondage of Irishmen to the bondage of the Israelites. But his main argument was intellectual and political. He says, again and again, that the religious differences at the Reformation had not induced Englishmen to impose Catholic disabilities in the extreme form which they subsequently assumed. It was not in the Reformation period but in the days of James I that persecution became most severe, reaching its height under Charles II in England, and under William III in Ireland. It was the conversion of James II to Catholicism and his flight from Protestant England into Catholic France, which awakened the greatest suspicion.

Concurring in the religion of the exiled family, the Roman Catholic subjects of the British Crown were also held to be devoted to their political claims. The Roman Catholic was presumed to be essentially a traitor; but as treason was naturally concealed as much as possible, while religion was more readily avowed and ascertained, the test of the suspected politics, was found in the professed creed. It was necessary to discover the papist who was ready to restore the exiled family to the throne. It was desired to detect him by the oath of transubstantiation. Was his creed his guilt? No. But his creed designated the man, and his guilt consisted in his foreign attachment. Would any man present assert that that attachment existed at present? The exiled family had then ceased to exist, so there was no case for maintaining the penal statutes and the religious tests any longer.*

Canning's next argument was also political. The oppressions had been so monstrous that they had defeated themselves. In 1774 the first relaxations had been made, and these had been increased in 1793. Lastly, in 1818,

* March 16, 1821. *Speeches*, IV. 274-5.

for the first time, Catholics were allowed to be officers in the army and navy. Thus the sapping process had begun in any case, and was certain to go on. In 1793 Catholics had been given, and still retained, the power of electing representatives to Parliament, but had been forbidden to elect Catholic members. The Catholic Irishman was, therefore, an elector but could not himself be elected. The best and purest and highest born Catholics in Ireland were thus deliberately repelled and alienated by England.

"This was not the surest or safest way to bind Ireland to the rest of the Empire in ties of affection. . . . We had already bridged the channel. Ireland now sat with us in the representative assembly of the empire ; and when she was allowed to come there, why was she not also allowed to bring with her some of her Catholic children ?" Or again, "if we had but half the allegiance of the Roman Catholics, why was it that we had only half ?" . . . Homer, who was a better judge of human nature than Euclid, had answered the question. "A man," he said, "is but half a man who has not the rights of a freeman."*

The whole thesis is that the interests, as well as the affections, of Catholics must be bound up with those of England. At one time he played with the idea of "securities", but rejected this after realizing the impracticability of obtaining any not approved by the Pope. What he finally proposed to do was to treat Catholics like other religious dissenters. He objected strongly to distinctions being drawn between other dissenters and Catholics. He proposed to maintain the Church as established both in England and in Ireland.† But, apart from that, he wished to secure all civil and political privileges for the Catholics, together with full liberty of private religious worship. As always, he insisted that he was anxious to "redress practical grievances" not "to run after theoretical perfection". He desired the practice, not the theory, of justice.

Canning strongly insisted that he was no direct advocate of the claims of Catholics, and still less their avowed representative. It was dangerous to be so,

* May 26, 1825. *Speeches*, V 429.

† April 21, 1825. *Speeches*, IV. 389-90.

if one was an English politician. He, therefore, never had any direct communication with Catholic priests or laymen on the subject of their claims. He derived his public information from their utterances in the press or on platforms and from their petitions to Parliament. But, in private, he took good care to get acquainted with their views through intermediaries. There is evidence of the care he took to ascertain the opinions of the Catholic laity in England and in Ireland. He got friends of his to obtain their opinions by letter, and studied them with great care. One of his private notebooks records a number of these letters, though we do not have his comment upon them.

All Canning's efforts were, in reality, directed to one great object. He wished to obtain the definite views, not only of the Holy See, but of the Pope himself as to the best practicable method of reconciling Irish and English Catholics to the British Crown. Not long after he came into office Leo XII became Pope (Sept. 1823) and sent a courteous letter announcing his accession to George the Fourth. Canning, as Foreign Secretary, received it. He "had always thought that the only way in which the question of securities to be required from the Catholics was by a negociation with the Pope". He now saw his chance, but he dared not take it without finding out what penalties he might incur. He therefore consulted the Law Officers of the Crown, who ventured the opinion that direct correspondence with the Pope implied the recognition of his claims as the spiritual head of Christendom. Hence, under Statute 5, Elizabeth, cap. 50, 32, Canning would incur the penalties of *praemunire*, if he answered.* Canning returned to the charge in 1826. But the answer appears to have been the same. At any rate it is believed that the matter ended there.

A study of the records shows, however, that, while direct correspondence was not instituted, Canning

* March 6, 1827. *Speeches*, VI. 157-9. The original opinion is in P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] F[oreign] O[ffice] 83/2294. After Catholic emancipation had been carried (1829), such correspondence became legal. v. opinion of Denman, 20/8/32, who declared that a diplomatic agent could be accredited.

took means, in the year 1825, to find out indirectly what the views of the Holy See were. These I propose to quote *in toto* as the conclusion of this article, without any comment of my own. All I need do is to preface it with a short explanation. Lord Burghersh, who was instructed privately by Canning to find out what he desired, was Minister to Tuscany in 1825, was afterwards, as Lord Westmorland, Minister to Prussia in 1848. When he heard that Lord Palmerston was contemplating the accrediting of a diplomatic representative to the Pope in that year, he wrote the letter that follows :

Lord Westmorland to Lord Palmerston.*

Now that you are about to enter into a legally authorized communication with the Court of Rome, I cannot refrain from placing in your hands a copy of a private Letter of mine addressed to Mr. Canning in the year 1825, in which I contemplated this arrangement, and detailed the feelings with which a closer and more intimate connection with the British Government was looked upon by the then ruling Authorities of the Papal Government. I think it probable this Letter may be amongst the Archives of your Office, for I know Mr. Canning submitted it to the Cabinet, and that the general principles contained in it were recognized as those by which concessions to the Catholics should be regulated, whenever it might be thought advisable to adopt them. Lord Liverpool concurred in this opinion, but I believe when, in 1829, the emancipation took place, the difficulty of the question was so great, that the extended portion of it which I had suggested was omitted, upon the consideration of the legal difficulties it presented.

I only now refer to it as relating to a subject upon which I was instructed by Mr. Canning to obtain information, and upon which (although my letter is a private one) still I made this Official report, and because it may be of use to you as showing what, at the period, it was written, were the opinion of the Pope and the leading men who were his Ministers and advisers.

The letter referred to as containing the views of Canning, in 1825, was as follows :

Lord Burghersh to Canning.†

From my frequent opportunities of conversing with the Cardinal and influential persons in the Court of Rome, I have

* F.O. 64/285. *Private*—Berlin. Feb. 21, 1848.

† F.O. 79/44. *Private*. Naples. April 2, 1825.

obtained information which, under the present circumstances, may not be uninteresting to you to be acquainted with.

The Court of Rome see, with dissatisfaction, the unruly spirit at various times shown even against itself by the Catholic Clergy of Ireland: it would be anxious to reduce it to more orderly conduct, both as regards the British Government and its own authority: to do this it would receive, with gratitude, any proposition for the payment of that Church, conceding in return a total renunciation of all pretention to the antient establishment that belonged to it; and granting to the Government a power in the election of Bishops and other of the Church Dignitaries, such as has been secured to other Protestant Governments. These arrangements, when completed, would be promulgated by a Bull which would put down all opposition.

The Court of Rome believe that such a settlement of a difficult question must be of service to the British Government, it would lead to a connection between it and the Catholic Clergy which, by degrees, would bring about a feeling of dependence which the Court of Rome is far from objecting to: it would lead the Catholic Priest to look to the approbation of the Government as a means of advancement, and the Court of Rome would encourage this feeling.

The persons whose sentiments I am now giving conceive that to have the whole body of the Clergy of five or six millions of People totally separated, in interest, and without connection with, or control from the Ruling Power, must be calculated to render the people under the spiritual charge of this powerful Body bad Subjects, and therefore in the desire of healing wounds which have so long existed, the Court of Rome would anxiously lend a hand to bring about a better state of things, and in doing so it conceives it would be acting in its own interests.

To do this, if the Statute restricting direct communication with the Holy See, was taken away, it would be most happy to enter into any such arrangements as with strict compliance with its religious tenets, yet with an anxious desire to contribute to the tranquillity and prosperity of the British Nation, it should be thought advisable to require from it.

Forgive my having thus entered upon a subject which I know to be replete with difficulties, but I merely mention facts; it is for you to judge whether they are of sufficient importance to be taken notice of.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

ART. 2.—ERNST TROELTSCH

The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. By Ernst Troeltsch. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.)

THE translation of the immense work of Troeltsch's *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, has given English readers an opportunity of enjoying and estimating the thought of one reputed to be amongst the wisest and most learned of modern religious writers. Even a translation competently done does not make easy reading, for Troeltsch is not an artist in words, and the translation takes up two volumes amounting to more than a thousand pages.

Fortunately we have been prepared for Troeltsch's teaching by one of the essays of the late Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Time and again the latter whetted our appetite by his generous praise of his friend, and in the essay mentioned he summarises his philosophy of religion and adds some of his own gentle criticism. As he says, it is not easy to furnish a short yet useful account and criticism of Troeltsch's *Soziallehren*, with its nearly thousand pages, its bewildering variety of topics, and the range and delicacy of competence it so strikingly reveals. And all this is here subservient to certain few, closely interdependent, central convictions and conclusions. And again these self-commitments are reached only across surging seas of the strongest feeling and closest networks of objective complication.

This is very true, and makes it almost impossible to do justice in one article to the many vital questions which the author takes up and decides; it would require as well a genius with the same infinite capacity for taking pains to test the worth and accuracy of the varied learning shown in these pages. There are no more than three chapters, but the first gathers together all that has been written and said on the outlook of the early Church; the second gives a very fair, if external, statement of the aims and problems of the Mediaeval Church and of the solution reached; while the third chapter, which takes up the whole of the second volume, gives an unrivalled account of the strong and weak points of Protestantism in the two chief forms which it took and in the development of the sects and mysticism.

Von Hügel in his essay gives us some conception of the conclusion of this vast book by a series of quotations from it, and I cannot do better than follow his example, restricting myself at the same time to two main questions: the truth of his general summary and the strictly social problem. Troeltsch insists that it is completely un-historical to think of the Gospel of Christ as a socialistic manifesto.

The "Hope of the Kingdom" was not an attempt to console those who were suffering from social wrongs by promising them happiness and compensation, perhaps even to the extent of complete revolution, in another existence—an assurance given by the Gospel to the destitute over against the dominant forces of contemporary society. The message of the Kingdom was primarily the vision of an ethical and religious situation, of a world entirely controlled by God, in which all the values of pure spirituality would be recognized and appreciated at their true worth.

Religion, as Troeltsch goes on to say, is independent of social and economic influences, however much it may be indirectly affected by them.

Following current habits of criticism, Troeltsch distinguishes between the outlook of our Lord in the Gospels and the views of St. Paul. Of the preaching of Christ he says that

it deals with the proclamation of the great final judgment of the coming of the "Kingdom of God", by which is meant that state of life in which God will have supreme control, when His Will will be done on earth, as it is now being done only in heaven . . . and further, the message of Jesus also deals with the formation of the community, based on the Hope of the Kingdom, which in the meantime possesses both the pledge of the Kingdom and the preparation for its coming in Jesus Himself.

The members of this community mingle everywhere with the children of this world, and continue to take part in the national form of worship. They only prepare themselves inwardly for the coming of the Kingdom, coupled with their right behaviour towards one another. Jesus did not organize a Church. He simply asked for helpers who would spread the message by preaching; these assistants were to be men who would leave all and sacrifice everything for His sake and for the Cause.

From these quotations—and they could be multiplied—it will be seen that to Troeltsch the message of Christ contained no positive teaching on the State or society or the family. “The centre of His Message was the glory of God’s final victory and the conquest of demons.” No wonder, then, that he distinguishes it sharply from the teaching of St. Paul. “Paul’s ideas were quite distinct from the ideals of the Gospel, and, at least for the Early Church, they determined the immediate path of duty.” The effect of Paul’s teaching was far-reaching; it introduced a conservative element into Christianity and a new attitude towards society and the world.

The principle which Paulinism here lays down, on the threshold of the great development of the future, is the duty of the recognition and use of social phenomena as organizations and institutions—which did not come into existence without God’s permission and which contain an element of good—mingled with a spirit of detachment and independence, since, after all, these things belong to a perishing world and are everywhere steeped in paganism.

But while Troeltsch thus contrasts the Gospels and St. Paul, he goes on to admit that the ensuing combination in the Early Church of conservative and radical elements does correspond with the “spirit and meaning of the Gospel, and that in this respect it presents the classical example of the union of fundamental ideas right down to the beginning of the modern era”. This curious inconsistency is typical of Troeltsch, as I shall go on to show by other examples, and it seems to indicate that his higher criticism and instilled prejudices were at war with a noble and spiritual rightmindedness which is, in fact, responsible for what is so valuable in his writings. It is quite clear that he does not altogether like the development which now took place in the Early Church. He owns that after the Ascension of Christ the need was felt for some external organization to take the place of the Lord who had been visibly with the disciples, and that though at first that organization was simple and undefined, nevertheless out of it came

that peculiar form of the Christian priesthood, the episcopate, with which the new Christian Bible or the New Testament was closely connected, the emphasis on a genuine tradition, secured by the bishops, and the development of the sacramental idea, which ascribed a miraculous power to the new ceremonies, and which ordained that the Sacrament was only valid within a properly constituted community through the hands of the regular clergy. This constitutes the development of Early Catholicism, which, after Pauline Christianity, was the second great development of the Christian Faith.

Thus there came into being that system known as Catholicism, rigid and scholastic and based on authority and revelation. The ministry possesses a truth of the highest order, which is exclusive of all others, and the new dogma in turn gave importance to the sacramental, rites.

The mystery religions are drawn into Christianity, above all in order to concentrate the redeeming power of the new knowledge of God in definite objective processes, and thus to remove them from the sphere of a fitful, merely human subjectivity. Even these rites which had originally been free were also put under the control of the clergy. The sociological significance of this fact, however, is extraordinary; it meant that the sacraments were now not merely the highest and central points of the cultus, but that, above all, they had become the main channel through which salvation is imparted to the souls of men. Outside the Sacrament there is no salvation, and since—with negligible exceptions—there is no sacrament without a priest, so there is no salvation outside the Church. The Church possesses not merely the sole truth, but also and chiefly the sole power of imparting salvation through the sacraments which link the world of sense and the super-sensible world. The Gospel, which was a completely non-sacramental and purely ethical Gospel, has thus assimilated a complex of ideas which was also alien to its basis in Judaism, but which is fundamentally inherent in all natural religion, and which from the point of view of Christ-mysticism could very well be utilized as a means of restoring real substantial union with God.

The reader will notice here again how Troeltsch, after leading him to expect a conclusion repudiating this authoritative and sacramental form of Christianity, finds

instead the surprising remark that it made for union with Christ and God. Here is the same inconsistency already mentioned. The authoritative and sacramental Catholic faith is declared to be quite contrary to the Gospel. The Protestant in Troeltsch prefers the ethical teaching of Christ and shows himself strangely forgetful that Christ did lay stress on baptism, that the early Church did allow anyone to baptize, so that it is quite unfair to say that the clergy reserved to themselves the exclusive right to impart salvation, and lastly, if the gospels state that the entry into the Kingdom of God is by baptism, the Church can hardly be said to be usurping a new claim when its ministers taught that outside union with Christ by baptism of some sort there is no salvation. His dislike of the external and sacramental or magical, as he often calls the rites of the Church, does not, however, prevent Troeltsch from seeing with his usual clearmindedness that a religion must be incomplete without some such forms, and this explains his conclusion. We find, however, that wherever he is exposing the Catholic system we have to be on our guard. One might well question the borrowing from the mystery religions, for instance, but a better example is given in his discussion of the relation of the Church to the world. He takes for granted that "in the eyes of Jesus the ordinary life of humanity, in spite of its sin, was full of traces of the Divine goodness". There is no contrast between the world and the kingdom; whereas to the early Church, with its exclusive possession of all that is holy, the world becomes the kingdom of Satan, "in which there is nothing but perdition and impotence". Hence arose the impulse to the ascetic life, to monasticism, and a division sprang up between those who surrendered the world entirely and those who submitted to the social order, to the world of sin. Troeltsch lays great stress on the significance of asceticism, and clearly has no liking for it, and he thinks that this contrast of the Church and the world led to a complete change in the Christian ethic. "It was broken up into varied combinations of particular scriptural commands, unscrupulous borrowings from the ethics of Stoicism and of Cynicism, ascetic regulations and regula-

tions of church order ; it confused worship and ethical behaviour, and so connected good works, fasting and almsgiving with the idea of merit and the assurance of personal salvation," and in another place he writes that "the aims of the asceticism of the West, and the early Middle Ages in particular, were purely eschatological and eudæmonistic".

One exception is made to this sharp separation of the Church and the world. "At one point"—that of science—"there was an almost complete fusion of the Church and the world." "Platonism provided Christianity with its unique Gospel of Redemption, with a universal foundation of mysticism", and "to the Christian ethic . . . Stoicism gave both a theoretical foundation and a terminology". The conception of Nature and its law according to the Stoics must indeed be held responsible for the reconciliation of the Church and society which was achieved in the Middle Ages. . . . "It was this idea which finally made it possible for the Church to come to terms with the State, and it also provided her with a theoretical reply to the question of her relation with the world." Some sort of reconciliation between the Church and the State was practically necessary, and on the Stoic theory the Church could maintain that the world, too, was a divine creation, and at any rate a minimum of the secular conditions of life was required as a basis for the supernatural values. Much turned on the form this "minimum" should take, and the question divided Christianity into two camps. "The main line of development, and the official doctrine of the Church, extended this minimum more and more, without giving up the 'supernaturalism' of the Church theory ; monasticism restricted this 'minimum' as far as it was humanly possible." The next step was to endow Imperial authority with divine sanctions, a step taken by St. Augustine and consolidated later in the crowning of Charlemagne. But as neither St. Augustine nor his successors abandoned the old Christian view of the wickedness of the world, the Church was in the unhappy state of living by two contradictory principles. It was at once aloof from the world, the home of redeemed humanity

and at the same time a co-partner with the Empire and dependent upon it for her social life.

Summing up his conclusions about the development of the Early Church, Troeltsch writes that

in the Bible, in the absolute Law of Nature, and in the monasticism the old sociological ideals lie ready to exert a new spiritual influence upon the whole of life. In the Church, through the concentration of the divine power in priest and sacrament, these ideals have been ecclesiastically united, and the creation of the Church is the real great sociological achievement of this period, whose fundamental theory does not penetrate too deeply into the common life; so far its influence was mainly felt in family life. Through the ideas of theocracy and relative Natural Law, social problems have also been mastered, in that, although the State and Society remain outwardly and legally the same, in their hearts men are quite remote from and hostile to them, without, however, feeling urged to alter them, and using their institutions for future salvation and for the general security of life. These are the social doctrines of the ancient Church; they also contain both the germ of the new social doctrines of the Middle Ages, which will be quite different, and also the germ of ideas which will lead to the disintegration of these same social doctrines at the beginning of the modern period.

I have spent some time on this first chapter of Troeltsch because it contains his chief principles of criticism and the main ideas are implied in the later vicissitudes of Christianity. The second chapter of the Mediaeval Church relates how the Church developed "into a social entity inclusive both of the sociological circle of religion itself and of the politico-social formations also, and which thus realized, in its own way, what had haunted Plato, in his Republic, as the true end of a single state—the rule of the wise and of the friends of God over an organic many-levelled social entity, and what the Stoic Cosmopolis had sought—the share of all men in an ethical universal kingdom". Von Hügel estimated very highly the critical survey in this chapter and especially the analysis and interpretation of the Thomist synthesis. As he asks, "Has Aquinas, on the ample questions here discussed been anywhere penetrated as delicately and deeply, as

generously and justly, as is done here, in these noble sections of a truly great book?"

According to Troeltsch Aquinas is the chief representative of the co-ordination between Church and society, natural law and the Christian teaching. The opposition felt at the beginning of the Christian development between the world and the kingdom of God was retained, but the outlook governing it changed.

No longer is this opposition held to consist in the antagonism between an ecclesiastical ethic, which is identical with the absolute Natural Law of the Stoics, and the relative Natural Law of the Roman order of Society, in which the Christian position is partly one of adaptation to the unchangeable order of Society, and partly one of mastering it, so far as is possible within the Church. The opposition is rather between two stages of purpose, between mystical supernature and its blessedness in the future state, on the one hand, and Natural Law in general, on the other hand; the difference between the absolute Natural Law of the Primitive State and the relative Natural Law of the State of Sin has become comparatively unimportant; both these ideas are summed up in the word "Nature", and are therefore opposed to Supernature. The end of the intramundane ethic of Natural Law with the rational purpose of the organization, unity, and welfare of humanity in all intellectual and material matters is set over against the end of the supramundane ethic, of the Christian moral law, within which everything aims at the sacramentally effected union with and in the Divine substance of life. That is why the Decalogue stands for the substance of the Natural Law, and, as the revelation to a particular people, it must submit to the law of Christianity and be baptized into Christianity in order to gain a Christian significance. The rather more ethical and practical Stoic-Christian idea of the free personality in God, and of the humanitarian idea of a unity of mankind, free from law and force, united by ties of a common humanity and mutual service, has been replaced by the combination of the sacramental idea of miracle with Neo-Platonic and Christian mysticism. The opposition which has to be overcome is no longer primarily that of a particular society, at enmity within itself, based on law, force, and selfishness, against the universal Kingdom of Love of the children of God; it is now the opposition between Nature, working out its Law of Reason, and the peculiarly Christian purpose of the sacramental and mystical miracle of Grace, between the natural Christian social system, of life in the world, which arises out of the former, and the fellowship of mystical

love and happiness which results from the latter. The task of reconciliation is now a double one ; to reconcile not only absolute and relative Natural Law, but above all, nature and supernature. . . .

Along these lines, then, the social order is rationalized and Christianized—while at the same time, as a means and a presupposition, it is incorporated into the higher absolute aims of mystical morality. . . . To the early equation provided by Stoicism is now added that which has been evolved with the aid of Neo-Platonism, and the transition from the first to the second is effected with the help of the Aristotelian teaching of an ascending series of ends, of a continual building up upon the degree which has already been attained, which then becomes the “potentiality” for a new “actuality”. The ethic and order of reason, which corresponds to the Decalogue and to the Natural Law, is the “potentiality” through which the “act” of grace and “Habitus” of the supernatural virtues created by it is alone rightly formed and directed. Catholic civilization is based on the relative Natural Law of the fallen State moulded by the ethic of grace. Thus this ethic, so long as it speaks of the instinctive reason and the social order created by Natural Law, can bear a character which emphasizes as far as possible public spirit, love and freedom ; nevertheless, at the same time it is entirely rational and intra-mundane, and, entirely in the manner of Aristotle and the Arabian philosophers, it makes spiritual and physical happiness the object of morality, and its central point of organization ; then, however, this whole ethic of Natural Law is incorporated into an organism which imposes upon it the realization of the absolute religious end, as a means and assumption—which are only justified if everywhere they are used with references to the service of the absolute end.

I do not know whether readers will echo Von Hügel's words of praise after reading this passage. No one can doubt that it is a serious attempt to pick out the component parts of the mediaeval scheme of life. But I feel that Troeltsch is like the unfortunate man who, having received a parcel and untied it, finds when he tries to make it up again that the result looks deplorably clumsy. The Christian who is still trying to live on the same scheme of life is startled to find that he is part Stoic, part Neo-Platonist and Aristotelian, and that he has been trying to walk on a double track, a pagan and a Christian, a natural and a supernatural. He is no doubt

a little too complacent at times and inclined to shut his eyes to real difficulties, and Troeltsch does a useful work in showing some of the strands of the complicated mediaeval outlook. I should like to discuss what I believe to be the real problem with which Troeltsch somewhat mistakenly and in rather a heavy-handed way deals; but before doing so a few minor criticisms are in place, and it will be well to summarize his second volume. In the passage quoted Troeltsch stresses the note of miracle, and it would seem that he regards it with distaste, as though it contrasted in some way with true interior religious life. This distaste leads him astray, for while there is no denying the insistence on the *ex opere operato* effect of the sacraments and the vital necessity of supernature in the doctrine of the Church, he forgets that St. Thomas, for instance, balances the first with his doctrine of the *ex opere operantis* and lays great emphasis on the latter. To confuse, too, supernature with the miraculous is most unfortunate, as it obscures the infinite suggestiveness of sanctifying grace and the necessary part it plays in the union of God with the soul. I doubt, too, whether he is accurate in his use of the terms "potentiality" and "actuality" in the passage I have quoted; he underestimates the influence of Aristotle before St. Thomas and makes a somewhat foolish comparison between the attitude of the Church towards Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century and the rejection of Modernism in the twentieth; and he is certainly wrong in his analysis of asceticism. The movement at times and the language of its devotees give ground for the view that it represented a denial of human values and of all forms of life in the world. But it was never an independent religious idea within the Church hostile to the orthodox and official attitude; nor was it set over against a compromise with the world which the lay life involved. Troeltsch would have it that the Church encouraged two separate vocations, one for bacchants, the other for wand-bearers, a life for saints and a life for sinners or at any rate mediocrities. St. Thomas is quite clear on this point. All are called to perfection, the life of charity, the layman as well as the monk or friar, and the distinction of counsels and com-

mandments refers to means and not to ends. It should be remembered also that for St. Thomas the excellence of the religious vows does not depend upon the rejection of possessions, marriage and personal authority; asceticism is not mere denial, it is an exchange, a sacrifice of what is good in order to have more opportunity, freedom, and time to give to the supernatural end. If Troeltsch had succeeded in appreciating the meaning of the supernatural he would have had to modify what he says about the "miraculous" and the point of view of the ascetic.

The exposition of the chief forms of Protestantism in the second volume appears to one like myself, who am a Catholic, to be better done; indeed, it is difficult to praise the analysis of Lutheranism and Calvinism too highly, and I wish that I had time to gather together the main points. The summary given in a few pages of his final chapter must, however, suffice. He says that there are three types of Christian thought: the Church, the sect, and mysticism. The Gospel did little to shape the Christian religion which succeeded it.

The Gospel of Jesus was a free personal piety, with a strong impulse towards profound intimacy and spiritual fellowship and communion, but without any tendency towards the organization of a cult or towards the creation of a religious community. . . . The Church is an institution which has been endowed with grace and salvation as the result of the work of the Redemption; it is able to receive the masses, and to adjust itself to the world, because to a certain extent it can afford to ignore the need for subjective holiness for the sake of the objective treasures of grace and of redemption. The sect is a voluntary society, composed of strict and definite Christian believers bound to each other by the fact that all have experienced the "new birth". These "believers" live apart from the world, are limited to small groups, emphasize the law instead of grace, and in varying degrees within their own circle set up the Christian order, based on love; all this is done in preparation for and expectation of the coming of the Kingdom of God. Mysticism means that the world of ideas which had hardened into formal worship and doctrine is transformed into a purely personal and inward experience; this leads to the formation of groups on a purely personal basis, with no permanent form, which also tends to weaken the significance of forms of worship, doctrine and the historical element.

These three forms are according to Troeltsch always present. The first alone has power over the masses, whereas mysticism appeals more to the cultured classes. I need not repeat what he has already said about Catholicism.

The theology of Protestantism—with its principle of the Church which spiritualizes public worship and the Sacrament—made the purified doctrine into an intellectual system, which, however, retains its connexion with the sermon in public worship, and with the authoritative basis of grace and doctrine; in consequence it oscillates between a system of ideas which are valid themselves and a group of dogmas based on history and supported by miracles, an uncertainty which has only been increased by the influence of modern science.

As to morality, the Catholic Church, as we have seen, offered a dualist scheme, a compromise between the monastic ideal and the secular life.

When this compromise had been effected, however, within the Church, the average morality of the world and the strict morality of holiness then separated and went their different ways. . . . Ecclesiastical Protestantism destroyed this dualism, and wove both its elements into the ethic of the "calling"; Lutheranism carried this out with a careless acceptance of existing conditions, which are due to the presence of sin in the world; Calvinism and Ascetic Protestantism in an attempt to restore in a rational manner the holy community within the life of the world.

Troeltsch confesses that none of the later movements, neither the Protestant Churches nor the sect nor mysticism, has been permanently successful, and the habit of the two latter to stand aloof from the world has "been sensibly weakened by the tendencies of modern life". The problem to-day, as he sees it, is to reconcile this freedom from the world which is essential in Christianity with participation in its activities and labours; in other words "to supplement this religious onesidedness with an ethic of civilization which can be combined with it". Troeltsch holds that those who like Marx make Christianity nothing more than "an ideological reflection of economic development" are quite mistaken,

but that nevertheless there is a connexion which Christianity cannot safely neglect, and there is no problem more serious than how best to establish this connexion in modern conditions of life. The Christian ethos, despite all its changes in history, has retained always certain characteristics. These Troeltsch enumerates as follows : it alone "possesses in virtue of its personalistic Theism a conviction of personality and individuality, based on metaphysics, which no Naturalism and no Pessimism can disturb". It alone, "through its conception of a Divine Love which embraces all souls and unites them all, possesses a Socialism which cannot be shaken. It is only within the medium of the Divine that the separation and reserve, the strife and exclusiveness which belong to man as a natural product, and which shape his natural existence, disappear." "Thirdly : only the Christian ethos solves the problem of equality and inequality, since it neither glorifies force and accident in the sense of a Nietzschean cult of breed, nor outrages the patent facts of life by a doctrinaire equalitarianism. Fourthly, "Charity, or active helpfulness, is the fruit of the Christian spirit, which alone keeps it alive." "In conclusion : the Christian ethos gives to all social life and aspiration a goal which lies beyond all the relativities of this earthly life, compared with which, indeed, everything else represents merely approximate values." This vision of eternity does not, however, make this world meaningless and empty : "the life beyond this world is, in very deed, the inspiration of the life that now is".

But what form then should Christianity take if it is to be both a supernatural religion and one which rectifies the world and co-operates with it ? Troeltsch answers that

It needs an independent organization, in order to distinguish it from other organizations of a natural kind. . . . Unless it is organized into a community with a settled form of worship, Christianity cannot be either expansive or creative. . . . Secondly, so far as the form of this organization is concerned, it has become evident that the Church-type is obviously superior to the sect-type and to mysticism. The Church-type preserves inviolate the religious elements of grace and redemption ; it makes

it possible to differentiate between Divine grace and human effort; it is able to include the most varied degrees of Christian attainment and maturity; and therefore it alone is capable of fostering a popular religion which inevitably involves a great variety in its membership.

Troeltsch adds, however, that the Church-type also lowers the level of the Christian spirit. He considers Roman Catholicism to be the "pure and logical form of the Church-type", but again, no sooner has he said this than he adds that "to an ever increasing degree it has sacrificed the inwardness, individuality, and plasticity of religion to the fixed determination to make religion objective in doctrine, Sacrament, hierarchy, the Papacy, and Papal Infallibility". Protestantism went in the opposite direction. "Luther based his hopes on the all-converting power of the Spirit and of the Word, a hope which was speedily disappointed, while Calvin sought the support of a stable ecclesiastical constitution with authority to control the authority."

Now for such Church-types to succeed they are forced to rely on some degree of compulsion, and they depend upon the instinctive and common outlook of vast masses of people. But compulsion has become more and more unpractical and undesirable, and the masses no longer have the simple and uniform outlook of the past. Hence "the days of the pure Church-type within our present civilization are numbered" and everywhere there is the decay of it. The Catholic Church to preserve itself "has been forced to exercise an increasingly powerful and external dominion over the consciences of men", while the Protestant Churches have almost merged with the sect and mysticism. This being their state, what powers and capacities have they in face of the modern social conditions? Troeltsch says that they are trying to mobilize afresh for the titanic struggle and that they are relying on their old philosophies.

Now as we have seen, there are only two great main types of social philosophy which have attained comprehensive historical significance and influence. The first is the social philosophy of mediaeval Catholicism which is based on the family, guild, and class, which was able to combine a relative dependence on the

struggle for existence, the establishment of all fellowship upon personal relations of authority and reverence, the relatively simple economic forms and needs of the pre-capitalistic period, the remains of the old solidarities in conditions which involved being bound to the soil or involved in the fortunes of some ancient family, with the Christian Ethos of the personal value of the individual and of the universal fellowship of love within the ecclesiastical organization of life. The second is the social philosophy of Ascetic Protestantism, which developed out of that kind of Calvinism which was tinged with a Free Church, Pietistic outlook, and also out of those ascetic sects which had almost broken with the Churches altogether, which is inwardly related to modern Utilitarianism and Rationalism, with diligence in one's calling and the glorification of work for its own sake, with political democracy and Liberalism. . . .

Neither, however, of these two types are fitted to survive, the first because it belongs to a patriarchal state of society and can only be kept alive by force, the second because the currents it has let loose have been too swift for it and it has been caught up in the bourgeois capitalism which owed so much to it. The future therefore is black, if Troeltsch be right, and his concluding words may help to restore his own faith, but for most of us they are not enlightening.

The truth is—and this is the conclusion of the whole matter—the Kingdom of God is within us. But we must let our light shine before men in confident and untiring labour that they may see our good works and praise our Father in heaven. The final ends of all humanity are hidden within His Hands.

The original of this translation of *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* was first published in 1912, and the conclusions just summarized bear the mark of that period. Since then a revolution in ideas has taken place and there are few who have the same confidence in the doctrine that the "Kingdom of God is within us", that religion is summed up in the word "immanence". The Protestants have a new teacher and sage in Karl Barth, the ranks of the Anglo-Catholics have increased in the Anglican Church, and the social conditions have become such that the word has passed round that there are no

alternatives save Communism or the Catholic Church. Troeltsch's prophecy of the decay of organized religion was premature, for an organized religion is proving to be the one bulwark against rapidly organizing social forces and despotisms. That is the danger of the historical method which Troeltsch uses. Not only is it responsible for the very dubious historical distinctions between Christ and St. Paul and for the ignoring of elements present in early Christianity which are incompatible with the too easy theory of development prevalent in the nineteenth century, but it is prone to subsidize a future which never comes to be. The result is that the historical philosophers prove themselves to be as bad tipsters as the economists of the city or universities and the financiers of the Bank of England. The work of Troeltsch notwithstanding retains its importance, and it is well to have clearly set down the five or six headings under which the special values of the Christian ethos are proposed. Even here, however, it would have been well if he could have realized the truth in the account given of the Christian notion of *agape* by the Swedish scholar Dr. Nygren; that it is distinct from *eros*, man's urge and longing for God, being God's forestalling and unbounded love for men, and that St. Paul does no more than embody that doctrine of Christ in the Redemption, in that "God commendeth his charity [*agape*] towards us, because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us". From such a principle spring the supernatural, the sacraments and an external authority. Troeltsch is too inclined to view all religion as arising from man's heart and ending in him, whereas it is the claim of Christianity that it begins with God and ends with God, and that His charity, like the operation of the Holy Ghost within the Trinity, is the connecting link. Whether the Catholic Church be successful or not in its commerce with the world and society, let us first of all determine whether it be the truth and the final truth of God.

The secondary, though most important, question is the capacity of the Church to co-operate with and save society and the world. I say both society and the world because there is a twofold problem here, the one theoretic-

tical, the other practical, and I can do no more here than suggest the nature of the problems. In the New Testament, in St. John's gospel, the word "world" is used to describe what is opposed to Christ and his kingdom; it would be wrong to identity this with the natural activities of man expressed in society, and yet there is a connexion. This is the fact which comes out in Troeltsch's discussion of the attitude of the early Church and the mediaeval Church to the State and society and natural ethics, though I do not think that his interpretation is right and believe that it would have been better to answer the question on its deserts instead of treating it purely historically in terms of the Stoic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of natural law. The problem has always been to reconcile together man as fallen, man in a supposedly natural state, the decalogue of the chosen people, and the pagan virtues or splendid vices and the Christian code formulated to bring the heirs and co-heirs of Christ to their supernatural destiny. Within the bounds of orthodoxy variant solutions have been given, as the differences of St. Augustine and St. Thomas testify. Theologians generally take the fiction of a natural man as their starting point and from that proceed to the supernatural end as though it were almost an afterthought on the part of God. I cannot leave this fascinating problem without alluding to a suggestion made recently that it might help to a more complete solution if we were to start with what surely was first in intention in God's mind, namely the supernatural end of man, and from that work downwards. At any rate the attempt is well worth while.

The second problem concerns the capacity of the Catholic Church to construct a social policy adapted to modern needs. The principles which must govern and direct all social activity are well known, as they have been expressed by Pope Leo XIII and more recently by the reigning Pontiff. Troeltsch would complain that such principles belong to a simpler and more patriarchal society, and are therefore of no avail in the face of modern discontents. Such a criticism ignores the fact that the principles are the necessary conditions of

any healthy society and are not intended to serve as precepts for any particular type. We must admit, however, that fundamental principles bearing on property and wages and the right to live are exceedingly difficult to apply in a world of banks and shares and companies and machinery and in a society where money not only talks but is productive; and so Troeltsch is so far right when he asserts that there are modern complications undreamt of in mediaeval social theory. The Socialists and the Communists have a definite and enticing programme to present to the working classes; the Church will condemn these because they are wrong in principle; It has condemned the excesses in capitalism as well, though the task here is harder because capitalism starts with principles which are not in themselves wrong. But how to correct the excesses of capitalism and to enunciate a social policy which is both Christian and as clear and enticing as communism, *hoc opus hic labor est*; and it must be done if the reproach which Troeltsch levels against the Catholic Church is to be taken away.

M. C. D'Arcy, S.J.

ART. 3.—AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGY

1. *The Framework of a Christian State.* By the Rev. E. Cahill, S.J. (Gill. 1932.)
2. *Faith and Society.* By Maurice B. Reckitt. (Longmans. 1932.)

IN the March issue of the *Month* of the present year an unnamed writer, reviewing some recent works on sociology, committed himself to the following judgment :

Not that the Church has ever failed in the practical exercise of charity and justice in regard to all human relations, as her multitudinous religious organizations testify, but within the last few generations she has sought, not merely to succour the victims of social disorder, but also to attack the cause that calls for her works of mercy.

That the Church (but certainly not all nor even the majority of Christians) has always shown the greatest regard and sympathy for the victims of bad social conditions is beyond doubt, but that she has never failed in the practical exercise of *justice* in the matter requires as a condition of assent some agreement about the meaning of the words.

At a time when the conditions of life are such that, on the one hand, millions of employed and unemployed are so oppressed that a full religious and human life demands of them as its condition a degree of virtue which in many cases may be said to amount to heroism, and, on the other, millions of the well-to-do are so encompassed by the amoral and economically unsound system through which their property and profits are derived that they have to give up hope of harmonizing their religious and moral life with their social and economic life, at such a time as this there is the greatest danger in any kind of self-complacency, the greatest danger in what Miss G. P. McEntee describes as congratulating one another on "our worthy accomplishments as Catholics irrespective of whether or not we can point to a sufficient number of objective achievements to justify our sanguine

state of mind". (*The Catholic Social Movement in Great Britain*, quoted in Reckitt, op. cit., p. 103.)

The social conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are not only new in themselves, but they present what almost amounts to a new kind of ethical problem. The organization of the economic world has reached such a degree of complexity, and in so doing has impinged at so many points on the other aspects of the life of the individual, that the latter (the only ultimate object of the Church's social concern) is trapped body and, too often, soul as well in a machinery which no one thought out, which no one properly understands, with which no one can do more than tinker. It is a unique phenomenon, and one which might cause many to question the foundation of Christian optimism. That optimism, after all, is based on the belief that the Church possesses the key to the Truth and therefore to the Good Life, but for the first time perhaps in history a technical and secular problem to which the Church as such holds no key has connected itself so intimately with the conditions of the religious and moral life of Christians that the practical applications of the Church's teaching about that moral life appear to share the uncertainty and ignorance about those technical questions. For example, unless we understand the social and economic effect of the accepted attitude to 'interest' or to labour disputes, how is it possible to apply the general principles of justice? While in all aspects of life it is the rightness and wrongness of concrete actions, not general laws, which are of most interest and importance to the individual, this is even more obviously so in the economic aspect, for economics is not an *a priori* system but a working solution to practical problems, a solution obtained for the most part by repeated trial and error. If moral principles are to remain in close contact with these experiments, made, alas, at the expense of the individual, they cannot impose themselves in doctrinaire fashion, they must, so to say, unfold all that is contained within them and let this content shape itself to the form of the economic and social experiment.

Leo XIII in his great encyclicals called the attention

of the faithful to the existence of the moral implications of the modern social problem. He did so at a time when the Western world was drugged with gold and dreaming of a new golden age in which economic and scientific prosperity would as surely blot out the dim, uncertain values of religion and traditional morality as the light of the sun renders insignificant the unsteady flame of the candle. Under the circumstances it was not likely that the world would listen to his call for social justice. But the present generation has lived to see through that particular dream, and an unparalleled opportunity for correcting the moral deficiencies of an economic system whose economic failure is more and more clearly seen to be connected with those deficiencies seems to present itself. At all events our generation, listening to the call of the successor of Leo XIII, has no reason to feel that it is working *contra mundum*. Every man, nowadays, is a would-be reformer. Nevertheless it does not follow from this that the task of the Catholic sociologist has become easier. On the contrary it has become more difficult. To amend and render more equitable an economic system which is or appears to be successful according to its own canons is a practically difficult, but a theoretically easy task; to humanize an economic system which is proved a failure and which no one understands is both practically and theoretically far harder. If a machine does not work at all or works extremely badly, how can one set about the business of guiding it in a more just or useful direction?

It is not therefore to be wondered at, much as it is to be lamented, that in a great industrial country like England the Catholic community should remain almost entirely unaware of the social side of their religion. Catholics are vaguely aware that personal salvation involves something more than their private Sunday souls and God, but the gap between their religion and the social life of the world in which they live for six days of the week is so great that they cannot be expected to make a personal effort to bridge it. Mr. Woolf in his many respects acute analysis of democracy in *After the Deluge* writes:

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One notable result of the conflict [between the communal psychology of democracy and the communal psychology of Christianity] has been a gradual pushing back of religious beliefs into a secluded corner of the ordinary man's mind, disconnected with politics or the affairs of this world and reserved for rare contemplation of his private conduct, metaphysical speculation, and meditation on death. (p. 217.)

Mr. Woolf is thinking of the time when it was generally held that democracy and scientific economics opened up a vista of natural happiness more tangible than the religious promises of supernatural happiness; the danger to-day is rather a sense of hopelessness and even of despair due to the failure of the hopes of natural happiness, the undermining of the general faith in supernatural happiness, and the resignation of Christians to the slowness of any possible Christian leavening of pagan society. The non-Christian has lost his faith and the Christian buries his head in the comforting sand of Christian faith. In this he is wiser than the ostrich, for he knows that he *can* thus be saved, but he is hardly more helpful to the world in general. He is certainly less of a Christian for so doing. No doubt Mr. Woolf falls into the theoretical error that Christians are so occupied with their own souls that they *cannot* care about social happiness, but he is right in thinking that the majority of Catholics in difficult times find refuge in the belief that their religious and moral life begins and ends with the sanctification, or, more often, with the making sure that they fulfil the lowest conditions for the salvation of their souls.

The true Catholic doctrine, the doctrine of St. Paul and of the great Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages, the doctrine that has been too much forgotten during the centuries in which a political and economic world divorced from Christianity has been allowed to shape itself, a doctrine which means nothing to the traditional Protestantism which was the dominant expression of Christianity in "forward" countries during that period, is expressed in magnificent language in the following passage from the writings of the Baron von Hügel:

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We have here, as it were, a great living Cloth of Gold, with, not only the woof going from God to Man and from Man to God, but also the warp going from Man to Man—the greatest to the least and the least back to the greatest. And thus here the primary and full Bride of Christ never is, never can be, any individual soul, but only this complete organism of all faithful souls throughout space and time ; and the single soul is such a bride only in so far as it forms an operative constituent of the larger whole. (*Myst. El. Rel.*, ii, p. 356.)

And the full import of the doctrine is given in the words :

The Church is the born incorporation of this Supernatural Pole, as the State is of the other, the Natural. The Church indeed should at its lowest limit, also encourage the This-World Stage ; the State, at its highest limit, can, more or less consciously, prepare us for the Other-World Stage. Both spring from the same God, at two levels of His action ; both concern the same men at two stages of their need and of their call. (*E. & A.*, 1st Series, p. 96.)

The practical exercise of justice and the practical exercise of charity are very different. In fact it may be hazarded that charity is the expression of the good man's or good society's desire to remedy the shortcomings of justice, shortcomings that are inevitable in a world of conflicting temporal and contingent ends. But though charity in its personal impatience will not wait for impersonal justice, it cannot be a complete substitute for the latter. On the contrary it wants to clothe and personalize justice. But justice is objective, it presupposes knowledge and the application of knowledge to concrete cases, to life which is always a series of details. Can it then be truly said that the Church has exercised practical justice in regard to all human relations so long as an abyss separates both the Church's own knowledge of what is just in principle in the matter of social relations and the abstruse labours of moral theologians on the new problems of casuistry to which the conditions of moral society have given rise from general Catholic literature, from the pulpit, even from the confessional ? In other words, so long as the Christian (and, in its measure, the non-Christian) community has not been educated and

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informed, so long as that community in its turn has not contributed, not merely by vague general maxims, but in the detailed application of the true Christian *ethos*, to the formation of a society, more moral and maybe, less inefficient in its own order, so long as this is so, is not practical justice even more defective than it need be in a world in which both theoretical justice and practical justice must be imperfect? In this matter, as in any other, the Church unfolds in the process of time that which she possesses, and the unfolding can be quicker or slower according to the demands and co-operation of the faithful and the difficulty of the problems. But more dangerous than the slowness of that unfolding is the complacency which is so often met with, the complacency which destroys the incentive to further effort, especially in the case of social problems, which, connected as they are with secular technical questions, demand for their solution more co-operation from the faithful than purely moral or religious questions.

These reflections are prompted to some extent by the contrast between two recent books on Christian sociology, *Faith and Society*, by Mr. Maurice Reckitt, and *The Framework of a Christian State*, by Father Cahill, S.J. We shall have much to say in criticism of this second work, but let it be said once and for all that we do not wish to criticize the work of this particular author so much as the *schema* of traditional Catholic teaching on sociology at the stage at which it passes from the last instructor to the faithful. It is an accident that this particular work comes to hand in very opportune fashion.

Father Cahill's seven hundred pages form a textbook "intended primarily for students of Social Science who accept the Church's teaching", but the greater part of it has already been published in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* and the *Irish Monthly*, so that we may fairly infer that it is an original discussion, pretending to some depth. As we read it, we ask at every page, "How is all this labour going to help either the individual Catholic living in modern society or the teacher or preacher whose

duty it is to instruct and help others?" Father Cahill gives us the framework of the Christian State, but surely the task of Christian social science only really begins with the filling of the frame, the setting out of the principles (even though tentative and experimental) which will guide the men and women who live in the social and economic conditions of *to-day*? Father Cahill only comes to earth in history. That is, for 265 pages he gives us an historical sketch which states, but is far too short adequately to defend, the thesis that the goodness and badness, the justice and injustice, of the world varied in direct proportion to the influence or lack of influence of the Catholic Church. In particular he holds that in the thirteenth century the Christian State as he describes it existed in fact. This *simpliste* reduction of history, even if it were true, would not be very helpful, for, in the discussion of the relation between morals and politics or economics, history will only help when the differences as well as the analogies between the past and the present are borne in mind. For example, while we may allow that in theory at any rate the characteristic of the Middle Ages was the interpenetration of natural or secular society by the supernatural motives and values of Christian ethic, it does not follow that it was this influence which effectively caused the comparative economic health of the Western world. The Christian of the Middle Ages did not gamble in "futures", did not divorce money from the real natural wealth of which money is an expression, gave away his surplus wealth instead of converting it into a perpetual lien on the future produce of the universe. Why? Because he could not help himself. Practically all property was in the shape of land, houses, and the fruits of the earth; the conditions of life made it necessary that property should be largely localized. How could he save profitably, how could he avoid giving away either directly or indirectly a great proportion of the yearly returns which would otherwise perish, how could he fail to condemn usury as robbery, seeing that there was small scope for the real use of surplus money? When, for instance, we try to apply the mediaeval doctrine about usury (a

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doctrine within its own terms most obviously moral and just) to modern conditions we face a host of problems on which the experience of that time throws no light. Yet at the same time we feel that so reasonable and just a doctrine and one which seems at first sight to be entirely neglected in modern economics will guide us in our modern enquiry. We see, for example, that in a world in which all real wealth perishes sooner or later money alone seems to possess the capacity of reproducing itself without effort or expenditure of energy, and it reproduces itself apparently in complete indifference to whether it is expended on productive or unproductive enterprises. Yet on this vital and most fascinating question Father Cahill's space only allows him (according to the full index) some eight pages, of which six deal with the Middle Ages!

In direct contrast with Father Cahill's work is Mr. Reckitt's remarkable essay. Mr. Reckitt is an Anglo-Catholic who, though on the friendliest relations with the Church, is Protestant enough to call Catholics on occasion "Romans". A third of the book is devoted to the history of the Christian Social movement in Great Britain and the United States, but the rest (about three hundred pages) constitutes a real attempt to solve the problem of how to find a point of useful insertion of supernatural and natural morality into the amoral social and economic system. Some of the chapter titles will give the reader an idea of the angle of insertion: "Industrial Civilization and the Challenge of the Faith"; "A World Order"; "Reality of Economics", with sub-headings, "The Factor of Complexity", "The Obsession of Employment", "Motive and Vocation in Industry"; "Freedom and Justice in the Social Order", with sub-headings, "The Universalization of Leisure", "Problems of Interest and Investment", "The Control of Industry". Here indeed are live questions!

Father Cahill is like a golf instructor who takes a player of some experience (for presumably Catholic students already know the elements of Catholic teaching on the Family, Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, the Social Status of Women, the State, the Church) and

spends hour after hour talking about the theory of golf, quoting not too accurately the examples of players dead and gone, bringing in a good many technical terms (legal, distributive, and commutative justice, perfect and imperfect societies) and never allowing the pupil to practise for himself. Mr. Reckitt takes all this for granted, makes him swing a club and drive a ball, experiments with him on that foundation, suggests this and that, and leaves him a wiser man in his ignorance as well in his newly acquired knowledge. Father Cahill's method may work in dogma, it may work as philosophy in seminaries, but it is of little help in instructing and enlightening the averagely intelligent Catholic in the tentative conclusions of that extremely difficult and extremely uncertain subject, Christian social science.

The difficulty of finding a point of insertion for the Catholic *ethos* into secular social science comes from having to avoid two extremes. Both extremes start from an over-simplification of Catholic premises. The Church, we know, has full authority to teach in matters of morals. Social problems, in so far as they are directly related to moral matters, must work out satisfactorily if the Church's teaching is accepted, and if they are not so related they are of secondary importance when the full religious and human life of man is concerned. Therefore one of two courses may be pursued. The Church (and Christians in the degree of their participation) may contribute to the solution of the social problems by changing the heart of the secular world, by converting it to Christianity's moral way. The solution is to make employers and employed, governors and governed, either Christian in fact or Christian-minded in conduct. In practice, then, the Church, instead of bothering directly with the largely technical problems of sociology, should preach the gospel, pray, and have faith in God's providing. This attitude implies usually a certain hostility to the pagan world, a sense of separation. It also tends, at all events as regards the complex secular problems of the world, to impose a formal, subjective ethic: "If you have Faith, all will go well; if you have the right spirit, you need not fear."

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The alternative extreme course is to argue that since the Church has authority to teach morals she must also have within her grasp the real solution to practical social problems in so far as they are related to morals. She can teach the world the world's own business. Whether one accepts the Church's moral teaching or not, it will obviously be for the common good to listen to her suggestions about the social difficulties which weigh on the whole community. If the Church knows the ultimately right way to the good life, as by hypothesis she must, it is cutting off one's nose to spite one's face to refuse to walk in that way merely because one does not like the Church or does not agree with her dogmatic teaching. When the secular world does discover that the Church *was* right in her advice on social problems it will be more ready to enquire into her other credentials, and conversion, instead of preceding the process, will end it. In the first extreme nature and supernature were too sharply distinguished, in this one they are too closely related. In both the stubbornness and complexity of nature are underrated and therefore neglected.

As against the first method, it may be argued that it by no means follows that because a man is a good Christian he will escape committing material social injustice or being the victim of the mistakes of other good Christians. The end of the moral law is not the same as the end of the good State, though the ends may be related and the means to those ends at many points overlap. In the words of the Père de Broglie :

Impossible de contester que par la fin essentiellement collective, temporelle, terrestre, et, à ce titre, profane dont elle étudie la nature et les conditions de conquête, la science politique ne diffère de la morale civique ; et à plus forte raison diffère-t-elle par là de tout le reste de la doctrine chrétienne. (*Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Dec. 1928, p. 571.)

It would be possible for every man to save his soul and for the State to be most unjustly organized, and *vice versa*. None the less, it is clear that the spreading and intensifying of the Christian *ethos* is in itself the greatest

contribution to the social problem, more especially at a time when not only the social morality of the Church but the very foundations of personal morality and religion are being attacked in every quarter. We must admit that the social problem, however important, is secondary to the religious and moral teaching of Christianity. It does not follow that it may be neglected. It springs, or ought to spring, from it.

It is precisely, specifically, the Christian element, the personalistic conception of God, and the optimism in the estimate of the world from which springs the perception that the divine action has an end which comprises and fashions the world, and which assigns to human labour the task of constituting a community of personalities devoted to the sanctification of the ends of this world and to making these ends subserve the full and final end. (From Troeltsch, *Soziallehren*, p. 638 ; quoted by Von Hügel, *E. & A.* 1st Series, p. 160.)

The trouble about the second method is, as we have suggested, that it may be doubted, not only by non-Christians, but by Christians as well, whether the Church has an answer to the social problems of the present day fit to offer to and impose upon the non-Christian community. Why should it have? Economics, finance, industrial organization, technology, are all specialized sciences with specialized ends. These ends are in themselves neither good nor bad. Their moral value only comes into existence when they are fitted into an actual system. That is obvious; what is not so often seen is that nevertheless you cannot make a useful moral judgment about that actual system or some part of it without taking into consideration the knowledge that exists about these technical sciences, still less can you undertake to improve the moral conditions of secular life without understanding a great deal about these sciences whose conclusions bear so heavily on that life. Let us take an example. Practically every intelligent critic agrees that the financial system of the world is seriously defective. It is indeed only too clear that we have not yet discovered how money can properly

serve individuals who are being deprived of the wealth which the world knows how to produce in quantities undreamed of a few years ago. It is equally clear that the consequences of this technical failure have serious moral repercussions. A large portion of the community, have to live in a kind of insecurity and poverty which is far worse than the lot of the poor of Galilee whom our Lord blessed and held up for our example. Many others are practically forced to compete in a catch-as-catch-can scramble for what is going, a scramble as bad for their souls as its effects are unjust to those from whom the catch is taken. If a better financial system could be devised there would be less excuse for some sins and more chance for many to lead a decent and good life. Equally, those who want to improve the moral conditions of the people would probably agree that a sound currency reform would do more to effect this than the teaching of general maxims about the "just price", "living wage", "usury", theoretically important as these subjects are, far more, immediately at all events, than the preaching of the evangelical counsels. There are not wanting many proposals for a radical change in finance, such as those of Mr. Keynes, Major Douglas, Professor Soddy, the Technocrats. Yet practically the whole world of responsible economists and financiers refuses to be tempted by the innovators. What is the Catholic sociologist to do? How will his Christian principles help him to judge between the practicability of the diverse plans of economists? By what authority has the Church the right to pronounce on such technical matters?

In neither of the two courses described above does the Christian sociologist plunge into the unknown. In the first he rests safely in the known territory of formal religious and moral values, hoping that somehow they, the greater, will include economic values, the lesser. In the second he makes a rapid, obvious, *a priori* application of the known to the unknown and, hoping for the best, imposes a superficial solution. There was a time when the material which the Christian *ethos* had to transcend, spiritualize, and unify was comparatively familiar and comparatively easy to understand. Casuistry

was able to make a brave attempt to provide for every sin imaginable, and moral exhortation could cover the whole field of the "*doable*". That time has passed, and until the Christian sociologist does take an experimental plunge into the unknown, risking mistakes and ready to acknowledge them, the Church itself will not be in a position to exercise practical justice to its fullest extent.

In a sense the Protestant is in a better position than the Catholic to make this plunge. He does not feel committed to so much, he speaks with less authority, he speaks more for himself—in a word, responsibility weighs less heavily on him. It is not, then, surprising that Mr. Reckitt, for example, can take more risks than Father Cahill writing a textbook for seminary students. But if it is true that the social problems of the present day are new in the sense that morals are far more closely bound up than ever before with technical questions about which the knowledge of the Church as such is no greater than the knowledge of the secular experts, it follows that Catholic social science, and indeed the application of Christian morals to this most important aspect of the Christian's human life, will only make useful progress if Catholics are willing to make a plunge so distasteful to some Catholic mentalities.

We have not the space to analyse Mr. Reckitt's full and patient discussion. We should have liked in particular to draw attention to the original and suggestive section entitled "The Obsession of 'Employment'". Is it right that in an age of plenty the distribution of the wealth of the world should be made according to work done, that, in fact, work should often be made for man that man may live? The thought leads to a far-reaching reversal of the values that are taken for granted in an economic world inheriting the ideas of an age of scarcity, values which Christianity has not yet examined in a spirit freed from those same ideas.

Let it not be imagined that taking the plunge involves departure from the traditional Christian morality, still less from Christian dogma. On the contrary, Mr. Reckitt, for example, starts from the central dogma of Christianity, the Incarnation :

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The whole effort of the Church and of the Christian in the social sphere is founded upon faith that in the Incarnation God had identified Himself with the fate of His creation. This tremendous conviction cannot remain a merely intellectual tenet, either for the individual or for the Church; it demands, if it is to be in any sufficient sense *believed*, the constant re-kindling of our corporate Christian imagination. And, truly believed, the social consequences are profound.

Thus on the second page of his essay the author finds what is surely the unshakable lighthouse which, if Christianity mean anything at all, will illuminate the difficult journey from the *known*, the end and meaning of man's life, lived, as it is, within the three fundamental societies, the Church, the Family, and the State; through the *less known*, the best organization of these societies in view of the spiritual and temporal good of man, and the resolution of the conflicts between them, conflicts which man's frailty and ignorance render inevitable; to the *unknown*, the moral import of the social and economic problems arising from new material conditions and from centuries of misuse of those conditions by men who are too weak, or too proud, or too ignorant to keep the social meaning of the Incarnation in the forefront of their imagination. Compare Mr. Reckitt's start with that of Father Cahill.

He [the Catholic sociologist] will, of course, utilize experience and induction in social studies. . . . But Catholic sociology rests, to a large extent, upon principles of the natural law, which are as uniform and as unchanging as the essential nature of man himself.

Alas, this natural law which Catholic moralists keep up their sleeve like an ace of trumps turns out so often in the course of the play to be of no more value than the two of a minor suit.* Father Cahill only reaches the Incarnation on page 601, and then only in reference to the authority of the Church.

Perhaps one day a Catholic sociologist will write an

* I do not wish to suggest that the natural law is of no importance. It is the structure of Christian ethic. All I mean is that its complete formulation is the goal, not the datum, of morality.

English work for English conditions (for it must be remembered that one of the special contingencies of sociology is the locality for which it is meant to apply) which will imitate Mr. Reckitt's utilization of the "experience and induction in social studies", damned by Father Cahill with faint praise, and fit conclusions, however tentative, perhaps to be proved one day to be erroneous, into the complete framework of the Christian State in so far as such a State can be presented in terms understandable by and adapted to the modern mind. Fortunately there still exists a large number of people engrossed in the economic activities of an amoral world who believe in the Incarnation; there is a far greater number which still clings to the moral values whose only real *raison d'être* is the fact of the Incarnation. But, as Mr. Reckitt warns us :

It is entirely possible, and we ought to face the fact, that the tendencies of our social and economic life may degenerate rather than improve, and this not necessarily because men individually are actually worse to-day than before, but because we have been travelling for several centuries on the wrong side of the moral watershed in social theory and practice.

We cannot undo the past, but for the Christian there is always hope for the future, because there is faith. But faith is no substitute for works, nor for intelligence, nor for trial. The world has to be bent, and to be bent it must be understood. And, if the world is to be bent, so also must be the Church's moral teaching, not of course in itself, but in its order of application to conditions and situations themselves novel of which the causes and effects are not yet understood.

MICHAEL DE LA BÉDOYÈRE.

ART. 4—BALZAC'S MISERS

SHELLEY, the spiritual child of the French Revolution, denounced a privileged class and a privileged religion. Freedom consisted in getting rid of kings and priests. He never foresaw the plutocrat, the offspring of the middle-class, and the industrial system. He never denounced capitalists, only tyrants.

Balzac began to write *La Comédie Humaine* only a few years after Shelley's death. He said of his work* that he tried to depict life and man, persons, *and the material representation that they give to their thought*. So Shakespeare might have said, but Balzac, wide as his interests are, wider perhaps than those of any other French writer, has not Shakespeare's impersonal attitude towards life. We know very little of Shakespeare's own beliefs, but no one can read far in Balzac without realizing that he considered himself a strong royalist and a pronounced supporter of the Church.† He was the first to realize in all its implications that in the modern world almost everything depends on money. This is the thesis behind the imposing façade of *La Comédie Humaine*. The astonishing variety of his misers, the loving care with which he depicts them, as Fielding depicted clergymen, have an added interest, if we realize that his visualization of the power of money heightened his royalism and strengthened his support of organized Christianity. A study of his misers explains the intellectual basis of his creed, showing it to rest on reason, not on emotion or prejudice. He reveals all the species of the genus miser, the town miser, the country miser, the rich and the poor miser, the one who has genius, and the other who is almost incredibly small-minded. However diverse in character and surroundings, they have one obsession in common, the love of money for its own sake, unlike his other characters, who desire it but as a means to an end.

The usurer Gobseck may be called the miser of genius‡

* In the preface to *La Maison du Chat-qui-pelote*.

† In the introduction to *Sur Catherine de Médicis* and in the conclusion of *Jésus Christ en Flandre*.

‡ Gobseck.

The son of a Jew by a Dutch mother, he sailed for the Far East when ten years old. In the next twenty years he met de Lally, and de Suffren, Lord Cornwallis, and Warren Hastings, Tippoo Sahib and various pirates. He sought for gold in South America, and took part in the American War of Independence. He seldom mentioned his early life, and then seemed to feel he was indiscreet. Possessing millions, and with correspondents all over the globe, he lived in Paris in the cell he hired in the common corridor of a lodging-house which had once been a convent. In his room all was worn, clean, and cold, and in winter his fire smouldered behind a rampart of ashes, but never burst into flame. His face was pale and wan, like silver-gilt; unmoved as Tallyrand, he seemed cast in metal. His hair was ashy grey, carefully combed, and he had yellow eyes with hardly any eyelashes, and black eyebrows. He always wore a shade, beneath which were the pointed nose and thin lips of an alchemist. He spoke in a low, soft voice, and never got excited. He paused when a carriage rumbled past in the street in order not to have to raise his voice, and his life glided silently away like the sand in an hour-glass. His only acquaintances were the notary who did his legal work, and a few moneylenders whom he met at the Café Themis, near the Pont Neuf. Here at night he might be seen through the lighted window with a face like a cameo against the yellow-panelled wall, "surrounded by other faces on which thirty per cent discount seemed written in circular wrinkles around frozen cheek-bones".* He never saw his relatives. "There are no marriages," he said, "in our family." When he had had a successful day he rubbed his hands in a sort of mute joy.

His conversation was almost entirely monosyllabic; "sometimes his victims made much noise, and flew into a passion; *and then followed a great silence, as in a kitchen after the killing of a duck*"; so said his notary, Derville. He did his business errands on foot, unless a client paid for a cab. So afraid was he of being thought rich that when a gold piece fell from his pocket on the common

* *Les Employés.*

staircase, and was picked up by another lodger, he simulated great surprise, and denied it was his.

He lent money to everyone, to the fashionable Comtesse de Restaud in the Rue de Helder, and to Fanny Malvaut, the sempstress in a Montmartre garret.

He had three words in constant use: True, Possibly, and Exactly.

"My debts are not payable before they are due," said Maxime de Trailles. "True." "My bills of exchange will be met." "Possibly." "Can I give you sufficient guarantees for the sum I want to borrow?" "Exactly." The interview ended by the Comtesse de Restaud pawning her diamonds with him for eighty-four thousand francs in order to pay her lover's gambling debts. Gobseck handed her a bank draft for fifty thousand, and, despite Maxime's rage, paid her the balance in her lover's protested bills, which he had bought up for a nominal sum. The departure of the pair was followed by the irruption of the injured husband. "Sir," he cried, "you know my wife." "True." "I have rights over her property." "Possibly." "She has no right to dispose of her diamonds." "Exactly . . . but-I-do-not-know-your diamonds." The Count had to compromise, for he dared not go to law.

Gobseck is the only one of Balzac's misers to have a philosophy of life. It is obvious that here Balzac expressed what he considered to be the philosophic concept behind the miser's apparent misery.

Man is the same everywhere; it is better to exploit than to be exploited, and after the pleasures of the senses are exhausted vanity is the only sentiment left. Vanity can be satisfied with money, whose possession gives a sense of power which fills the miser's heart with joy. "All human passions developed by the play of social forces parade before me," says Gobseck. "I, who live in calm, I replace scientific curiosity, a contest in which man is always beaten, by understanding all the springs of action which move humanity. I possess the world without fatigue, and yet it has no hold over me. . . . Here the fieriest lover prays with clasped hands, the

proudest merchant, the vainest beauty, the fiercest soldier, all entreat me with tears of rage or sorrow in their eyes. Here the greatest artist implores me and the writer whose name will descend to posterity. . . . Do you now believe there are no joys under this pallid mask, whose immobility has so often astonished you ?”

His person and character are shown with such vividness that we should instantly recognize him, if we met him, as we should recognize the originals of Holbein's drawings of the personages of Henry VIII's court. Like them, he has something about him unconquerable and eternal. He is not a miser, so much as an ideal type towards which misers tend to conform. Holbein's personality was greater than those of his sitters, and has passed into their likenesses till it dominates them. So with Gobseck; he is in truth the gigantic phantom of Balzac's imagination drawn with such force and power that he seems a living man. In reality no mortal could have possessed such superhuman control over himself, and over others. He is a creation of the spirit in an envelope of flesh.

Very different are two country misers, “the famous” Monsieur Hochon* (one of Balzac's few important secondary characters whose Christian name is not mentioned), who was the greatest miser in Issadun, and Felix Grandet† who paid more taxes than anyone in Saumur, which was considered in that town “a new title of nobility”. Neither of them, I regret to say, appears in more than one novel. Each of these worthies lived in large old houses, very sparsely furnished, in decaying country towns. Each allowed his wife a single domestic, and measured out food and drink to his household with meticulous care, keeping the bread under lock and key, and doling out a slice a head at meals. Each had reduced his family to a complete state of passive obedience, which in their wives found its only relief in religion. Here all resemblance between them ends.

Hochon we first meet at the age of eighty-five, sound in wind and limb, and convinced that he will outlive his wife, who is years younger. She, unlike Madame Grandet, has a few sparks of spirit left, and occasionally

* In *Un Ménage de Garçon* (*La Rabouilleuse*). † In *Eugénie Grandet*.

reminds him that she can bequeath her fortune, the revenue of which she is never allowed to touch, as she pleases, and so extorts small concessions, though complaining bitterly that she is never allowed twenty francs in her purse. Hochon started life as a tax-collector, but retired shortly before the French Revolution, to the principles of which he adhered, "like all honest people who shout with the successful party". He never took any part in public affairs. Year by year he became more close and careful over trifles. His household were only allowed to eat fruit too damaged to sell. He would pick up a pin in the street and say, "There's the day's work of a woman," and pin it into his cuff. He complained that the quality of modern cloth was so bad that his frock-coat only lasted ten years. He was tall, dry and thin, with a yellow complexion and a sweet voice, speaking little, reading little, and never tiring himself. He was as careful as an Oriental to observe all the forms of social etiquette, and, unlike any other miser drawn by Balzac, was capable of giving sound and disinterested advice, so long as it was kept secret and involved him in no sort of responsibility. Many stories were told in Issadun about his meanness. It was said that while the notary was solemnly reading out the marriage contract of his daughter to the assembled relatives, all dressed in their Sunday best, his cook disturbed the ceremony by asking him for a piece of string to tie up a goose, an invariable dish at wedding feasts. He produced a bit from his frock-coat pocket which he had taken off a parcel, but called after her before she got to the door, "Mind you let me have it back." He refused to pay his deceased daughter's debts on the ground that she was a minor, but he carefully deducted in his accounts as guardian of his grandson the sums he had lent his mother. He did nothing except scrape and save. He seems to have had no friends.

Felix Grandet, or Father Grandet, as his oldest friends called him, had bright yellow eyes, one trait in which he resembles Gobseck. He was a far abler man than Hochon, though not as well educated, having started life as a cooper and married the daughter of a rich wood-mer-

chant. He took long views, and was not afraid of very large transactions, though equally careful of small ones. With his savings and his wife's fortune, aided by judicious bribery, he acquired the best vineyards in the neighbourhood, when the monastery lands were sold as national property, and took in exchange for the wine he furnished to the revolutionary armies of the young Republic the fine meadows which had belonged to the local nunnery. He was considered a patriot, and a red republican, but really his soul was in his vines. He became *maire* of Saumur under the Consulate, but was dismissed by Napoleon. He quitted municipal honours without regret, "having constructed in the interests of the town some excellent roads which led to his own properties". He invested the money his wife inherited so skilfully that at fifty-seven he was by far the richest man in that part of France. Five feet high, squarely built and thick-set, he had hands like shoulders of mutton, and large bony joints. His face was round, and tanned, and pitted by smallpox; his lips showed no curve above his vertical chin. He had white teeth, and his eyes were as calm and expressionless as a snake's. His forehead was marked with bosses, above which his yellow hairs, turning grey, were silver and gold, according to some young people, who did not realize the seriousness of making jokes about him. He had a big nose with a vein at the end, full, it was said, of malice. He cared for no one, except his daughter Eugénie, who was his heiress, but when she dared to show some independence he kept her in her room on bread and water for weeks. He had a character of bronze, but was soft-spoken and easygoing in his manner. He always dressed as in 1791, wearing strong shoes with leather laces and stockings of woollen cloth, thick maroon-coloured knee-breeches with silver buckles, a velvet waistcoat with puce and yellow stripes, a large chestnut-coloured coat with big tails, a black cravat, and a hat like a Quaker. His thick gloves lasted him twenty months, and he always put them down in the same place on the brim of his hat.

He was regarded in Saumur with admiration mingled with terror and respect, but he was a very unpleasant

person to do business with. Four phrases served him, like algebraical formulae, to resolve all the difficulties of life and commerce. "I don't know", "I can't", "I don't want to", and "We will see". Growing older, he adopted two additional expedients. He pretended deafness, holding his great hand to his ear, and getting people to repeat themselves whilst he thought over his reply. The other was more original. Once he had been cheated by a Jew, who got the better of him by stammering so dreadfully that Grandet had to help him out. However, he honoured the only person ever known to have beaten him by imitating and improving on his method. In business he stammered forth such lengthy ambiguities that his hearer out of pity or exasperation would at last furnish him with words and ideas, whilst he left his own intentions in doubt till he knew what was in the other's mind. His character was a mixture of the tiger and the boa-constrictor. He stalked his prey for a long time before leaping on it, and, when he had engulfed his money he, as it were, slept, like a serpent who digests, calm, undisturbed, methodical.

He lent money at high rates of interest on good security, not directly, but through his friends, the local banker, and the local notary, for, unlike most misers, he had some friends. He was delighted when told by the former that Jeremy Bentham had shown money to be a commodity, remarking, "These English sometimes show good sense." He only gave three dinner-parties in the course of his life, but the bourgeois society of Saumur came and played cards at his house on his daughter's birthday. Needless to say, he merely looked on.

His avarice increased with age. The kitchen fire was the only one in the house from 31 March to 30 November. He took to measuring out candles as he did the food. He allowed his daughter a franc a month for small expenses, such as needles and thread, and his wife's pocket money was four or five gold pieces a year from the sale of his wine. He used to borrow most of this back again in small sums.

His old servant Nanon did all the housework, cooked, and washed the linen for sixty francs a year. Many

years previously, when a miserable waif, Grandet had given her a refuge, and she repaid this act of interested kindness with a doglike devotion, whilst he had for her the affection one has for an old watch-dog. His conscience, for he had a sort of conscience, which he usually successfully repressed, sometimes reproached him when he thought of her hard and cheerless life of unbroken toil. He would then exclaim with the horrible pity of a miser, "Poor Nanon," and give her a glass of *cassis*, a liqueur made with currants and brandy, the only luxury in his house. He allowed his wife to die from inability to realize that she was seriously ill. Although somewhat distressed at her death, he felt far more keenly the terrible revelation made to him by his friend the notary, that his daughter could now legally insist on her share of her mother's fortune. "Life is very hard," he murmured; "one meets with much sorrow." He gradually became almost insane on the subject of money. In his last illness he took a childish delight in seeing gold pieces spread out on the table before him. "They keep me warm," he said; and in his death agony he tried to seize, instead of kiss, the gilt crucifix that the priest held to his lips. He is far more horrible than Gobseck, because far more human.

Another type is Jean Baptiste Molineux, who appears in *César Birotteau*. He was a grotesque little house-owner, "who could only exist at Paris, like Iceland moss can only grow in Iceland". He resembled a human plant, the flower being his blue tubular headdress, the stalk trousers green with age, with bulbous roots wrapped in list slippers. He was not very intelligent, believing most things he saw in print. He was a bourgeois friend of order, always in revolt against the Government, which, nevertheless, he always obeyed. He lived in four meanly furnished rooms on the sixth storey of the building he owned in a sort of slum. Here he kept a canary, plants in pots, and cats whose food in saucers covered the floor. His cats supplied his lack of family and relatives, and through living along with them he grew somewhat feline in his manner, making little disagreeable remarks on leaving as a cat will scratch

before it runs away. Even the old woman who looked after his flat could not stand him. He found his pleasure in life in studying the law relating to leases and the letting of apartments, and in the spiny questions that arise out of party-walls, pipes, lighting, and the carrying on of unpleasant trades, etc. This hobby became a mania, for he had neither the ability nor the opportunity to defend the rights of the citizen against oppression, so—as he felt he must fight someone—he became the enemy of his own tenants. He considered them very rude if they passed him on the stairs without speaking. Those who failed to pay rent on the due day were proceeded against on the next with a mechanical exactitude. On no pretext whatsoever would he wait, remarking that any delay involved the loss of interest for which the law provided no remedy. He had one fundamental principle to which he religiously adhered : never to do any repairs. The tenants might undertake them, for which purpose Molineux would lend them money, but, once done, he schemed night and day how to get them out in order to re-let the newly repaired premises at a higher rent. He tried to insist on sufficient furniture to satisfy a distress for rent, which he always wanted paid six months in advance. He, alone of Balzac's misers, went to Mass, but he made up for this weakness by writing long and dull letters to the newspapers, which were never published, denouncing the pretensions of the clergy. To visitors on business—and he had no others—he poured out an endless stream of grievances against his tenants. He was very afraid of being laughed at. His only recreation was to play dominoes at a café (doubtless not for money), and his demands on a debtor became almost reasonable if threatened with the ridicule of the other frequenters.

He is very lifelike, very annoying, and quite happy in a mean and shabby little way. He never reappears.

Very different from all these is Bidault, nicknamed Gignonnet,* who had a convulsive movement in one of his legs. He was an acquaintance of Gobseck's, and, like him, is mentioned frequently by Balzac. On retirement from paper-making he became a bill-discounter and money-

* See *César Birotteau*.

lender in the miserable quarter of Paris where he lived. He gradually in the course of years developed into a banker and a satellite of Nucingen, whose firm, through three fraudulent bankruptcies, had become the richest financial house in Paris. He dwelt on the third floor of a house in the squalor of the Rue de Grenétat, where each window consisted of small, dirty squares of glass, and where all the rooms, save his own, were the homes, as well as the workshops, of miserable and sweated lace-workers and makers of cardboard boxes. All opened on to a fetid staircase covered with filth and rubbish. His ante-room, the door of which he opened himself, was correct and cold, without curtains. In his sanctum beyond, Gigonnet sat before a hearth where, in the midst of a heap of cinders, a log defied the fire. The table was covered with green cardboard boxes containing his accounts; everything was of a monastic rigidity, and the room resembled a well-aired cave. The faded wallpaper had not been renewed for twenty-five years, but upon the mantelpiece were a beautiful lyre-shaped clock and two vases in "bleu de Sèvres" with richly gilt mountings. These had once decorated the boudoir of Marie Antoinette herself, and had been picked up by Gigonnet after the sack of the Tuileries by the mob. On each side of them stood a miserable iron candlestick. This Balzacian touch is very striking, but one may perhaps doubt whether such a creature as Gigonnet would not long ago have sold the relics. His portrait is drawn in *César Birotteau*.

He was a little old man with a greenish complexion, a great red nose, like a drunkard's, and two little piercing vulture-like eyes, with grey hairs under a three-cornered hat, wearing knee-breeches, which hung over their buckles, cotton stockings, large shoes, and a coat of many colours. He resembled a village factotum, sacristan-cum-beadle-cum-gravedigger, and looked like the fantasy of a caricaturist seen in the flesh. He visited and dined with a niece, on Sunday, because there was no business doing on that day. With Gobseck's help and money he carried through a most complicated intrigue, which is described in *Les Employés*, whereby both of

them made large profits, and the incapable but pious husband of his grand-niece, who knitted his cotton stockings, was promoted to be the head of the Government office in which he worked, and decorated with the Legion of Honour. The genius and patience displayed in this shady affair, important as it was to those concerned, are, as often happens in *La Comédie Humaine*, quite disproportionate to the results achieved. Balzac's misers, like many of his more agreeable characters, are endowed with such talents that one is sometimes surprised they did not make a greater success of their lives. One feels no one could have successfully resisted them.

In his office Gigonnet sat with a horrible green cap on his head with a peak to shade his eyes. When he was refusing a request, he would take it off with a Voltairean grimace, exposing his bald, butter-coloured crown. He was absolutely unscrupulous and merciless, and would do anything for money. A rival, to ruin his enemy would, persuade him to borrow money from Gigonnet, or employ the latter to buy up his bills and suddenly present them for payment.* His motto was, "Money always wins." He could never be persuaded by his female relations to leave his sordid and miserable abode. To the end he lived there squeezing money out of unfortunates, as the juice of the grape is squeezed out by the wine-press, surrounded by noise, dirt, and misery, like an octopus in the mud at the bottom of a hole. He is barely sane, and almost incredible.

Other novelists, like Defoe in *Moll Flanders* and Stevenson in *The Wreckers*, have interested or amused their readers with a detailed verisimilitude of income and expenditure. Balzac alone understood that, in the modern world, the power of money is the greatest danger which threatens the social order. He believed an absolute government to be the only one that can deal effectively with the plutocrat, whether usurer, company-promoter, speculator, financier, or banker, who keeps within the letter of the law whilst violating its spirit. "The laws", he says,† "are spider's webs, through which the great pass while the little are caught. . . . Arbitrary

* See *Une Fille d'Eve*.

† In *La Maison Nucingen*.

power saves the people by coming to the help of justice." Hence he wanted to restore monarchical rule, not the sham constitutional monarchy of Louis-Philippe, but the full-blooded autocracy of Louis XIV. He regarded the Roman Church as that monarchy's strongest buttress. "I write",* he says, "in the light of two eternal verities: religion and kingship." Popular election is a good way of getting a law passed, but it fails to represent the ideas of the intelligent minority to which a monarchy is more favourable. He believed in Justice rather than Liberty; he would to-day have been the strongest admirer of Mussolini, but he could not foresee that a dictator has greater powers of direct action than the most absolute monarch.

DAVID FREEMAN.

* In the preface to *La Maison du Chat-qui-pelote*.

ART. 5.—SOME ACCIDENTALS OF THE CHURCH

THERE are certain things in the discipline, uses, or traditions of the Catholic Church to which we in Western Christendom have grown so accustomed that it is difficult for us to imagine them otherwise. Such are the celibacy of the clergy, the use of the Latin language in the Mass and liturgy, and the predominance of Italians in the Church's government. Were it possible it would be interesting to discover how many Catholics in England realise that millions of the faithful receive the Sacraments from married priests and hear Mass in a language other than Latin; though no doubt a greater number are aware that it is for no such very long period, as the Church counts time, that the Italian tradition has been unbroken. It is no part of the purpose of this article to dwell at length on the merits of these three subjects, which I cite as illustrations of the distinction between the essential and accidental, but perhaps a word may be said on two of them before opening on the main theme.

On the Italian matter I will only say that the Lateran Treaty may well prove the beginning of a new epoch with dangers as well as advantages of its own. If on the one hand the present good relations between Church and State endure, and on the other Italy continues to play an assertive and perhaps aggressive part as a Great Power, something like the Avignon position may arise or seem to have arisen. In the difficulties that might then ensue it is easy to foresee that a solution might be sought in the choice of a spiritual ruler from outside not only Italy, but Europe, and it is hard to imagine a finer demonstration of the Catholicity of the Church and her diversified unity than would be afforded by the spectacle of the throne of St. Peter being ascended by a prelate from the Middle West. But this, of course, is a speculative conception.

With regard to the Latin language, the advantages of a uniform medium are obvious, and it is only the wholly illiterate who have any excuse if they fail to follow in their prayer-books the order of the Church for the Holy Sacrifice. Moreover, as regards at least Slav Uniates, the congregation are hardly more likely to understand

the words than Italians do Latin. None the less, it could be wished that outside the Mass the English language could be pressed into the service of the Church in some more effective way than has yet been found. It is surprising to find the hold that the Anglican Church service has upon many whose personal faith one would imagine weak, and it has been long since pointed out how great a support to English Protestantism has been rendered by the beauty of the Authorised Version. Is it impossible to devise some prayer of real literary excellence in which the whole congregation could join after the principal Mass on Sundays? And could not something better be found than the present optional jejune prayers by which funerals are sometimes ended? Many are moved by the beauty of words to whom music makes no appeal, and words will linger longer than sounds in the memories and the hearts of men.

There is one aspect of Latinism to which a short allusion may be forgiven. There are those who, irritated doubtless by the absurdities of what is known as the "Nordic" school, seem to dwell on the merits of Latin culture to an extent that almost suggests that other traditions and conceptions are alien to the true spirit of the Church. This notion is surely in flat contradiction to the essential meaning of the word "Catholic". The Oecumenical body, which on its human side was of Semitic origin and Byzantine expansion, which has absorbed and adapted the wisdom of Greek philosophy no less than the traditions of Roman government, cannot be bound inseparably by the "*genius loci*" of the seat of authority. It was well, no doubt, that Roman spiritual power through the Saxon Church prevailed over Celtic ideas at the Synod of Whitby, but it does not follow that either Celt or Saxon need bow before Latin conceptions as apart from Catholic discipline. If I feel more at home (as in fact I do) in a Slav or Teutonic than in a Latin country, let it not be counted to me for disloyalty, and let us not be reproached if we prefer our traditions of law and politics to those prevailing in the Latin world.

In truth, the Church in the course of her long history has appeared under many masks, to the indifferent

or hostile without and to the faithful within her fold. To the Jewish hierarchy she was an association of heretics and rebels. To the Roman world she was an Oriental sect, suspect because of her Jewish connexions and regarded as one of the channels which poured Eastern corruption into the metropolis of the world, "*quo cuncta atrocia aut pudenda confluunt*". To the barbarian she was the mysterious ally of a powerful but decadent Empire; to the mediaeval tyrant often the sole and hated obstacle in the way of his ambitions; to revolutionaries she has been a prop of civil tyranny; to the ardent nationalist an alien power; and to many a modern scientist the intangible enemy that is indifferent to the merits of his discoveries and the permanent values he would fain ascribe to them. Conversely, to her children, in different times and places she has shown herself as the protector of the poor, the refuge or promoter of learning, the pillar of social order, or the organizer and inspirer of patriotic sentiment. In all these ascriptions, for better for worse, there is some partial or temporary truth or at least a colourable presentment, but in none of them are the essential attributes and end of God's edifice on earth revealed.

I looked lately, after many years, into Newman's *Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans*, first published in 1850. Delivered at a time of strife and tension, they have a directly polemical character, and as in the kindred volume, *The Present Position of Catholics*, I think a vigilant critic may find passages in them in which an argument or illustration is asked to carry more than it can properly bear. The author himself dwells in his preface on the ephemeral nature of the issues with which he deals, yet his readers, after more than eighty years, will find much of universal application, whatever may be the shifting phenomena of the world and of mankind. This is, I think, especially the case with the eighth and ninth lectures, which deal with the true mission of the Church and with the manifestations of popular religion.

The Church's aim, he insists and re-insists, is to save the individual soul, first and last and all the time, and all else is secondary and accidental.

I do not, of course, deny [he says] that the Church does a great deal more than she promises. She fulfils a number of secondary ends and is the means of numberless temporal blessings. I only say that she is not to be measured by such effects, and if you think she is, then I must reckon you with Erastians. . . .

It is one thing to say that prosperity ought to follow religion, another to say that it must follow from it. . . .

There may be particular and most valid reasons in the scheme of Divine Providence, whatever be the legitimate tendency of the Catholic Faith, for its being left from time to time without any striking manifestation of its beneficial action upon the temporal interests of mankind.

And then, changing his theme somewhat, he dwells on some of the outward effects, often repellent to many, of corporate and popular religion when it permeates a mixed mass of varied and peccant humanity.

Now, of course, there is nothing new in what Newman says, he merely expresses and exposes a universal truth in his inimitable way. But his words are none the less worth quoting, because from the common premisses of the Church's Mission very different deductions have been, and are being, and will be drawn. I will not say in this connexion that they are two schools of Catholic writers, but there are certainly two tendencies among them when they dwell on the problems that arise from the consideration of the nature and effects of the Church's Mission.

There was in my youth—and perhaps still is—a certain class of writer who, not content with the truism that temporal interests must be sacrificed when they clash with spiritual necessities, seemed to think it necessary to hug and gloat over their, often imaginary, temporal chains. Oblivious of the epochs of Constantine and Justinian and, *longo intervallo*, of Charlemagne, they wrote as if the poverty and abasement of the faithful were almost an essential mark of the Church. They were constantly drawing a contrast between the flaunting prosperity of the infidel or heretic and the straitened humility of the elect. If reproached with the backwardness of Catholic countries, they seemed lukewarm in denying the assertion or proving exaggeration in cases when it could be done, or in showing how accidental

was the connexion between religion and stagnation. If a case of bad sanitation were alleged against a particular town, they would irrelevantly answer that the inhabitants were virtuous, as if godliness and cleanliness were incompatible alternatives. To this type of mind the civic patriotism of St. Paul is wholly alien. It hardly regards the problems of civic society as of any interest except in so far as may illustrate the evils that flow from neglect of the moral law, or indicate likely occasion for a suitable exhibition of Divine chastisement. Such a temper has presumably always existed throughout the phases of Church history. It runs naturally into Novatianism or perhaps again into Quietism, and it had its counterparts outside the Church. It acts also as a grave handicap and discouragement to the legitimate aspirations of the faithful, and as an excuse and cover for selfish isolation and repulsive sloth.

At the present time, however, there is observable a wholly different tendency. Writers and preachers are invoking the teaching of the Church to cure the temporal evils of humanity. Whether the causes and manifestations of these evils be economic or political, we are asked to look to "Catholic principles" for a remedy. Are they not asking what they have no right to expect? What promise has ever been given of economic infallibility or that prosperity will necessarily follow virtue and temporal chastisement fall on vice? What about the rebuke to those who drew false inferences from the disaster at Siloam? Does not the rain fall equally on the just and unjust, whether in gentle irrigation or destructive flood? Are we to claim for the Church a lead in—for example—finance and problems of currency which we neither expect nor desire in natural science?

Of course I am very far from denying that the precepts of the Church are capable of defence on purely temporal grounds. For example, the veto on the marriage of uncles and nieces is good eugenics. Also the condemnation of Malthusianism appears most strikingly justified at present by the unprecedented manner in which production has outrun consumption. Further, we may say generally that the world would be a vastly simpler

planet if everyone observed the moral law as expounded by the Church. But admitting all this, it is a very large deduction that by searching the teachings of Sts. Albert and Thomas or the latest Roman textbooks of moral theology we can decide whether gold should be the universal medium of exchange or whether silver can be united with it at a fixed ratio.

The kind of writer whom I have in mind is apt to refer to a happy condition when a spirit of unquestioning faith and European brotherhood prevailed under the parental care of Pope and Church, and when the class warfare and economic difficulties which now beset us were as yet unknown. I wonder what dates they would assign to the beginning and end of this Golden Age. It cannot include the period of spiritual decadence which ended with Hildebrand, but does it embrace the time of which St. Bernard wrote his *Hora novissima tempora pessima* or the Pagan reign of Frederic the Second and the time of the licence of the Paris schools? What of the Avignon period or the Anti-Popes, or the social and political evils that followed on the calamity of the Black Death? What of the conditions that led to the Vehmgericht in Germany, to the Jacquerie in France, and to the depopulation of the countryside that followed on the development of the wool trade here?

Undoubtedly there was a unity in Europe, and of that unity the Church was the cement and the Pope the keystone, but the extent of that unity and of the benefits that flowed from it are surely often greatly overstated, and some at least of its causes are ignored. The great slice of Eastern Europe whose faith was of Byzantine inception and connexion had no part in the unity at all. And in the West I would submit that the unity was due not solely to a community of faith but to two circumstances that were accidental to the age. I mean the breakdown of the Civil Power and the practical monopoly of learning in the Church.

In his masterly introductory chapter to the *History of the Vatican Council* Abbot Butler shows how the assertion of temporal power by Hildebrand was acquiesced in because the Papacy was the only authority which

commanded the general respect of Christendom. But he thinks it evident that the strain of universal secular government was beyond the capacity allowed even to the greatest of mortal men. After the disruption of Charlemagne's Empire the Church seemed the only surviving organ of civilization in Western and Central Europe and it became her duty in common charity to grapple with the prodigious material evils of the age, just as in the case of a municipal breakdown in a cathedral city a Bishop may have to organize relief for the sick or starving in times of pestilence or famine. No doubt theologians constructed a theory of a Divine origin for the Pope's temporal authority, but this was never universally accepted, and after centuries of disputation and challenge it was at last definitely repudiated by one of the most militant of pontiffs little more than sixty years ago. In fact the Popes exercised a jurisdiction by consent, and the consent was owing to the patent fact that the Church gave evidence of a persistence in power and vitality for richer for poorer, through persecution or through scandals, which no secular institution could rival. But for all that this jurisdiction was an "accidental" unknown in the ancient period of the Church and unexercised in modern times.

In like manner the survival of learning was due to the reverence felt for the Church and her institutions wherever the population was at least nominally Christian. In the darkest of times before and after the millennium the libraries of the monasteries were usually safe from the marauder. There only, speaking broadly, was education possible, and even when some of the pupils had no intention of becoming clerics they must soon have lost much of what they had learnt when they emerged into the rude atmosphere of an unlettered world. Only churchmen could keep in touch with scholarship and the movements of thought in other countries, and only churchmen found a road for their ambitions by other means than hereditary possessions or the sword. Not by design but by the mere process of events, churchmen became monopolists of letters and formed an intellectual oligarchy that knew little of national bounds. Before languages

had crystallized and in lands where vernacular literature was hardly known, they corresponded in a common medium and on their travels found in the guest-houses of the monasteries safe resting-places and congenial society. But again the unity thus engendered was not of the essence of the Church's Mission, and was destined in time to perish even in countries between which the bond of the faith remained.

In this argument I do not forget the Emperor, but his area of practical jurisdiction was restricted. I imagine people thought little of him in England, and in Scotland, Ireland, and Scandinavia less. The conception, none the less, of a secular head of Christendom whose office was second only in sanctity to the Pope's must have impressed the nations with a sense of community, even though the spiritual and temporal potentates were at violent and constant variance. But here again the theoretical dualism of the government of the world, and the mutual advantages of the theory to the governors, constitute an "accidental" in the Church's history which we may now recall but can hardly realise.

It is often argued or assumed that the disruption of Christendom, as Christendom was understood, say, in the year 1200, was the work of the Reformation, but surely that catastrophe was but the extension of a process that had long been active. The position of the Emperor was never the same after the death of Frederic the Second in 1252; the temporal influence of the Papacy was never the same since the French domination that caused the seizure of Boniface VIII in 1302 and was the prelude to the Avignon period. The monopoly of learning was broken by the development of the universities and the growth of schools of lay jurists well before the movement we know as the Renaissance. The definition of national languages, the growth of national literatures, the development of national laws, were all disruptive factors; while the fifteenth century showed a steady growth of national consciousness and separation through the consolidation of Spain and France and our own forced withdrawal from the Continent. Lastly it would be idle to deny that the admitted scandals of the period gravely impaired

66 Some Accidentals of the Church

the prestige of the Popes, and thereby their unifying power.

This process of disintegration was of course greatly hastened by the Reformation, but it has only culminated in quite recent times. It was a strange illusion indeed that captured the imagination of men in the middle of last century and was most strikingly evident at the time of the Great Exhibition. Perhaps it was not unnatural to suppose that the discoveries of science, the diffusion of knowledge, the growth of communications, would lead to an approach to the brotherhood of man ; but the exact contrary has been the case. Education has intensified diversities, if only by fomenting the revival of dying languages and fanning the embers of historical controversies. Communications have brought men easily together in associations and conferences for the accentuation of racial differences and the embitterment of national antagonisms. The subsequent success of nationalist aspirations has extended the number and narrowed the boundaries of fiscal units. The discoveries of science have multiplied and rendered far more terrible the mechanism of human destruction.

Such is the state of Europe to-day. Just as its latest phase was not caused by religious disunion, so there seems little chance, humanly speaking, that a community in the Faith (or in any belief) will do much for unity. Certainly between individual Catholics it is a great bond of charity, but in large corporate political issues it seems powerless against national or racial forces. To a great degree this is nothing new. In the seventeenth century France fought Spain, and England Holland. Richelieu saved the Protestant cause in Germany and subsidized the Scottish Covenanters against a king who at least wished to show toleration to Catholics. Some decades earlier the whole force of Spanish diplomacy was exerted to prevent the reconciliation of Henry the Fourth of France to the Church. At the present time religion hardly appears to be a force even for the mitigation of temporal hatreds. Do French Catholics love Bavarians better than Prussians ? Would the Germans and Slavs under Italian rule have any more to complain of if they

were Protestants? Is the Polish Government much more sympathetic to the Ruthenian Uniates than to the Ruthenian Orthodox? Would De Valera be better disposed to England if a Catholic king were on the throne?

I well remember the incidents known as the "Wreschen Scandals", when Polish children were whipped and their parents imprisoned for their refusal (of course instigated) to learn their religion through a German catechism. Being on my travels not long after, I obtained an introduction to the arch-persecutor, the Director of Education of the Province of Posen. He was a bearded, spectacled man of a pronounced old-fashioned professorial type. Honest, diligent, a sincere and indeed rigid Catholic, and possessed, I should say, of the imagination of a bullock, he impressed on me a great regard for his character, but also a conviction that any Slav would wish to kill him after an hour's acquaintance. During the same tour I was assured by a German prelate, who seemed by no means of an intolerant disposition, that it was very difficult to get the Polish clergy to take a proper interest in the minority of German Catholic children, while I have been told that in Westphalia the Polish immigrants show the utmost repugnance to the ministrations of German priests. Between the Teuton and the Slav there is a greater gulf fixed than between the Saxon and the Celt, and religion does not bridge it. So is it in some measure everywhere, for better or for worse, where race or nationality are the dividing factors.

I say for better or for worse because this breakdown of religion as a binding factor in international politics does not in practice work wholly for evil. When the expression "the Catholic Powers" meant something real there were obvious reactions in non-Catholic countries. The last acute persecution of Catholics in England, under Charles the Second, though against his will, owed its strength, if I mistake not, less to the calumnies of Oates than to the notion that Catholics and their friends at Court were acting as the agents of French designs. For precisely the converse reasons the position of Huguenots must have been gravely compromised before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Up to our own times the

Christian subjects of the Sultan suffered not so much for their religion as because they were thought the instruments of Russian aggression. Now that the great Powers of the world have ceased to be labelled with names of religion (or, if they are, the label is meaningless), these complications, so terrible sometimes for patriotic religious minorities, no longer arise. I only trust that Signor Mussolini will never attempt to assume the title of Defender of the Faith. Were he to do so with any success or plausibility, the enemies of the Church in France would rejoice and the sufferings of the Croats would be intensified.

I have heard, and I think read, suggestions that the Pope should be asked to pronounce on the moral rights and wrongs of disputes between nations as they arise and should call upon the faithful to support his judgments by political action in their several countries. The idea seems happily as impracticable as it is mischievous. The mere attempt at mediation so nobly conceived by the late Pope was suspected and repudiated alike by Ludendorff and Allied stalwarts. What would the reactions have been had he tried to impose himself as an arbitrator with injunctions to all Catholics to lend sanctions to his decisions? And how could the present Pope have been asked to give judgment (let us say) as to the bombardment of Corfu by the Italian fleet? Great occasions may conceivably arise when a great pronouncement may be worth the risk or may be necessary at any risk; but that the Pope, in the midst of his solicitude for all the Churches, should permanently assume the functions of Geneva and the Hague in a temporal sphere in which no special guidance has been promised him is surely the culmination of fantastic idealism. What was an "accidental" possibility in Hildebrand's time would, if conceivable at all, mean a catastrophic disaster in the modern world.

My argument has taken me over many points, but I trust has kept within relevance to my main object, which is to show that aspects which the Church has worn in the past, policies with which she has been associated and temporal benefits which she has promoted, have been accidental to her mission, and that to expect her to cure

the material ills of humanity is too often to ask for a disappointment. To say she gives her children a capacity for innocent enjoyment in prosperity and for fortitude in adversity is one thing—but to claim that she can always show a way through mundane difficulties and complications is another. Even in matters where right and wrong were immediately involved her action perforce has often been slow—e.g. in the abolition of slavery under the old Empire, or of the "*jus primae noctis*" of later times. It had never been promised her that she could avert war, pestilence, or famine, or social unrest or economic depression or financial disorder, and to expect her to perform what she has never undertaken is to provoke disillusion the spiritual reaction from which may be disastrous. St. Peter was neither economist nor financier; whatever he may have known about the fish-market, he did not even do the catering for the embryo Church, and why should we expect his successors to possess the wisdom of both worlds? Yet there is often apparent in current utterances of Catholics a tendency to suggest that by some latent power in their religion the rough places of the world may be made smooth. With this tendency is often associated another, namely to rail and gibe at the operations of capital, whether in the hands of producers or of lenders. Moreover, the two classes of capitalists—in other words, the manufacturers and financiers—are often confusedly blended in the indictment although their interests are often divergent and sometimes conflicting. In all this there is neither reason nor charity. That there are grave abuses natural to manufacture I would not deny, though in our country it has been a main object of our legislation for nearly three generations to mitigate them—and doubtless there are serious abuses in finance, especially if in some countries the supply of credit is concentrated in a few hands. Be this as it may however, to suppose that they could be replaced any more than policemen by the nominees of theologians is an idle dream. It seems sometimes to be assumed that modern finance is a creation of yesterday; but, to say nothing of the more restricted operations of the Medici, it certainly dates back to the great house of

Fugger, of Augsburg and Antwerp, in the sixteenth century. I do not suppose that at the height of their pride the Rothschilds ever enjoyed such influence as Anton von Fugger, and he used it unsparingly in the Catholic cause. Humanly speaking, he saved the Church in South Germany by his advances to the Emperor when the Lyons bankers failed to raise a loan for the Protestant Leaguers, and by the irony of fate his house was in the end brought low by bad debts from the Kings of Spain. Incidentally, it may be remarked that Sir Thomas Gresham, the father of English finance, learnt his business from the Fuggers' Antwerp branch.

Sir Arthur Salter has shown in his book *Recovery* how complicated are the financial wheels of the world and how lacking they are in any central direction. There are thousands employed in the processes of finance, but each of the practical men understands only his own process, and the theorists alone profess to be able to understand the whole. The result is only too apparent in the slow, clumsy, laborious attempts to re-set the dislocated joints of a suffering world. To my mind the financier of to-day, so far from being an object of execration, is at least as much an object of pity as the rest of his fellow-sufferers. When the great Credit Anstalt fell, though all the resources of the Rothschilds were behind it, and nearly dragged all Germany down, it showed how precarious were the foundations of financial power. So far from being the malevolent secret despots of the world, financiers are, in these times at any rate, just fallible, struggling, and anxious individuals, and at all times I have found in those of them I know a really quite astonishing resemblance to the generality of other men. But, whatever their qualities or defects, they will have to find a way out of the morass without the aid of applied theology, which is no more likely to solve their difficulties than it would problems of chemistry or medicine. It will be an "accident" if the Church can help them.

At this point some critic may well say, "Is there, then, nothing to be done? Are you not reverting to that very attitude of passive isolation which you condemned? Cannot Catholic principles be applied to the relief of a

stricken world?" The answer is, They can be so applied, but not usually by any organized external corporate effort. It is by the individual doing his individual duty according to his own conscience in his own sphere that we must fulfil our task.

One of the best men I ever knew, a priest and school-master, was accustomed to concentrate his spiritual teaching to his pupils very largely on three points: the sacramental life, the virility of continence, and the sanctification of secular activities. I am sure that his doctrine on the last point is applicable beyond the private life of individuals. It is by the percolation of truth and right into every department of life that in these times, so far as the laity can discharge it, the mission of the Church must be made effective. It was once the fashion to dwell in glowing terms on the faith and piety of primitive populations who lived under traditional conditions which must inevitably change under modern communications and contagious fashions. Is it not better to trace the workings of grace in the centres of restless life and godlessness and see how religion will keep the merchant honest, the lawyer straightforward, the soldier tolerant, the politician high-minded, and the workman patient. The fruits of these things can come neither by isolation nor organization, but by the natural action of men and women living up to their convictions while following strenuously their several ways.

Of course there must be organizations, but they should not go beyond the spheres of some definite objective work, e.g. the defence of schools, the correction of mis-statements, the insistence on full civic equality, resistance to immoral propaganda, and the Catholic interests involved must be clear and unambiguous. Scientists, economists, and legislators must be fought when their acts or dogmas conflict with religion or the moral law, but we cannot ourselves, by virtue of our religion, teach science or politics. If we try, we shall be making exactly the converse error to those of whom we justly complain when they try to destroy theology by physics. Let us oppose, e.g., licensed euthanasia as immoral, but do not let us pretend, like the Christian Scientists, that we have

a specific for enabling the sufferer to forget his pain. History is full of misapplied theology, and we have warnings enough lest we add to the instances. The most striking example that I can recall is the theological domination of strategy that occurred at the battle of Dunbar. Here the Scottish forces appear to have been in an impregnable position, but the Ministers of the Kirk insisted that they should go forth in the name of the Lord and destroy the invader in the plain. Poor General Leslie knew better, but the Kirk prevailed, and a decisive victory lay with Cromwell, who was not similarly afflicted by the Independent clergy. No doubt it is difficult to imagine Catholic prelates either able or willing to play a like part at General Headquarters, but none the less it may easily be that *de nobis fabula narrabitur*, whether the scene be a battlefield or a legislative building.

The Church has suffered grievously in certain countries through an accidental association with dynasties, and may suffer also by like association with political parties or with schools of thought. So great is her assimilative power that we are apt to forget that the things assimilated to her current teaching are often not of the essence of her message to the world and may be replaced by rival systems. The Aristotelian philosophy was not accepted as tenable without the bitterest theological opposition, and a synthesis with newer schools may yet be made. Or look at the history of Copernicanism. It was tolerated as a permissible hypothesis long before it became a temporary danger through the aggressive dogmatism of Galileo. There was then created a living menace to the faithful, but neither the consequent reaction to the Ptolemaic system nor its subsequent abandonment were anything but accidentals when set against the deposit of eternal truth. As in philosophy and astronomy, so it may be in politics and economics, and they would indeed "halve the Gospel of God's grace" who would deny the transforming and sanctifying power He has left in things temporal to His Church. *Μέγας ἐν τούτοις Θεός οὐδὲ γηράσκει.*

Nevertheless, to transform and sanctify is not to incorporate. The Church can use, discard, and dispense

with the power and thought of man. On the other hand, man has no right to look to the Church for a path through the jungle of his earthly cares. Perhaps things are not meant to be too easy for us and we are intended to grope our way unaided, save that the Church can keep us unstained by the mud through which our feet must pass. But in finding our road we must surely use all the secondary gifts which God has given us beyond the Faith to the utmost of our several energies and powers. It is not by withdrawal from the world, it is not by mass attack on the world, it is by doing our duty in the world that we can get interest on our talents, whether they be one or ten. May we be able to say of ourselves—and here, once more, I come back to Newman :

*Felices quibus in omni re haec usu venit
 ars sublimior
 Bona amplectendi, non amplectendi mala
 Dubiam ut vitae percurrentibus viam
 Amittat terra id omni quod terram sapit
 Et plus quam proprio vestiatur lumine.**

RANKEILLOUR

* These lines are from the prologue to Newman's expurgated acting edition of the "Phormio" of Terence. I have made a full and inadequate rendering as follows :

"Blest they who can the Highest Art apply
 The good in all to clasp, the ill pass by.
 The earth for them its savour shall resign
 Of all things earthly and for them shall shine,
 As life's dark path they tread, with borrowed gleam divine."

ART. 6.—SOME DIRECTIONS OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT

Et les fruits passeront la promesse des fleurs.—MALHERBE.

IN centenaries, as a rule, it is proper to contemplate with admiration and affection something that happened a hundred years ago. In this year 1933, by common consent allowed to be the "centenary" of the Oxford Movement, it is more interesting and more profitable to reflect upon what has happened in (and to) the Church of England *since* John Keble preached a sermon in 1833.

Briefly, there has been a revival of all forms of Christian activity. Theological studies have revived: the works of Newman, who had received the greater part of his training before he became a Catholic, Pusey, and Liddon—not to mention living persons—bear witness to this. Devotional writing, as evidence of private piety, has been stupendously increased, and an ever-growing public is found for it: the names of Keble and Neale remind us that the quality of this increase has not been low. Preaching has been transformed and revolutionized by the recognition that it is not only an art, but a work of mercy, an apostolic labour. Countless foreign missions have been founded, in which such devoted men as Frank Weston have spent and lost their lives. The "parish" has ceased to be merely the unit of local government, and all over the country, under such pastors as Dolling and Stanton and Marson, has become a "fold". The outward appearance of Anglican public worship has completely changed. Most English Catholics are aware of this, at least, and of some characteristics of this change: even in churches where no candles and crosses are to be seen, it will be found that services are held far more frequently, and conducted with much more reverence, as an indirect result of the Oxford Movement.

These changes and growths are a thing which, I think, has not its parallel in Church history; they are the signs of a change for the better in the spiritual condition of a non-Catholic religious body, taking place some centuries

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after the foundation of that body. The immediate cause of this development is perhaps the presence, labours, and example of Catholics in England ; while the peculiar historical anomalies of the Church of England may have made it unusually susceptible to this sort of "influence". It is not, however, of causes, but of effects that we propose to discourse.

An epitome of the total effect of the Oxford Movement may be found in the vast body of persons (a body much larger than the "Anglo-Catholic party", which it includes) who will be celebrating this year's centenary in Oxford, or in London, or simply in the spirit ; and if we are to perceive and understand the importance and direction of that Movement we need only to analyse the composition of this body.

It is arguable, and has, in fact, been argued,* that the "High-Church" tradition never died within the Church of England, but is to be found continuously from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. Whether or not there was a continuity between, say, Dr. Johnson and Keble (that is about the weakest link), whether the Tractarians worked a resurrection or a rejuvenation, it is certain that the "High Church" of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries derives its quality and savour from infusion in the "Oriel teapot". The term "High Church" has been much abused, and has fallen into some disrepute of late. Nevertheless, it has a splendid history ; and even now it satisfactorily represents something not altogether unworthy of mention. It includes the idea of a loyalty to the Church of England—established and respectable—which (apparently) nothing can cause to waver ; together with a great love of those parts of the liturgy, polity, and tradition of the Church of England which are most obviously free from Calvinistic or ultra-Protestant influence ; and a pronounced disposition to favour certain ancient Catholic forms of public worship which the Prayer-Book neither prescribes nor prohibits. These affections are commonly allied with a personal piety of that special and valuable kind which is perfectly expressed in the "Preces Privatae" of Andrewes. Unfor-

*e.g. by H. F. Mackay in *Saints and Leaders*.

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unately, so much that is admirable seems to be inextricably bound up with things of less worth : human loyalties are exclusive, and love of the good in Anglicanism implies a certain militant insularity—the use of “Italian” as a term of abuse, or the resurrection and predication of Gallican principles, for instance. It is another fault of the “High Church” mind (why, it would be interesting, but take very long, to enquire) to make “Christian” and “Gentleman” convertible terms in morals.

The Oxford Movement, as its name might be held to imply, was intellectual in character from the first. We have said that it gave new birth to Anglican theological studies : the School of Theology in the University of Oxford is one of its fruits. An indirect result of this revival of theology was the birth of English “Modernism”—not the remote speculations of Loisy and his disciples, but the “adventurous” and naturalistic system outlined in all the contemporary best-sellers of the schools. For it is not possible that a man should preserve a “traditional” attitude towards the content of revelation if he sets out to study this with all the critical, scientific, historical, and philosophical “discoveries” of the nineteenth century thronging his mind and no ecclesiastical magisterium worth the name in sight. Modernism is certainly very far from anything the initiators of the Oxford Movement intended or desired ; it is, none the less, an inevitable and legitimate consequence of that Movement.

Until very recently, education at one of the great Universities was the normal preparation for the clerical state in the Church of England. It was therefore clear that the Oxford Movement, once established in the place of its origin, would of necessity affect the Church of England in all its parts.* “Anglo-Catholicism” is the word which has been coined to describe what happened when the Oxford Movement reached the parishes, through the agency of sometime undergraduates, subsequently ordained and beneficed. The fifth “Anglo-Catholic Congress” is being held this year, to commemorate the

*Clear both as a hope and as a danger. How many young men were “warned off” the Tractarians before they came up, and with how little success !

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Centenary of the Oxford Movement ; its members are numbered by scores of thousands, and come from all parts of England, as well as from North and South America, Canada, Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand, Polynesia, Korea. . . . It is estimated that one third of the Anglican community is "Anglo-Catholic" in sympathy. This important development of the Oxford Movement is in the first place a religion of enthusiasm. It comprises within itself such activities as the following : arduous theological studies, in which Catholic authors are freely used ; ascetic effort of great intensity, guided by the principles of Catholic ascetics, which have been appropriated *en bloc* ; zealous apostolic labours, over a great field ; excellent social works, such as the transformation of slums into dwelling-places, the care of orphans, primary education, "rescue and prevention" ; a serious programme for the restoration of beauty and order to Church services in which the fullest use is made of what may be called "Catholic aesthetics", and a liturgical ideal pursued which owes almost everything to Catholic uses. Such exalted aims, and so successful a history, are perhaps some excuse for one of the faults of "Anglo-Catholicism", namely an overweening confidence in its own mission and power ; the mergers, the progressive centralization of the "headquarters staff", the modern methods of advertisement, and other features of the organization of "Anglo-Catholicism, are out of tune with the selfless zeal of many of the believers, and betray, perhaps, some influence here of "Americanism". Again, whereas all his up-bringing and environment conspires to persuade the Anglo-Catholic that the Church of England *is* (a part of) the Catholic Church, he is apt to meet with some competition in the course of his good works from those who think otherwise ; and from this there springs a certain formless jealousy, an almost unconscious antagonism, in his attitude towards the Catholic Church. No one who really knows Anglo-Catholicism would, I think, care to maintain that there is no such "jealousy".

In spite of its affinities with the insular High Church, the Oxford Movement was early seen (by some of its supporters as well as by its antagonists) to have a "Rome-

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ward" tendency: an observation which is confirmed by the fact of so many converts brought, in the last hundred years, along the Oxford road to Rome. But a side-track has recently been opened, and is much patronized: a new thing in the Church of England, called "Romanism", for want of better. The definition of this system is "a firm and deliberate purpose—often rendered abortive to some extent by material ignorance or invincible moral constraint—to believe all that the Catholic Church teaches, and to obey all her commandments (save one), and walk in all her ways, without scruple as to the consistency of this with Anglican professions". For instance, there is a considerable and growing number of Anglican clergy who daily recite the Divine Office, and perform all sacerdotal functions, in strict accordance with the local "Ordo", and without regard to any non-Catholic authority. For another instance, there is a numerous section of the laity which takes Communion in one kind only.

Such seem to be the main lines of filiation, through which the present-day "children" of the Oxford Movement may trace their descent. While many actual persons approximate more or less closely to the definitions suggested above, it is not to be thought that these definitions are of "classes of men". It is possible that no "High Churchman", Modernist, Anglo-Catholic, or "Romanist" exists in the absolutely pure state. These four branches, or divisions, are abstractions for the purpose of analysis, and nothing more; and as such, as families or categories, the first three are, I think, broadly familiar to most English Catholics. But the fourth, Anglican Romanism, is an unfamiliar, novel thing, concerning which there is much ignorance and much misunderstanding even among those who make it their business to be informed about the Church of England. If we are not to overlook it altogether—and that would be a great pity—we must investigate it with some attention.

Let us consider the development and position of the hypothetical "pure" Romanist. He has learnt to love first the ceremonial, and afterwards the ritual, of Catholic worship; he has surmised, sought, explored, and

possessed (so far as he may) the whole structure and organization of Catholic life, both interior and exterior; perhaps he has made considerable progress in the study of Catholic doctrine—which he accepts in advance as true. The curve ought to continue, but in this case it does not: this man does not become a Catholic. Why? Sometimes it is a matter of time only. Sometimes there are “personal reasons”.* More often progress is arrested by that “fear of being different” which must always be operative where conversion is in prospect, and derives much more force to-day from the existence of a Romanist party as an alternative to conversion. In Newman’s time he would have been as “different”, remaining in the Church of England after 1845, as joining the Catholic Church, but now he might perhaps pass unnoticed and without censure among scores of clergy who appear to be in the same case as he was then. The process of conversion has, in this way, become more arduous and painful in proportion as the tolerance of the Church of England is wider stretched. That is the chief reason why Anglican Romanists exist. Of course their position is illogical and inconsistent; but we may try to understand it. Are they insincere, either in their Romanism or in their Anglicanism? Some would say yes; but not those who know them best, or personally. No, they are not insincere, but mistaken, and mistaken precisely in this point, that they do not admit the schism of the Church of England.† They admit the separation, but on historical‡ and other grounds claim that this separation is insufficient to destroy the Catholicity of the Church of England—that it is a sort of “venial schism”.§ That is the root of their position. They are not easily driven from it by strict dilemmas; for instance, they see in their *de facto* “Romanism” an equivalent of that

*cf. L. J. Walker, S.J.: “Anglia Quaerens Fidem”, in *Gregorianum* (1922), iii, pp. 352-3.

†There are many Anglicans for whom this appears to be the only capital error. It is not an articulate school, but evidence of its existence and extent is occasionally found, v.g. K. D. Mackenzie, *The Confusion of the Churches*, 1925, p. 211.

‡cf. S. Jones, *Rome and Reunion*, 1904, p. 38.

§An exercise of “private judgment”, in the worst sense—pure Protestantism—but the Anglican claim to Catholicity is as old as the Church of England, and “sucé avec le lait” by her children.

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"subesse Romano pontifici" which they admit to be necessary for salvation. The "signs" (consensus of Catholic theologians, uniform practice of the Church in receiving converts from the Church of England, existence of a distinct Catholic hierarchy in England) will, presumably, only become evident to them by the Grace of God.

We have by now seen something of the Oxford Movement, of its directions and its force ; what is its destination, since nothing moves but to rest elsewhere ? In the first place it would seem that the High Church is in a condition of stable equilibrium : it is as true a derivative of the Elizabethan settlement as is Evangelicalism—it has none of that inner contrariety which makes for growth, alteration, and death. Left to itself, it might remain indefinitely unchanged and self-consistent, the most respectable thing in the Church of England. It was an established system long before the Oxford Movement began, which is perhaps the reason why, alone among the consequences of that Movement, it enjoys this quality of stability.

With Modernism and Anglo-Catholicism the case is quite different. However widely diverse in origin and nature these two things may be, they are strangely interwoven—not as ways of thought, but as party principles : it is fair to discuss them together. Hardly one of the "Anglo-Catholic" leaders is altogether free from all traces of modernism, and half the more important "modernists" have Anglo-Catholic sympathies. In the same way, German nationalism and Zionism have little in common, yet there are many German Jews. Evidence of this personal connexion between the opposed principles of Anglo-Catholicism and modernism is easy to collect : "the Protestant underworld" is a phrase coined by one who would probably call himself a "modernist", and the foremost Anglo-Catholic journal approves the methods, if not all the conclusions, of the modernist theologians. Now we have seen that Anglo-Catholicism involves a certain jealousy or antagonism towards the Catholic Church ; and, on the other hand, modernism in religion is based upon a repudiation of all those principles of authority which are implied in Catholic doctrine. From

the alliance of modernism with Anglo-Catholicism, then, there results a mutual reinforcement of two different kinds of opposition to the Catholic Church, so that modernist Anglo-Catholics may be heard to declare that Catholicism involves "atrophy of the intellect", "spiritual suicide", and so forth. Nevertheless, it is not considered incompatible with a profession of Anglo-Catholicism to entertain some velleities of "reunion with Rome": but these propositions are normally formed in a spirit of "take and give", and imply a fundamental unreality.

A more serious and consistent tendency of Anglo-Catholicism is towards some form of union with the Eastern Churches—a tendency with which anti-Romanism is perfectly compatible, and which it may even further.* In the last thirteen years considerable progress has been made towards a "rapprochement" between the Church of England and the Eastern Churches. As far as circumstances allow, the "Whole Orthodox Church" may be said to have recognized the validity of Anglican Orders; numerous "economies" have been granted which may lead towards intercommunion; and hopes are entertained of more definite conclusions being reached in a future "pro-Synod of the Whole Orthodox Church".† Beside all this, the "episcopal" organization of the Church of England, together with the anti-papalism of Anglo-Catholics and modernists, have made possible certain projects of alliance between the Church of England and such bodies as the Lutheran Hochkirche, the Old Catholics, the Swedish Church, and the Moravian Unitas Fratrum. In 1925 Anglican ordinations were formally admitted to be valid by the Old Catholics;‡ matters are less far advanced elsewhere, but progress has been made. Modernism and Anglo-Catholicism, the "*bloc central*" of the children of the Oxford Movement, have been making to themselves friends.

The principles which govern these various alliances are somewhat fluid, but it would seem that there are

*This is not mere speculation; v. J. A. Douglas, *The Validity of Anglican Ordinations*, 1930, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

†v. Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. xxxiii; and G. K. A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, 1st series, 1924, pp. 52-100.

‡Bell, *op. cit.*, 2nd series, 1930, pp. 64-7.

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definite limits. In spite of recent developments in South India we may surmise that Episcopacy, and the fact that Anglican theology is predominantly Lutheran rather than Calvinist, will render abortive all overtures from the Church of England towards Anglo-Saxon Nonconformity.* This being so, we might look forward to an apotheosis, in the indefinite future, of "Döllingerism", in which English, German, Dutch, and Scandinavian Reformed Churches would participate, and the "Orthodox" East would assist with vague approval. Such a development would not, so far as can be foreseen, materially further the cause of Catholic Unity.

All this speculation presupposes the unimportance of "Anglican Romanism": for those Anglicans who accept so far as they possibly can without being Catholics the whole corpus of Catholic faith and practice would not easily submit to the implication of the Church of England in any such anti-papal entente. It is possible, though humanly unlikely, that Anglican Romanism will disappear in the near future, owing to the conversion of all the Romanists. If this does not happen, what will become of it? The question might seem to be otiose, because of the present numerical unimportance of its supporters; but it is probable that Romanism will continue to increase in the Church of England. Suppose a great log to be floating in a river, and to catch in some obstacle. The course of the stream is retarded, and the channel begins to silt up; thus the stoppage is increased, and may become almost complete; a dam is formed, and the stream widens into a lake. The stream is here the procession of converts from the Church of England, and the channel is the inherent "Romanism" of the Oxford Movement: the log, or obstruction, is the incipient "Romanist" party in the Church of England. The fear of being different, which may have contributed formerly to the conversion of such Anglicans as had come to accept any considerable portion of Catholic doctrine, is now found to work the other way, and we may look forward to a great development of "Anglican Romanism" without a corresponding

* Such seems to be the burden of Nonconformist opinion on the subject: v. Bell, *op. cit.*, 1st series, pp. 106-113, and 2nd series, pp. 102-115.

increase in the number of converts from Anglicanism. What, then, is the future of Anglican Romanism?

The Romanists themselves hope and pray for what is called "Corporate Reunion": indeed, such hopes and prayers are an integral part of this "Romanism". By "corporate reunion" is meant something like the formation of an English Uniate Church, such as was adumbrated in the "Conversations at Malines", and inspired the compilers of a recent "Manifesto": a form of union with the Holy See which would not involve the abrogation of local rites, customs, and traditions.*

At present, no doubt, Anglican Romanism has no *locus standi* from which to ask for any such arrangement; the desire for it emanates solely from one section of the Church of England, comprising, perhaps, no more than five per cent. of the whole body, and almost entirely without authority in the councils of Anglicanism. Nevertheless, "Romanism" is certainly the product of the Oxford Movement of which it is most profitable to ask, "What is its future?" There is a dynamism and a fluidity in this system which is lacking even in Anglo-Catholicism, still more in Modernism and the High Church. If such bodies as the "Confraternity of Unity" continue to grow in numbers and influence during the next fifty years as they have grown in the past ten or fifteen, then the question of the "future" of Anglican Romanism will become not only interesting, but very important, for it may involve the whole future of that perplexing body, the Church of England. At present it would appear that the alliance of the Church of England with the Old Catholics, for example, or even with the Eastern Churches, deserved more attention than any possibility of the return of Anglicanism as a whole to Catholic unity. But while, on the negative side, innumerable questions of organization, and still more of doctrine, have to be resolved before the Church of England can be finally committed to any definite plan

*It should be said, in the interests of truth, that there is some artificiality in these proposals. Those Anglicans who put them forward are, for the most part, perfectly willing to forgo all insularity, but they wish and claim to speak for the High Church party and for Anglo-Catholicism, which are not so willing.

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of non-Catholic "union", there is also (and this is what the present article is intended to convey) a real positive possibility of such a development within the Church of England as may give her an entirely new orientation, and direct her back towards that true centre of unity from which she has been separated for so long.

NIGEL ABERCROMBIE.

IT is one of the paradoxes of life that the most unlikely people find something to admire in one another. We should at the first blush hardly expect to find any approximations between Cardinal Newman and the poet Swinburne. Indeed, Sir Edmund Gosse, in the *Letters of Algernon Charles Swinburne*, has published a letter from Swinburne to himself that reveals how nettled the poet was by a criticism made by Newman, also in a private letter, on the "ethical quality" pervading his poems; so nettled, in fact, that he gave vent to a number of remarks in the most execrable taste, as a relief to his wounded feelings.* However, this spasm of irritation clouded only for a moment the permanent sentiment of admiration felt by the poet for the priest—an admiration that he voiced exquisitely in his poem entitled "Two Leaders",† although some of his expressions are open to retort:

O great and wise, clear-souled and high of heart,
One the last flower of Catholic love, that grows
Amid bare thorns their only thornless rose,
From the fierce juggling of the priests' loud mart
Yet alien, yet unspotted and apart
From the blind hard foul rout whose shameless shows
Mock the sweet heaven whose secret no man knows
With prayers and curses and the soothsayer's art.

Here it is not Newman the writer but Newman the man whom he enthrones as the object of his veneration.

But elsewhere it is Newman the writer whom he holds in esteem. His judgment on Newman in this capacity cannot be summarily dismissed, since, putting it at its lowest, it is the judgment of a poet on a poet, a judgment which he did not hesitate to proclaim, and according to Shenstone every poet conceals a critic. "I converted Watts," he wrote to his mother in 1882, "who did not

* i. 258-60. The passage from Newman's letter that annoyed Swinburne is given in a note on p. 258.

† *Poems and Ballads*, Second Series.

know his verses in the *Lyra Apostolica*, to enthusiastic belief in the Cardinal as a poet, not long since, by repeating a stanza or two from memory.”* Eight years later, in a long letter to his sister elicited by Newman’s death, after a thoroughly perverse estimate of the dead Cardinal’s religious philosophy, he remarked: “I hope I have not bored you by all this improvisation about the man whom all the papers are writing about, but who, at all events, *must* live as a poet by grace of two splendid little poems in the *Lyra Apostolica* (which you—and others—gave me so many years ago).”†

What these “two splendid little poems” were, it would be interesting to discover, but perhaps idle to conjecture. We may presume that *Lead, Kindly Light* was not one of the two. It does not exhibit the qualities that Swinburne selected for praise in some of Newman’s poetry. “The force, the fervour, the terse energy of Cardinal Newman’s verse at its best,” he observed in an article on Wordsworth and Byron in 1884, “add to the sincerity and simplicity of an apparently spontaneous expression that vivid and masculine plenitude of life which ceases to distinguish the style of Wordsworth whenever—to use a somewhat more than familiar phrase—he drops into theology”.‡ Moreover, he found a “genuine lyric note” in the *Zeal of Jehu*, as also in “some graver and less impulsive, though not less ardent strain of rhymed or rhymeless iambics—as here and there in the *Dream of Gerontius*. He does not single *Lead, Kindly Light* out for mention, it should be observed; and from his silence we may reasonably conclude that he did not rank it with Newman’s verse “at its best”.

And yet, by a curious irony, Newman’s name for the world at large lives by grace of this lyric which, set to music, has become one of the best-known and most popular hymns in the English language. And further, by another curious irony, the author himself laboured under no illusion

* *The Boyhood of Algernon Charles Swinburns*, p. 99. The reference is to G. F. Watts, the painter.

† *ibid.*, p. 102.

‡ *The Nineteenth Century*, April and May, 1884.

about the impropriety of using his poem as a hymn. Indeed, he went out of his way to declare that, since it could not be regarded as more than the translation into language of a subjective and transient mood, it was not a hymn nor suitable for public worship ; and consequently, true to his principles, he would not have it included in the Oratory Hymn Book ; and although he afterwards inserted it in *Verses on Religious Subjects*, he put it not among the hymns, but in the section to which he gave the quaint title of *Sentiments*. None the less, in spite of the author's own opinion on the matter, his poem has been time and again, more often perhaps than any other poem in the English language, set to music for the purpose of public worship ; it is to be found in all the authoritative collections of hymns adopted by the various religious bodies ; and indeed, whenever and wherever men meet for common worship, whatever their creed, they seem to find in Newman's poignant words the appropriate expression of the human desire for supernatural guidance. This popularity, however, its author maintained, it had won not on its merit as poetry. "You see," he once remarked to a visitor, "it is not the hymn, but the tune that has gained the popularity. The tune is Dykes', and Dr. Dykes was a great master."

It is difficult, perhaps even impossible, when once we have become familiar with a poem sung as a hymn, to divorce the poem from its musical accompaniment, and to appraise it on purely literary grounds. Of his own works Newman was a severe critic ; he found authorship an exacting pursuit, and he seems never to have completely satisfied himself ; he wrote, tore up what he had written, and wrote again. He could not even let his work alone when it had been issued from the press ; successive editions bear their witness to the minute precision with which he scrutinized the text. It is therefore significant that in *Lead, Kindly Light*, apart from the punctuation, the spelling of a single word and the substitution of a capital for a small letter in two instances, he made no changes ; as it first appeared in *Lyra Apostolica*, so it appeared in *Verses on Various Occasions*, published more than thirty years later. He altered the

title : *Light in the Darkness* in the *Lyra* became *Grace of Congruity* in *Verses on Religious Subjects*, and *The Pillar of the Cloud* in *Verses on Various Occasions* ; but as far as the words go, it is identically the same poem all the way through without an alteration. That fact may be taken to imply that Newman was, if not entirely satisfied with it, at least unable to improve upon what he had originally written. But the question remains, What judgment are we to form of it, not as a hymn which we have heard sung, but as a poem which we have heard read, or read ourselves ?

Competent critics, to whose judgment we must defer, have praised the poem as a poem. For example, Professor Saintsbury, lately taken from our midst. In his opinion, only those who would make the same denial in the case of the *Dies Irae* could deny that it is poetry, and great poetry ;* and in his opinion again, elsewhere expressed, it can challenge comparison with any piece of sacred verse, Christina Rossetti always excepted, "for really poetical decoction and concoction of religious ideas".† In this judgment, be it noted, there is a reservation, a reservation by no means to be ignored. The comparison is not with any piece of verse, but with any piece of sacred verse, which is a very different matter. Religious poetry, instead of soaring in the heights, tends to grovel along the flats. The emotion which it seeks to express baffles the resources of language, which is, after all, but a human invention ; and the poet's halting words when he enters upon themes so exalted fail to do more than to reflect in an imperfect medium what he feels, and attempts to utter. Wordsworth said of Goethe's poetry that it was "not inevitable enough", and thereby presented literary criticism with a phrase of which critics have made lavish use. Hackneyed though it be, the phrase is in place here ; since the religious poet falls short just because his emotion and his expression of it do not attain to such a unity, do not achieve such a fusion, that the expression must be regarded as "inevitable", the one perfect and final mode of expressing what is to be expressed. So

* *Cambridge History of English Literature*, xii. 170

† *Nineteenth Century Literature*, p. 687.

Lead, Kindly Light, though belonging to the highest order of religious poetry, does not reach the perfection which poetry, in the hands of the great Masters, does exhibit. A recent critic, who maintains the apparently paradoxical thesis that Newman was a poet who did not write poetry, is not far from the truth when he says, "*Lead, Kindly Light* is poetry, and, of its kind, very beautiful and touching poetry. It is poetry in the same order as Tennyson's *Crossing the Bar* and, in that order, a more beautiful poem than Tennyson's." *

But critics point to two blemishes, and allege that they detract seriously from the beauty of the poem. They claim that the imagery is confused, and that the meaning of the last two lines is obscure.

To the first criticism, we may say *transeat* for what it is worth. In the first stanza the poet prays that the "Light in the Darkness" may guide his steps, and in the last he looks forward to the coming of the morning; and yet in the second he confesses that he once loved "the garish day". The confusion does not amount to very much; and it could easily have been avoided by the substitution of another word for "day". But yet any change seems to be a change for the worse.

The second criticism introduces us to an old and well-worn story. In 1879 Dr. Greenhill, once a pupil under Dr. Arnold at Rugby, and afterwards a churchwarden at St. Mary's under Newman, although unaffected by the Movement, wrote to Newman for an explanation of the last two lines. Newman's reply to his request is given in Miss Mozley's *Letters and Correspondence*.† It is a polite refusal. This he grounds on an answer made by Keble in similar circumstances, that poets were not bound to be critics or to give a sense to their own words. A lyric was the expression of a transient state of mind; and as that had passed half a century before, there was nothing more to be said. To the rough draft of his letter which he kept, he appended a note to the effect that he had discussed the matter forty years ago "with our dear friend Charles Marriott". His reticence is inexplicable.

* *Cardinal Newman*, by J. Lewis May, p. 238.

† ii. 477.

Probably it was no more than an old man's whim. Certainly it cannot be held to support the view, put forward by unsympathetic critics, that he did not know what he meant. If there was a mystery, a letter to his mother a few months before, written as he was passing Ithaca, gives the clue :

I thought of Ham, and of all the various glimpses which memory barely retains, and which fly from me when I pursue them, of that earliest time of life when one seems almost to realize the remnants of a pre-existing state.

At Ham was his early home, a house with the name of "Grey Court", and of it he used to dream, as a schoolboy, "as if it were Paradise", to his young imagination a paradise peopled with angels. The angels appear in the *Apologia* :

I thought life might be a dream, I an Angel, and all this world a deception, my fellow-angels by a playful device concealing themselves from me, and deceiving me with the semblance of a material world.

So it all seems to come back to this: that he hoped, "with the morn", to recapture anew the sense of the supreme reality of the unseen world once possessed, but then lost.

But how lost, and when? In Newman's case what was "the garish day"? An unpublished paper reveals how he conceived of it in 1869.

Another thought has come on me [he then wrote], that I have had three great illnesses in my life, and how have they turned out. The first, keen, terrible one, when I was a boy of fifteen, and it made me a Christian—with experiences before and after, awful and known only to God. My second, not painful, but tedious and shattering, was that which I had in 1827 when I was one of the examining masters, and it, too, broke me off from an incipient liberalism, and determined my religious course. The third was in 1833, when I was in Sicily, before the commencement of the Oxford Movement. . . . I cannot but repeat the words which I think I used in a memorandum book of 1820, that among

the ordinary mass of men no one has sinned so much, no one has been so mercifully treated, as I have ; no one has such cause for humiliation, such cause for thanksgiving.

This passage must be read as the confession of one whose mind was especially sensitive to the deformity of sin. The concrete fact is that in the atmosphere of Oriel he had begun to prefer intellectual excellence to moral, and to drift in the direction of the theological liberalism that prevailed there. Pulled up short by illness, and forced by the pressure of events to realize the necessity of the time, he came to understand that he was being called by Providence to play his part in the drama of history. "We have a work to do in England," he said of Froude and himself to Dr. Wiseman in Rome ; "I have a work to do in England," he repeated to his servant during his illness in Sicily. But what that work was to be, he could not yet foresee. The future remained cloaked in uncertainty.

When Newman left England for a voyage in the Mediterranean in December 1832, the liberal cause was at the flood ; his experiences abroad revealed to him that at any moment the deluge might sweep away the fabric of society. *Lead, Kindly Light* has been called one of the birth-pangs of the Oxford Movement, the object of which, at its inception, was to maintain the established order of things. In Newman's hands poetry was a political weapon. Before he and Froude set out, they were proposing "to systematize a poetry department" for the *British Magazine*. The enforced leisure on board ship gave them the opportunity to translate the intention into act ; and so the *Lyra Apostolica* rapidly came into being. Newman, having parted company with Froude and his father, proceeded to Sicily by himself. Delayed there by illness, and afterwards through want of a ship, but all the time aching to get home, at last he left Palermo for Marseilles in an orange-boat on June 13, 1833 ; and three days later, on June 16, when the ship lay becalmed in the Straits of Bonifacio, he wrote "in the sun off Sardinia" the words that still echo through the years. Whither God was leading him, he did not know ; but

that God was leading him, he was convinced. Three weeks afterwards, on Tuesday, July 9, at seven o'clock in the evening, so precise are the details given in his Diary, he arrived at Oxford, "tanned with his exposure to the southern sun". On the following Sunday, July 14, Keble preached the Assize Sermon at St. Mary's on National Apostasy, and that day Newman always kept as the birthday of the Movement.

Lead, Kindly Light first appeared in print in the *British Magazine* for February 1834, and almost three years afterwards it was included in the little volume of verse collected from that magazine and published under the title of *Lyra Apostolica*. When Isaac Williams, himself a contributor, first saw the poem, he attributed it to Keble, because it was unlike Newman, "more subdued and touching", but suspected that, if it were really his, it was written while he was returning home ill.* He also relates that Newman induced Samuel Wilberforce to review the volume "as one who would do it in a popular manner".† The review appeared in the January number of the *British Critic* for 1837. The reviewer selected *Lead, Kindly Light* for mention as an "exquisite poem", but as to Newman's poems in general, after observing that they were marked by a peculiar grandeur of thought, by high poetic powers, by a certain severity of feeling, and by a remarkable truthfulness of view, proceeded to comment upon their metrical inharmoniousness, even harshness, due in his opinion to haste or carelessness, their involved constructions, and their occasional obscurity. J. B. Mozley, writing to his brother before the review came out, reported that Newman was "considerably amused" with Wilberforce's "cut at him" in insinuating that his "hidden sympathies [had] not been awakened by domestic life".‡ Isaac Williams, however, writing some years later, expressed the opinion that he was "much annoyed with the reflections of the review on himself", and quite without reason suggested this as the explanation of his abandonment of the writing of poetry.§ But with all respect for Williams' memory,

* *Autobiography*, pp. 58-9.

‡ *Letters*, p. 63.

† *ibid.*, p. 68.

§ *Autobiography*, p. 68.

we should not forget that Newman, who never regarded his poetical efforts very seriously, was quite as conscious as Wilberforce ever was of his demerits as a poet, and that when they had served his immediate purpose he desisted from them. The *Lyra Apostolica*, intended to be "an effective quasi-political engine",* was composed on "a theory, one of the extreme theories of the incipient Movement, that it was not right *agere poetam*, but merely *ecclesiasticum agere*; that the one thing called for was to bring out an idea; that the harsher the better, like wearing sackcloth, if only it would serve as an evidence that [he] was not making an *ἀγώνισμα*."† This same point Newman, in a letter to Faber in 1850, claimed that he had brought out at the very time when he was writing verse :

In the *Lyra* my object was *not* poetry, but to bring out *ideas*. Thus my harshness, as you justly call it, was part (if nothing else) of a theory. I felt it absurd to set up for a poet—so I wrote from Rome, where I was, to Keble‡ to tell him we (Froude and I) wished merely to inflict and fix sentiments into men's minds. All mine are written with this view, and I think this only—and I affected a contempt of everything else.§

It is curious to observe that *Lead, Kindly Light* contains echoes of other poems. The following comparison shows those that have been detected.

Lead, Kindly Light, amid the
 encircling gloom,
 Lead Thou me on !
The night is dark, and I am
 far from home—
 Lead Thou me on !
Keep Thou my feet ; I do
 not ask to see
The distant scene—one step
 enough for me.

HENRY VAUGHAN, *Joy of my Life*.

Stars are of mighty use, the
 night
 Is dark and long ;
The road foul ; and where
 one goes right,
 Six may go wrong.
One twinkling ray,
Shot o'er some cloud,
May clear much way,
And guide a crowd.

* *Letters and Correspondence*, i, 281.

† Ward's *Newman*, ii, 204.

‡ There is a letter to this effect in *Letters and Correspondence*, i, 365-6, but written to Rogers, not to Keble.

§ Ward's *Newman*, i, 225.

I was not ever thus, nor
 pray'd that Thou
 Shouldst lead me on.
 I loved to choose and see my
 path, but now
 Lead Thou me on !
 I loved the garish day, and
 spite of fears,
 Pride ruled my will : remember
 not past years.

So long Thy power hath blest
 me, sure it still
 Will lead me on,
 O'er moor and fen, o'er crag
 and torrent, till
 The night is gone ;
 And with the morn those angel
 faces smile
 Which I have loved long since
 and lost awhile.

DRYDEN. *But, gracious God.*

My thoughtless youth was
 winged with vain desires,
 My manhood, long misled by
 wandering fires,
 Follow'd false lights ; and,
 when their glimpse was done,
 My guide struck out new
 sparkles of her own.

HENRY VAUGHAN, *Joy of my life.*

God's saints are shining lights ;
 who stays
 Here long must pass
 O'er dark hills, swift streams,
 and steep ways
 As smooth as glass.

CRASHAW, *Hymn to St. Teresa.*

Angels, thy old friends, there
 shall greet thee,
 Glad at their old home now to
 meet thee.

CHARLES WESLEY, *Come, O Thou Traveller unknown*

I hear Thy whisper in my heart
 The morning breaks, the shadows flee,
 Pure universal Love Thou art.

Newman was familiar with Dryden ; he may have known Charles Wesley's hymns ; but it is extremely unlikely that he had then read Vaughan or Crashaw. So we must regard these echoes, except perhaps that of Dryden, as purely fortuitous, and not due even to unconscious reminiscence.

Many musicians have tried their skill at *Lead, Kindly Light* ; but of all the musical settings, that composed by John Bacchus Dykes is the one most indissolubly associated with Newman's words. In contrast with the picturesque circumstances in which the words were written—the orange-boat, the bright calm of the Mediterranean—the origin of the tune seems paradoxically

prosaic. A generation had passed since the poem had appeared in the *British Magazine*; about twenty years since the Oxford Movement had reached its climax in the going out of '45; the Achilles of the Movement had long vanished from the scene, and lived almost forgotten, except by the few who clung to the heroic memories of their youth; and then suddenly an unprovoked attack had summoned him into the controversial field, and his triumph had "brought him out", to use his own expression, before the eyes of his countrymen. In the summer of 1864 his name was on all men's lips. Not unnaturally Dr. Dykes' mind dwelt upon what had been the general topic of conversation. One day in August 1865, as he was walking along the Strand, the tune that bears the name of *Lux Benigna* came of itself into his head. From London he proceeded to Leeds, and there on August 29, as he records in his Diary, he began to write it out. Like many other hymn-tunes of his, it achieved great popularity in its day; and even now, although musical taste has changed, it retains much of its former popularity. Newman heard it once, and apparently only once. That was in April 1886, when it was played over to him, though not on the organ; and as one who was present remarked, "he seemed rather surprised at its very quiet hymn-like quality".

But for his "lines", as he called them in his humility, he never had any fondness. They crystallized a passing mood, begotten in the depression of illness by the ominous uncertainty of the future; and when life had, for him, been strained of its uncertainties, they awoke no responsive echo in his heart—he had attained the truth and his path lay clear. In April 1889, when death could not be far off, and at times seemed imminent, he remarked: "Father Faber wrote the hymn called *The Eternal Years*. I have always had the greatest affection for it, quite a passionate affection for it, in connection with Father Faber, and I always used to think that when I came to die I should like to have it sung to me." So in the evening a harmonium was brought to the door of his room; Father Neville knelt at his side and first recited the hymn verse by verse; and then two members of the

community sang it to him, accompanying themselves on the harmonium and 'cello. When they had finished, he observed: "Some people have liked my *Lead, Kindly Light*, and it is the voice of one in darkness asking for help from our Lord. But this is quite different; this is one with full light, rejoicing in suffering with our Lord. Thus that of mine compares unfavourably with it. This is what those who like *Lead, Kindly Light* have got to come to; they have to learn it." Then it was sung over again to him, and he thanked them: "Thank you, with all my heart. God bless you. I pray that when you go to heaven, you may hear the angels sing with the genius with which God has endowed them. God bless you."

But Faber's *Eternal Years*, unimpeachable though its sentiment may be, hardly rises above the flats of religious verse; nor has it, as so many of his hymns, won for itself any measure of popular favour. On the other hand, in the opinion of James Anthony Froude, *Lead, Kindly Light* was already in 1881 the most popular hymn in the English language; and that because "all of us, Catholic, Protestant, or such as can see their way to no positive creed at all, can here meet on common ground and join in a common prayer". Mr. Birrell, writing many years later, says much the same, but says it more effectively:

Lead, Kindly Light has forced its way into every hymnbook and heart. Those who go, and those who do not go, to church, the fervent believer and the tired-out sceptic, here meet on common ground. The language of the verses in their intense sincerity seems to reduce all human feelings, whether fed on dogmas or holy rites or on man's own sad heart, to a common denominator.

The night is dark, and I am far from home,
Lead Thou me on.

The believer can often say no more. The unbeliever will never willingly say less.

HENRY TRISTRAM.

ART. 8.—THE BILL FOR ABOLISHING THE POPE

"IT may seem rash", wrote Maitland as long ago as 1903, "to suppose that about these two famous statutes"—Supremacy and Uniformity—"of the first year of Elizabeth, anything remains to be said." Yet at the very time he was demonstrating that it was not so rash as might have been supposed, he read in this review "with pleasure" an article on the same subject in which Father Pollen had also something original to say.* Indeed the work that these two scholars accomplished thirty years ago was so far from being exhaustive that historians, Catholic and non-Catholic, are still found faltering over some of the devious manœuvres by which these two important laws were passed. Many of the problems involved are no doubt insoluble; but some, it is hoped, may still repay a further review of the evidence.

What, for instance, of the intermediate form of the Supremacy Bill, passed by both Houses in Holy Week 1559 as a "Bill for abolishing the Bishop of Rome"? Why the proclamation, issued the same day? And why, when the Bill itself was at last and with difficulty passed, did the Government instantly drop it as though it were hot?

As an example of how historians still differ on the matter, take first the account given by Professor Pollard, our leading modern authority on the period. Speaking of this Supremacy Bill (or Bill for abolishing the Pope), when after being mangled by the Lords it returned to the Lower House "to be reformed", he says:

It was reformed by the incorporation in it of the substance of the bill hurried through the commons of March 17-18. [i.e. that no one should be punished for using the second Prayer Book of Edward VI] and of something more. For not only did the revised bill, which passed its three readings on March 20-22, legalize the Prayer Book of 1552; but it revived the act of uniformity prohibiting any other service; and probably it deprived the queen of any option in the matter of her title. On the day that the bill left the commons, the Wednesday before Easter, it was read three times by the lords, who had obviously been impressed by the

* *Dublin Review*, Jan. 1903.

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temper of the lower house ; the ten spiritual peers repeated their vote against it, but they stood alone. A proclamation was drawn up on the same day, in which Elizabeth stated that in the "present last session" of parliament she had made a statute reviving the 1552 act of uniformity, but that its length prevented it from being printed before Easter ; she therefore by the advice of sundry of her nobility and commons "lately" assembled in parliament declared Edward's act to be in force. The English people were to have their Easter communion in both kinds.*

So much for Professor Pollard : and now for Mr. Belloc in his *History of England* :

Parliament had remodelled the Supremacy Bill in a conservative direction, suitable to the understanding that the Queen personally leant towards that side. The form of the new law was already drawn up. Had it passed [i.e. presumably, received the royal assent] the celebration of Easter, 1559 (the critical date), would have seen the *first* Prayer Book of Edward VI restored.†

Surely there is some discrepancy here. Professor Pollard never breathes a word about the contemplated restoration of the more conservative *first* prayer book of Edward VI. According to him it was the *second* and more Protestant prayer book that passed both houses during Holy Week and was subsequently enforced by proclamation. According to Mr. Belloc it was the first, and not till after Easter and the sham "Westminster Conference" was the prayer book of 1552 trotted out to become law by the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity. Admittedly the bill which passed in Holy Week has no practical importance, for it was afterwards dropped. But why ? And was it, after all, the first or the second of Edward's prayer books that it was attempting to enforce—or neither ?

It will make the matter clearer if we recapitulate the steps that had been taken already. The Bill of Supremacy in its original form—"Bill No. 1", as Maitland calls it—had been introduced into the House of Commons on Feb. 9. On Feb. 13 it was read a second time and on the 15th "committed". After that no more is

* *Political History of England* (1547-1603) p. 203.

† *History of England*, iv, 292.

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heard of it ; but the next day the precursor of the Act of Uniformity "A Bill for Common Prayer and administering the Sacraments" made its appearance in the Commons. What Common Prayer did it enjoin ? We know that Cecil had arranged for an unofficial committee of "divines", his own particular cronies, to meet and consider a new liturgy at Sir Thomas Smith's house in Cannon Row. Doctors Proctor and Frere* imagine it was this draft service book that was propounded to Parliament by the Bill for Common Prayer, but its history is obscure and they admit it may have been "strangled by Cecil at its birth". (A fascinating picture that of Mr. Secretary regarding with horror the liturgical child he had begotten—and then incontinently *strangling* it !) At all events if it was *not* this draft service book that the bill recommended, it was probably some such variant of the 1552 prayer book as that which was to receive parliamentary sanction later. It may be, indeed, that the alterations in Edward's second prayer book, recommended by Cecil's select committee, were so slight that it was unnecessary to submit any new draft prayer book to Parliament. In the absence of evidence to the contrary it seems simplest to assume that the recommendations of the Cannon Row Committee, the Common Prayer enjoined by the Bill of Feb. 16 and the final Book imposed by the Act of Uniformity were substantially identical. Be that as it may, the "Bill for Common Prayer" disappeared for good after its first reading, and we are no longer concerned with it.

Stage two. "It had apparently occurred to someone", writes Professor Pollard, "that the best way to get the Book of Common Prayer through the House of Lords was to tack it on to the royal supremacy." And so we have introduced into the Commons on the 21st a "new" (and composite) Supremacy Bill, or as it was sometimes called—"A Bill for abolishing the Bishop of Rome". This it that we are concerned with here.

The terms of the bill can only be gleaned indirectly, but it evidently restored to the sovereign the title of Supreme Head of the Church, authorized a Protestant

* *New History of the Book of Common Prayer*, p. 99.

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service book—probably the same as that we have been discussing—imposed pains and penalties and permitted the marriage of priests. It reached its third reading on the 25th, though not without some pressure from above. A majority in the Lower House was in sympathy with the Government's general aims (what Lower House under the Tudors was not ?), but it seems to have lacked docility about details. So at least one gathers from the account given by the Spanish Ambassador (de Feria) of its third reading when Secretary Cecil could only get it passed by "throwing the matter into a garboyle" !* Passed by the Commons—in a "garboyle"—the bill appeared in the Lords on the 28th.

Then comes a significant pause of nearly a fortnight. It so happened that on this very day Convocation (which was sitting simultaneously with Parliament) so far from supporting the Government's ecclesiastical aims, gave its adhesion to a series of Articles (in which it was supported by both Universities) that amounted to an open challenge. They consisted of an affirmation of the doctrines of Transubstantiation, the Sacrifice of the Mass and the Supremacy of the Pope. Embodied in the form of a petition, the articles were presented by the Bishop of London to Lord Keeper Bacon (Cecil's brother-in-law and tool) "who received them," says Strype, "but gave no answer". The Church of England having pronounced so unequivocally for Rome, there was clearly no hope of its corporately accepting the royal supremacy as it had done under Henry VIII, no disguising the completeness of the breach that was contemplated with the past, and no pretending that the acceptance of the proposed legislation could mean anything but the establishment of a completely new Church. It was a conclusion that the more ardent and genuine reformers were willing and anxious to accept; but for Cecil, appreciating as he did the weight of popular opinion against him and still hoping to achieve at least the semblance of an inclusive national settlement, the drastic

* *Que el Secretario Sixel se metiese la cosa en garbullo, y asi paso.* Kervyn de Lettenhove; *Relations Politiques des Pays Bas et de l'Angleterre*, i, 444. De Feria's despatch of Feb. 26.

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action of Convocation was something that might well make him hesitate.

Another circumstance that at this moment counselled delay was the difficulty that was being experienced in coming to an understanding with France. The three English peace commissioners were still negotiating at Cateau Cambrésis, where they found the French not only reluctant to restore Calais, but disposed to maintain that if it were given back at all it should be restored to England's rightful ruler, Mary Queen of Scots. They had even been at pains to approach the Papacy with a view to getting Elizabeth's title condemned, but in this they had been unsuccessful. Cecil had consistently avoided all relations with the Papal court, even to the extent of making no formal announcement of Elizabeth's accession. But in spite of this pointed discourtesy, Sir Edward Carne, the English representative at Rome, reported to the Queen that "his Holiness hath such respect to your Majesty that he will attempt nothing against your realms". Such unexpected forbearance was embarrassing, in that it removed any political pretext there might have been for reviving the royal supremacy; but at least it facilitated the negotiations for the peace. Philip of Spain could also be relied on. Though his own interests were amply safeguarded by the terms the French were offering, he showed no intention of deserting his ally in the matter of Calais. Reasonably, before continuing the war, he wanted to be assured that England was capable of some military effort on her own behalf. Actually, as everyone knew, she was not. Even so, had it not been for the new religious policy that was being thrust upon her, Philip would have taken it upon him to recover Calais for England, at whatever cost to himself. But the patriotism of Elizabeth's government was less sensitive about Calais than Mary's had been, and it was finally determined to make that ancient possession a virtual sacrifice to the new religion. On Feb. 19 Cecil drafted instructions to the Commissioners at Cateau that in the last resort they should abandon the claim to Calais. More than a week passed without any news being received, and on the 28th (the day the Supremacy

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Bill came first before the Lords) another urgent despatch was sent off. Rumours were afloat of a separate understanding between Spain and the French; it was imperative that Philip should be kept sound and until something definite was heard the religious project would have to be shelved. Finally, on March 13, news arrived of the signing of the preliminary draft of the peace.

The same day the Supremacy Bill made its second appearance in the Lords. It was referred to a committee representative of both parties, which, after due deliberation expunged all reference to a change of doctrine or form of worship, and while retaining the abolition of the Pope's jurisdiction made only optional the Sovereign's title of Supreme Head of the Church.

In this form it was again debated on the 18th and again opposed by the bishops. Heath, the Archbishop of York, attacked the abolition of the Pope's supremacy as causing a breach with the rest of Christendom. "By leaping out of Peter's ship," he proclaimed, "we hazard ourselves to be overwhelmed and drowned in the waters of schism, sects and divisions." Scot of Chester pressed home the contention by pointing to the four and thirty warring sects that already divided Europe, and reminded his hearers that the very men who had brought about the schism under Henry VIII had since had occasion to regret it. But the Lords Temporal—even those who refused to abolish the Mass—were unwilling to oppose Royalty on the mere question of Supremacy. Consequently the bill was passed by 32 votes to 12, but in such a mangled state it was little better than useless. It was back again in the Commons of the 20th, the Monday in Holy Week: "bill for supremacy from the Lords to be reformed", runs the entry in the journals. It was "reformed" by the addition of "a proviso" which passed its three readings by the 22nd (whether with or without "garboyles" we are not told) and on that same day, Wednesday, all three readings in the Lords!

Normally that should have ended it. The Bill for abolishing the Bishop of Rome might have received the royal assent and Parliament been dissolved before Easter, but contrary to all expectations it was announced on

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Good Friday that Parliament would continue to sit after Easter. When it resumed its sittings the Commons were taken aback by being asked to consider yet another Supremacy Bill, wherein the title of Supreme Head was modified to that of Supreme Governor, and a separate Uniformity Bill to enforce the modified version of the Prayer Book of 1552. It was these two bills which eventually passed and received the royal assent, whereas the unfortunate Bill for Abolishing the Bishop of Rome, though it passed both Houses, was never again mentioned.

We have set ourselves three questions :

What precise stage was reached during Holy Week—that is by the Wednesday ?

What was the object of the proclamation of March 22nd ?

Why was the bill, once passed, allowed to drop ?

(1). We know, with some degree of certainty, that the Supremacy Bill, by the time the Lords had finished with it on March 18, contained nothing much more than the abolition of the Pope's authority in England, whilst giving Elizabeth what Maitland calls "an embarrassing option of saying whether she was Supreme Head or not". But what was the proviso, tacked on by the Commons afterwards, which passed its three readings in the Lords on March 22—the Wednesday in Holy Week ? According to Professor Pollard, in the passage we have quoted above, it not only legalized the Prayer Book of 1552, but revived the Act of Uniformity prohibiting any other service. On the other hand Father Pollen was of the opinion that the amendments of the Commons were "presumably not very extensive or far-reaching".

Here is a serious discrepancy, and I think the probabilities favour Father Pollen. Admittedly the Lords would have nothing to do with the Protestant Prayer Book submitted to them originally as a schedule to this Supremacy Bill, and in committee they definitely rejected it. When the (probably) identical book was submitted to them again after Easter as a schedule to the final Uniformity Bill it passed only by the narrowest margin, and that

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merely because two of the bishops had been imprisoned by the Government and so were prevented from voting. And yet Professor Pollard asks us to believe that the very same proposal, when put before them on the Wednesday in Holy Week, floated through its three readings without opposition. Why? Because, forsooth, they "had obviously been impressed by the temper of the lower house"! No, this will hardly do. That the solid phalanx of "Popish bishops" and the little group of temporal peers that put up such a staunch defence of the Mass against the Bill of Uniformity should have so cowered on this particular occasion before the "temper of the lower house", is more than we can bring ourselves to believe. It is one of those historical statements that don't ring true.

And what of the evidence of the proclamation?

During this interval [writes the Mantuan envoy, Il Schifanoja, of the interval of the Easter recess] they had ordered and printed a proclamation for everyone to take the communion in both kinds. Some other reforms of theirs had also been ordered for publication but subsequently nothing was done, except that on Easter Day her Majesty appeared in chapel, where Mass was sung in English, according to the use of her brother, King Edward, and the communion was received in both hands, kneeling . . . nor did he [the priest] wear anything but the mere surplice, having divested himself of the vestments in which he had sung Mass, and thus her Majesty was followed by many of the lords, both of the Council and others. Since that day things have returned to their former state. . . . Many persons have taken communion in the usual manner and things continue as usual in the churches.*

Now it will be remembered that Professor Pollard's version runs:

A proclamation was drawn up on the same day, in which Elizabeth stated that in the "present last session" of parliament she had made a statute reviving the 1552 act of uniformity, but that its length prevented it from being printed before Easter; she therefore by the advice of sundry of her nobility and commons "lately" assembled in parliament declared Edward's act to be in force.

* Il Schifanoja, in the *Calendar of Venetian State Papers* March 28, 1559:

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And so he concludes magniloquently : "The English people were to have their Easter communion in both kinds."

Let us test this by reference to the proclamation itself :

*Whereas the Queen's Majesty hath in this present last session of parliament . . . made amongst others one statute to repeal sundry acts of parliament made in the time of the late Queen, her Majesty's sister, and to revive and make good certain other necessary and godly laws, used in the time of the reigns of King Henry the Eighth, her Majesty's father, and King Edward the Sixth, her Majesty's brother, of noble memories, amongst the which one godly act that is revived entitled an act against such persons as that unreverently speak against the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, commonly called the Sacrament of the Altar, and for receiving thereof under both kinds, made in a parliament begun at Westminster the 14th day of November in the first year of King Edward the Sixth and continued to the 24th day of December the next following, and because the time of Easter is at hand . . . and for that also the foresaid statute now made in the last parliament being of great length, cannot be printed and published abroad, nor any other manner of divine service for the communion of the said holy Sacrament (than that which is now used in the church) can presently be established by any law, until further time thereof may be had ; For to avoid all contention and discord and to quiet the consciences of such great numbers : it is thought necessary to her Majesty, by the advice of sundry of her nobility and commons lately assembled in parliament, to signify and declare . . . that the foresaid statute made in the said first year of King Edward the Sixth, is now wholly revived and in force, to all manner of purpose and intents, and that the same is and ought to be followed, obeyed and used.**

Not a word, it will be observed, about the Act of Uniformity (and second Prayer Book) of 1552, nor even about that of 1549. On the contrary the act thereby revived is that of the very first parliament of Edward VI, when as a temporary feeler and as a parliamentary ruse, communion in both kinds was introduced under cover of a bill ostensibly to protect the Blessed Sacrament. Now, as then, communion in both kinds was to be given in a separate service after the Mass, precisely as Il Schifanoja describes it done in the Queen's chapel. Certainly the Mass said there was not the Communion Service

* Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth, March 22, 1559.

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of 1552, which no one had ever dreamed of calling the Mass. Personally, and in spite of Schifanoia, I doubt if it was even the "commonly called" Mass of 1549. The rubrics of Edward's first communion service are particularly insistent about communion being given *during* the "Mass". A Mass without communicants cannot strictly have been "according to the use" of Edward VI, and I rather suspect it was nothing else than the Latin Mass without the elevation and with certain parts in English. Such a practice had been already enjoined by a previous proclamation* and had been constantly used in the royal chapel. A foreigner might be excused for confusing it with the "use" of Edward VI.

So far, then, from Professor Pollard's story being true that parliament had revived the second prayer book of Edward VI and that Elizabeth had ordered its use for Easter, all that had been done was that parliament had tacked on to the Supremacy Bill the temporary act of Edward VI, which enjoined the giving of communion in both kinds at a separate service from the Mass.† It was this practice that the Government now made permissive by proclamation and which the Queen observed at Easter in her own chapel.

(2). And why was the proclamation necessary? Clearly as a political expedient. We know that the Government's chief supporters, the comparatively small group of ardent Protestants, were growing restive. There seemed to be far too much parliamentary and diplomatic manœuvring and too little zeal for the true religion. At least they had expected to have their new prayer book and communion in both kinds by Easter, and Cecil had hoped to satisfy them. Then, when time was already getting short, what must the Lords do but throw out all the liturgical changes he had so carefully tacked on to the Bill of Supremacy! Thus Holy Week arrives with nothing done to propitiate the zealots. At this Cecil bethinks him of a "device"—one that he had seen effective at an earlier stage in his career. Why not re-enact Edward's statute for communion in both kinds and get

* Proclamation of Queen Elizabeth, December 27, 1558.

† 1 Edw. VI.

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the Commons to tack it on to the revised Supremacy Bill? Covered as it was by its ostensible purpose, to defend the Blessed Sacrament from profanation, surely at least *that* would get through the Lords. It did, and in a single day. Too late, indeed, to be published as a statute; but what of that? A proclamation would serve the purpose. The proclamation was made and the "English people" or as many as wanted to, "received their Easter communion in both kinds".

In view of the terms of the proclamation, which so obviously suggest the ending of Parliament, Father Pollen was inclined to think that the document was never published. But Il Schifanoia knew all about it, and was particularly circumstantial about the extent to which it was observed. As a matter of practical politics—and that is what weighed with Cecil—it was irrelevant whether Parliament was ending or no. What was most important was to let his faithful extremists have something in black and white to show that the Government were really moving. The proclamation serves this purpose: it secures them their communion in both kinds, and hints at other godly reforms only waiting to be printed and published. After all the proclamation was nothing if not a sop to the zealots. Probably the bill it was based on was little more.

(3). Why else was it allowed to drop? It is, says Maitland an "interesting question why that Supremacy Bill—No. 2 as I call it—which had with great difficulty been forced through all its stages before Easter, was abandoned, so that a new bill had to be introduced". Presumably a question of the royal title, he concludes.

There can, I think, be little doubt that Bill No. 2 declared that Elizabeth was supreme head of the Church of England, though perhaps in its ultimate form, when the lords had amended it, she was given an embarrassing option of saying whether she was supreme head or not. And further there can, I think, be little doubt that at the last moment and when the bill having passed both houses was no longer amendable, she decided (or for the first time published her decision) that she would not assume the irritating title.*

* *English Historical Review*, July 1903.

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Most historians are broadly in agreement with this conclusion, and with reason. Various people had been putting scruples into the Queen's head, and certainly de Feria had been doing what he could. As early as March 6, when (as we have seen) the bill was temporarily in abeyance, he learnt from Controller Parry that she would not call herself "Supreme Head" but only "Governor". Later, when the difficulties had been smoothed out at Cateau Cambrésis, he found her "resolved about what had passed in Parliament yesterday, which Cecil and Vice Chamberlain Knollys and their followers have managed to bring about for their own ends"; but the precise title was still in doubt, in fact according to Feria "she would not take it".* The possible menace of the proposed marriage of Philip to Elizabeth of France, added to the fact that the disputed title was even objected to by certain of the reforming party also, was a cogent reason for hesitating.

But, as we have seen, the formula "Supreme Governor" had been in the air as early as March 6. Elizabeth's scruples were obviously well known to her advisers who were managing parliament. It was naturally out of respect for them that the Lords' committee had made that precise title optional. Nor is there anything to show that on the first three days in Holy Week the Commons altered the optional clause. Maitland thinks they probably let it stand. The Pope being definitely "abolished" they had no reason to trouble their heads about the precise formula which was to make the sovereign supreme over the Church. No: what evidently worried them (and the Government, too) was not the optional title conferring supremacy, but the fact that the Lords had successfully withstood all Protestant tampering with the liturgy. There was clearly a deadlock. For the moment nothing could be done, and yet Cecil and his party felt obliged to have something to show for themselves before Easter. Hence the tacking on to a perfectly useless bill the proviso about communion in both kinds: hence the proclamation. The Government obviously had no intention that the matter should rest

* *Spanish Cal.*, i, 61.

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there. It was "the Mass that mattered" and so far nothing had been done towards abolishing it. A further attempt would have to be made after the Easter recess, when the Government should have had time, by propaganda and otherwise, to undermine the Catholic position still further and reduce the dangerous strength of the opposition in the Lords.

So perished the Bill for abolishing the Bishop of Rome. Whatever its original contents may have been, we may conclude, I think, (1) that in the final form in which it passed both Houses of Parliament it merely conferred upon the sovereign the (possibly optional) title of supreme head, and though annexing to the Crown the rights and jurisdiction of the Pope, it made no move in the direction of Protestantism beyond reviving the act of Edward VI enjoining communion in both kinds: (2) that it was made immediately operative by proclamation and was observed in the royal chapel and elsewhere (though by no means universally); (3) that in such places the terms of the proclamation were carried out by the holding of a separate communion service after a partially anglicized Mass; and (4) that both the passing of the Act as well as the issuing of the proclamation was intended to be no more than a temporary expedient—not so much because the royal title was still considered unsatisfactory, but because the bill as it stood, by defending the Holy Sacrament of the Altar, actually tended to preserve what it was the main intention of Cecil and his gang to destroy.

A. GORDON SMITH.

ART. 9.—ORATORIAN EDUCATION IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE

1. Lantoine : *L'Histoire de l'enseignement secondaire en France au 17^{me} siècle.*
2. Compayré : *Histoire Critique des Doctrines de l'Education en France depuis le 16^{me} siècle.*
3. Lallemand : *Essai sur l'Education dans l'ancien Oratoire de France.* (Paris, 1887.)
4. Lamy : *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, par le Père Bernard Lamy de l'Oratoire. (1682.)
5. Perraud : *L'Oratoire de France au 17^{me} et 18^{me} siècles.* (Paris, 1866.)
6. Hamel : *Histoire de l'Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly.* (Paris, 1868.)

IT is, of course, with secondary education that we are here concerned: of primary education there was little or none in seventeenth-century France; Paris, for instance, had only the schools of Notre Dame, under the direction of the Precentor, where reading, writing, and the Catechism were taught. But secondary education flourished then, and it will be necessary, unfortunately, to give a short account of its position at the beginning of the century before we can make clear the part played by the Oratorians—unfortunately, because this account will take time and space which could be more pleasantly occupied in describing the Oratorians themselves, who, although they were all Frenchmen, seem to have inherited some of the gentle spirit of the Italian founder of their congregation, Saint Philip Neri.

The most important teaching body at the beginning of the seventeenth century was the University of Paris, but within the first decade, in 1603, the Jesuits returned to France to become its chief rival. Soon their colleges were opened and rapidly increased in number, drawing from the University all its best pupils. They were followed by the Oratorians, who opened their first college at Dieppe in 1614. Much later in the century, in 1643, the Petites-Ecoles de Port Royal were begun, to be closed again some seventeen years after, in 1660. Only

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one thousand pupils passed through the hands of "Messieurs de Port-Royal", but yet in those few years they did more than any other teaching body in the cause of education.

To the University, then, to the Jesuits, the Oratorians, the Jansenists of Port-Royal, were the youth of the upper classes sent in the seventeenth century, but the University was by far the worst attended, for very obvious causes. By the end of the sixteenth century, after the civil wars, it had sunk very low. The scholars were rough and unruly, very little instruction was given, and that was bad. The colleges were let out to merchants; cows were even kept in one; and the students were crowded together in a few rooms. The Commission formed in 1600 by Henri IV did much to reform these abuses, although it was met by violent opposition.

Obedience and orderly behaviour were insisted upon. The students were divided into classes and examinations were instituted to determine the removes between the classes. The Commission concerned itself mainly with the Faculty of Arts, where Latin was the chief study. Much time was spent on grammar and in learning classic authors by heart—it is not strange that a latinized style is so frequently to be met with in seventeenth-century literature. Most important of all, Latin alone was to be spoken in the class-room, a rule which goes to show that the use of French was gaining ground.

Yet these reforms were not enough to counteract the stronger attractions of the teaching of the religious orders. The University was still in bad odour, and it was, moreover, far too conservative, completely cut off from the life and tendencies of the time. The French language was still despised and banished from its classes in the days when Corneille, Descartes, and the Académie flourished. Not so the Oratory and Port-Royal; they appreciated and taught their mother-tongue.

Again, the University took no heed of the social life of the time. The seventeenth century was an age of brilliant social intercourse. The aim of the University teaching was to impart knowledge, but what parents wished to see in their sons was the "honnête homme",

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of whom one hears so much. This "honnête homme" was apparently both accomplished and learned, and so versatile that it was impossible to discover his calling. Just as in Elizabethan England the scholar, however erudite, but unable to sing a part in a madrigal when called upon to do so, was heartily despised, so in seventeenth-century France the man who betrayed a profound knowledge of some one subject and ignorance of others was an object of contempt.

Montaigne and Pascal both spoke of this "honnête homme". "Il faut qu'on n'en puisse dire ni, 'Il est mathématicien', ni 'prédicateur', ni 'éloquent', mais, 'Il est honnête homme'."* So Pascal. Thus the University failed to supply the education required and left the field clear for the religious orders.

The Jesuits turned out "honnêtes hommes" in large numbers, and so popular were they that by the end of the century they had fourteen thousand pupils. The basis of the education they gave, as at the University, was Latin, but they taught it better; for they accompanied the grammars written in Latin with illustrations—a novel procedure. Five years they devoted to Latin—three to the study of its grammar, one to its literature, one to rhetoric. Their aim was primarily a religious one; they wished first to turn out good Catholics, then to produce poets and orators in Latin. The classic authors therefore—unfortunately not Christians—were considered rather unsafe reading. They used only expurgated texts and concentrated attention on the style of the author.

Their teaching has been called brilliant but superficial; however that may be, to judge from their popularity it gave great satisfaction. Certainly there have been many good Latin scholars among their pupils. The best were given titles, Censor and Decurion, for instance, and the highest, Imperator; for the incentive to work was competition, and, unlike some of the colleges of the University, Montaigu for example—famous for the frequent floggings there administered—Jesuit discipline was firm enough, but gentle. Their pupils acted plays so attractively that they drew audiences away from the regular

* Pascal, *Pensées*. Text of Brunschvicg. Section i, no. 35.

players at the Hôtel de Bourgogne. They held little academies where they discussed in public, verses, theses, and scenes for plays. And always the children were urged to act in everything *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*, to which end they were kept under a constant vigilant supervision. This, then, was the teaching of the Jesuits, the chief rivals of the University.

By far the most enlightened teachers were the Jansenists of Port-Royal. Their success at the time was small, because their religious doctrines drew down upon them bitter attacks and censures from the authorities and from their rivals the Jesuits, but it was they who saw most clearly the faults of the teaching of the day and, what is more, did most to correct them. They saw that the instruction given to children must be graduated according to their age, the beginnings must be made easy for them, and for this purpose they wrote books which were a definite advance on the heavy, difficult grammars then in use. Nicole, Arnauld, Lancelot, taught in the Little Schools of Port-Royal with the aid of their *Méthodes*, their *Jardin des Racines Grecques*, and their *Logique*. But this was only part of their contribution to educational progress; their great merit was that they taught in French. They taught Latin in French and they also taught French itself. Latin they held to be a dead language, and therefore they were not so concerned that their children should write it and speak it, but that they should understand it and be able to translate it. Latin composition and verse-making, so dear to the Jesuits, they considered profitless. The cultivation of personal reflection and sound judgment were more important to them, and they studied the authors for this purpose, using not chosen excerpts but the book entire. They read more for the matter than for the style. By doing away with Latin composition they gained time which was spent on modern languages—a *Méthode Espagnole* and a *Méthode Italienne* are among their books—history, geography, mathematics.

This was all very admirable, but the atmosphere at the Little Schools cannot have been very healthy. The Jansenists thought that "l'homme est mauvais" and natur-

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ally tends towards evil-doing, This attitude led them to gentleness and pity for such unfortunates, not harshness, but they did not trust the children. They gave them plenty of exercise and recreation ; they declared frequently, "Il faut égayer les enfants", but it is almost impossible to believe that they could have done so. They would not allow the children to "tutoyer" each other—the sign of friendship. They feared friendships as Pascal did. They disapproved of worldly pleasures, plays, walks, dancing, and they would allow no competition, no praise, in their class-rooms for fear of arousing vanity. But this had no good result, as we are told by Pascal :

Les enfants de Port-Royal, auxquels on ne donne point cet aiguillon d'envie et de gloire, tombent dans la nonchalance.*

Their severity showed itself even more in their education of girls. There must be no petting of the little girls, no particular friendships, they must never be more than two or three together, and they must be silent. They must not spend time on their toilette and must eat what they did not like. Not much was taught to them—reading, writing, the Bible and Catechism, and arithmetic as a special pleasure on feast-days. This severity was the outcome of their religious doctrines, as was their downfall in 1660.

These, then, were the chief centres of learning in the seventeenth century: the University, where the instruction given, though gradually improving, was still completely out of contact with the life of the day; the Jesuits, turning out "honnêtes hommes", accomplished latinists; the short-lived schools at Port-Royal, where the theory and method of teaching were indeed enlightened, but the discipline too dreary; and lastly the colleges of the Oratorians.

The first Oratorian college was opened at Dieppe in 1614, at the request of the townspeople and of the Archbishop of Rouen. The Jesuits were very eager to take command of this college, but their application was rejected. This was by no means the only occasion of conflict between the two orders; the relations between

* Pascal, *Pensées*. Section ii, no. 151.

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the various teaching bodies in France at this period were far from friendly. It is not difficult to see why this should be so between the Jesuits and the Oratorians: they were totally opposed to each other in every way, in their constitution, spirit, and rule of life. It is necessary to give some account of these, as they had their due influence on the nature and spirit of their teaching.

The Oratorians were founded in 1611 by the Cardinal de Bérulle for the purpose of reforming the clergy. He used as model the congregation in Italy of the same name, founded by Saint Philip Neri a century before. Bérulle had just succeeded in establishing the Carmelites, with much difficulty, in France. The foundation of the Oratory was an easier task—any project of reform was eagerly welcomed. The need was great; for by the end of the sixteenth century the Church had sunk low, her priests were worldly minded and far from holy. (We are told of the strange sermons delivered by them, full of far-fetched similes, as for instance:

Le christianisme est comme une grande salade: les nations en sont les herbes; le sel, les docteurs—"vos estis sal terrae"; le vinaigre, les macérations; et l'huile, les bons Pères Jésuites.*

This was delivered to a congregation of doctors, hence the curious compliment.)

These and other abuses the Cardinal de Bérulle set out to reform by founding a congregation of priests who should live together in all holiness and by their example and precept elevate the tone of the priesthood. The Oratorians were not monks, they were a congregation of secular priests and thus exempt from none of the work of the ordinary parish priests. They were under the jurisdiction of the bishops and strongly Gallican, unlike the Ultramontane Jesuits. The Oratorians were always distinguished for their patriotism. They took no vows; they were free to leave the house when they would; rules of poverty, chastity, and obedience there were, but their submission to them was voluntary. It is this spirit of freedom which was their most striking quality

* Hamel, *Histoire du Collège et de l'Abbaye de Juilly*, p. 170.

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and the secret of their strength, for they were the last to fall in the eighteenth century.*

Father Lamy, the chief source of information on the Oratory, has given a charming picture of the congregation in his *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, published in 1682. One cannot do better than quote some passages from it—unfortunately it is too long to quote at full length. The description takes the form of a conversation between a “bon ecclésiastique” and some visitors to his community.

Notre politique est de n'en avoir point, et il n'y a rien de plus éloigné de notre esprit que d'établir et d'afermir cette Maison par des moiens humains. Nous ne nous unissons point ensemble pour faire un corps qui éclate et qui se fasse distinguer d'avec les autres Membres de l'Eglise. Nous joignons seulement nos forces, nos études et nos prières pour faire les uns avec les autres ce que nous ne pourrions faire que très-difficilement étant séparés† . . . si nous ne faisons donc point les trois vœux de religion, de Pauvreté, de Chasteté et d'Obéissance, nous tâchons de les pratiquer. On nous inspire un amour tout particulier pour la pauvreté.‡ . . .

Pour Cloître on nous donne l'amour de la solitude . . . cette solitude n'est ni difficile, ni pénible. Nous aimons la vérité, les jours ne suffisent point pour la consulter autant de tems que nous le souhaiterions, ou pour mieux dire, on ne s'ennuie jamais de la douceur qu'il y a de l'étudier.§

These good priests had their first house where the buildings and Church of the Val de Grâce now stand. Another they had in the Rue St. Honoré which is now a Protestant temple, and also St. Magloire, which is now the Institution for Deaf and Dumb Children in the Rue St. Jacques.

Bérulle forbade the first Oratorians to teach, but the Pope ordered them to accept the direction of the colleges offered to them, and thus their first college was opened at Dieppe in 1614. Afterwards their numbers

* La Fontaine, attracted by the Oratory, thought that he had a vocation to the priesthood and went to live at Juilly. But all he did while there was to fill his biretta with breadcrumbs and lower it on a string into the courtyard that he might watch the hens fight over it. Shortly afterwards he left the Congregation. (Hamel, *Histoire de l'Abbaye de Juilly*, p. 170.)

† Lamy, *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 180.

‡ *ibid.*, p. 187.

§ *ibid.*, p. 189.

increased until in 1629 they directed fifty colleges. Their famous Collège de Juilly, not far from Paris, where all the young nobility went, was made an Académie Royale by letters patent in 1638.

The sources of our information on the Oratory are very poor or have not been properly utilized, because the few books that have been written on them show a striking lack of detailed information. They are very pious, dull, and full of long eulogies of the virtues of the congregation. As the authors are themselves Oratorians it pains them very much to write of the less creditable episodes in the history of the congregation: "Cette page que je viens d'écrire de l'histoire de l'Oratoire m'a arraché plus d'une larme,"* says Father Paul Lallemand in his book on the teaching of the Oratory, speaking of its struggles over the question of Jansenism. His book was written in 1887; it is the most recent, but vague and wordy. There is a book by Perraud on the Oratory dated 1866 which is really a history of the lives of some famous Oratorians. By far the most illuminating document on the subject is the *Entretiens sur les Sciences* by Father Bernard Lamy, written in 1682. He was one of the most prominent writers and teachers of the Oratory and evidently one of the most gentle and sensible as well, to judge from his book. He was a disciple of Descartes and therefore persecuted for his opinions. In 1675 he was exiled to Grenoble, where he wrote the *Entretiens*; it is not his only work. Another famous teacher was le Père Thomassin, but his books are not so interesting. There are various *Méthodes* and *Rationes Studiorum* in existence, drawn up under the auspices of the Père de Condren who was one of the first superiors.† These books, then, and some household accounts, Arrêts de Parlement, and various *mémoires* are all the sources of our information. Unfortunately

* Lallemand, *Essai sur l'éducation dans l'ancien Oratoire de France*, p. 181.

† He was a very forceful character, as can be seen by the story told of him. He was destined, it is said, for a martial career, but at the early age of twelve he used the only weapon he could wield—the bow and arrow—to shoot his own portrait, which he considered an object of vanity. (Hamel *Histoire de l'Abbaye de Juilly*, p. 121.)

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the fine library at Juilly was sacked at the time of the Revolution.

From the *Entretiens sur les Sciences* we gather that the aim of Oratorian teaching, like that of the other teaching orders, was above all a religious one. Their object was to set the children's feet firmly on the path of virtue and to show them how to continue therein :

Il n'y a personne qui ait tant soit peu de zèle et de lumière qui ne soit touché de l'abandon où l'on laisse la jeunesse. On sait qu'elle n'est pas capable de se conduire elle-même ; et cependant on la laisse faire.*

A secondary aim was more original : "Notre but à tous est de nous rendre capables de nos emplois." The Oratorians were above all practical.†

Like Messieurs de Port-Royal they were interested in their children and loved them, but, unlike Port-Royal, they trusted them and therefore gave them more liberty. In this they were far in advance of their time ; respect for individuality was an eighteenth-century idea.

Il faut même beaucoup de liberté dans l'étude, puisqu'il est presque impossible de réussir dans celles pour lesquelles on n'a aucun attrait. Ainsi on ne doit pas gêner les esprits.‡

And again :

Il n'y a, peut-être, pas deux esprits faits de la même manière.§

These two quotations have often roused writers on educational history to enthusiasm.

The Oratorians were much in sympathy with Port-Royal, but their outlook as regards human nature seems to have been fundamentally different :

Nous sommes l'ouvrage de Dieu, nous n'avons donc pas sujet de croire que notre nature soit mauvaise.||

* Lamy, *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, preface.

† Study and learning serve still another purpose according to Father Lamy. They not only preserve a State from ruin, but also fill in time when the office has been said. (*Entretiens*, p. 26.)

‡ Lamy, *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, preface.

§ *ibid.*, *Entretien* ii, p. 34.

|| *ibid.*, p. 55.

Accordingly discipline was not severe; Father Lamy deplores the harsh treatment that he sees meted out to children.

Quand le châtiment est nécessaire il faut qu'il soit plus honteux que douloureux, et qu'il ne fasse point de plaies qui rendent les Maîtres odieux. Il y a plusieurs autres voies que le fouet, et pour ramener les enfants à leur devoir, une caresse, une menace, l'espérance d'une recompense ou la crainte d'une humiliation font plus d'efet que les verges.*

This the Jansenists would have considered a highly dangerous method. Father Lamy had evidently made a study of his pupils and saw the need of so doing, for he says :

Outre la douceur on a besoin de prudence ; car enfin il faut une espèce de Politique pour gouverner ce petit Peuple, pour le prendre par ses inclinations. Il y a des tems d'opiniâtreté où un enfant se ferait plutot tuer que de plier. C'est être bien cruel ou bien imprudent que de ne pas laisser passer ce mauvais tems.†

How often have we read this in modern educational works ! After all, child psychology is only a substitute for common sense—which the Oratorians had in plenty.

This same common sense led them to bring about a revolution in the teaching of the classics. They were really the first to teach Latin and Greek grammar in French, although Port-Royal has usually received the credit for this innovation ; for as early as 1640 the *Méthode Latine*† of De Condren was printed and sent round to all the Oratorian Colleges. The Latin Grammars in use at the University were very difficult, and written in incomprehensible verse. Father Lamy pronounces firmly :

Les grammaires qu'on met entre les mains des enfants doivent être dans la langue qui leur est connue, c'est-à-dire, en françoys pour les collèges de France : car enfin c'est entreprendre de chasser les ténèbres par les ténèbres, que de se servir de Grammaires Latines pour leur faire apprendre le Latin.§

* Lamy; *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 198.

† *ibid.*, p. 199.

‡ Written in French, printed in colours with French equivalents—reproduced in Lallemand.

§ Lamy, *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 128.

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The University and the Jesuits treated Latin as a living tongue, Port-Royal treated it as a dead one and the Oratory as a dying one; at least their teaching seemed to show a compromise, for after the first two or three years of work in French they reverted to the traditional method, and Latin alone was spoken in the class-room, Perhaps they were obliged to do this to conform to the demands of the time—otherwise they might lose pupils.

As regards literature, they were inclined to consider the subject-matter of more importance than the style. They seemed to think, like Port-Royal, that to understand the sense of the text was the main end, and the only way to show that a text is understood is to translate it. It is to be hoped that their translations were not so elegantly unfaithful as that of some Jansenist writers who rendered "*Postumia tua me convenit et Servius*" as "*Madame votre femme m'ayant fait l'honneur de me venir voir et Monsieur votre fils*". The Jesuits in their anxiety to inculcate elegant Latinity dictated to their boys "*cahiers d'expressions*", notebooks of periphrastic phrases; the boys who stuffed the most into his verses probably won the prize. How different were Father Lamy's ideas! He condemned anything forced or artificial.

Greek was not neglected by the Oratorians; it was taught, but not so thoroughly as Latin: "*Il faut entendre et parler exactement le Latin et sa langue naturelle. Il suffit d'entendre bien le Grec*", says Father Lamy.

The Oratorians, too, were the first to teach French History in their colleges. At the University, history was banned altogether. The Collège de Juilly had a special master to teach History, which shows how important a place they gave it in the curriculum. Usually each master took his form up the school, teaching all subjects in turn—a method entirely out of favour in these days of specialization, but not without its good points. There was at Juilly a library of history books for the use of the pupils.

They recognized the moral and humanistic value of history, unlike many other educationalists even in the nineteenth century. Father Lamy says on this point:

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Il n'y a rien à quoi l'on doive plus travailler, qu'à se connaître. Or notre esprit est comme l'œil qui voit tout et qui ne se voit point, si ce n'est par réflexion, lors qu'il se regarde dans un miroir. Le secret pour se connaître et pour bien juger de nous, c'est de nous voir dans les autres ; l'histoire est un grand miroir où l'on se voit tout entier.*

He is no less enlightened as regards method. The master, he says, plays an important part in the teaching of history :

Un maître vertueux accompagne d'une reflexion sage et courte, l'histoire qu'il leur fait lire ou bien qu'il leur raconte.†

But he is well aware of the danger of these comments, that the children might never think for themselves. He advocates the method of scientific enquiry : let the child discover the truth for himself if possible, not accept the historian's word for it, "car on ne doit jamais se laisser persuader sans raison".‡ The best method is to consult the original sources, or at least ask if the historian was prejudiced ; we can seek proof elsewhere.

Father Lamy insists also on the importance of social history and geography as an accompaniment to history proper.

Il faut faire attention à toutes choses, remarquer les manières particulières de bâtir, de combattre, de se marier, de rendre les derniers devoirs aux Morts ; les mœurs, la conduite, les grands événements, les exemples rares de vertu.§

By means of pictures, furniture, and maps the master must make history a real and living thing, not a mere catalogue of names and dates. Maps should be given to the pupils and hung on the walls of the classroom—just as they are now in every school. To make history a pleasant and agreeable study, one of the Fathers even invented a card game, wherein the children drew a card with the name of a king on it and had to give the principal events of his reign. If it were certain that these were

* Lamy, *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, pp. 107-108.

† Lamy; *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 199.

‡ *ibid.*, p. 103.

§ *ibid.*, p. 99.

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the methods used in all the Oratorian colleges, the teaching of history there can have been very little behind the most modern teaching of our own days. Even if Father Lamy's advice was not carried out, we can at least give him the credit due to his very advanced, sensible, and enlightened ideas.

It is no wonder that Father Lamy advocated scientific methods in the teaching of History, since he himself was so devoted to the sciences. He wrote various scientific treatises himself; and he was not the only Oratorian to win distinction in the world of science: there was Malebranche, and others whose works Father Lallemand assures us are still read to-day. The Colleges had well-equipped laboratories with many "machines curieuses". Their results were good, their pupils distinguished themselves; one of them wrote a *Traité de Physique*, another opened a School of Navigation at Dieppe.

Father Lamy also believed strongly in the formative value of mathematics; they strengthen powers of thought, and have another use as well: namely to assist the Church to appoint the movable feasts by the aid of the moon and stars.

Il dit des Mathématiques qu'elles donnoient une entrée facile dans toutes les Sciences, qu'elles formoient l'esprit, qu'elles l'accoutumaient à raisonner juste, et cette science avait été nécessaire à la Religion pour célébrer les Fêtes, selon les apparences et les mouvements des Astres, dans le temps que Dieu avait ordonné.*

Science was not taught anywhere else than in the Oratorian Colleges; here again, they were far in advance of educational theory and practice at that time.

A few words must be said about the teaching of philosophy. The Oratorians were given to Cartesianism, and were therefore much persecuted. Father Lamy often makes a profession of faith in the *Entretiens*:

Par exemple lorsque nous faisons cette reflexion que nous pensons nous ne pouvons pas douter que nous n'existions.†

* Lamy; *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 14.

† Lamy; *Entretiens sur les Sciences*, p. 36.

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or, more shortly, *Cogito, ergo sum*. But he was exiled for his opinions and in 1684 the Oratorians were obliged to deny Cartesianism and to make Peripatetism their official belief.

The real innovations introduced by the Oratorians, then, were in the teaching of Latin, History, and Science. In other matters they did not differ from the Jansenists, nor the Jesuits. Like these communities, they taught riding, music, dancing, and their pupils performed plays—though permission for these was often very grudgingly given by the authorities.

These plays were a source of great delight to the pupils, and broke the monotony of everyday routine, which was much the same for Oratorian and the other colleges alike. The time-table was almost as broken up as that of present-day schools, but one supposes there was not so much bell-ringing. After breakfast, lessons were heard, by certain picked pupils called *decurions*, for half an hour, until the masters or *régents* entered the classroom. Then, after prayers, work began and continued, changing every half hour in method, if not in subject.* The work was so arranged that four successive days of classwork were always followed by some relief, a general lecture, for instance, or a half-holiday. Every month the *Préfet des Etudes* set some task to be done by all the classes, and three times a year they wrote a composition. On the results of this he distributed a card—a form of report for parents to sign; other examinations were held twice a year, at Easter and before the holidays, and these determined the remove into another class. Holidays varied according to the class: the eldest boys began their holidays on July 22, and the rest began later in descending order until August 20 or 25. This is in outline the régime of most of the colleges.

So much for the work of the Oratory in the seventeenth century; its spirit was reflected in the education they

* The actual timetable was roughly this: 5.30, out of bed; 5.45, prayers; then work till 7.30; 8, breakfast; repetition of homework till 9. 9, *Veni, Sancte Spiritus*, reading from the Bible, work. 11, Litanies were sung; lunch accompanied by readings of the lives of the Saints. Recreation till 12.30; 1.30-4, study; 4-6 evening class, recreation and study. Supper, litanies and study till 8.30. Bed.

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provided, distinguished for its common sense and solidity, avoiding the extremes of the other teaching communities, and in some points outstripping them in educational reforms. In the eighteenth century, although the work of education was still in the hands of the religious orders, the theory of it had passed over to those who were, if anything, anti-religious in their views.

Educational theory made great advances, practice was left behind ; for the theorists took no active measures, and the Orders were declining in every way. It says much for the Oratorians that they were the last to fall. Although there was continual dissension among them and a great decrease in wealth, they yet took the place of the Jesuits, banished in 1762.

For some years more they struggled on, until at the outbreak of the Revolution they were dispersed—yet not ingloriously, for they were told that “ils avaient bien mérité de la Patrie”. It is satisfactory to know that their services did not pass entirely unrecognized.

M. JOAN CORMACK.

QUARTERLY REFLECTIONS

LIVERPOOL CATHEDRAL The laying of the foundation-stone of Liverpool Cathedral will always be remembered as one of the landmarks in the revival of Catholicism in Great Britain. This revival we are apt to take for granted, and it is with something of a shock that we read of the scale and magnificence of the projected Cathedral. Has British Catholicism deserved a monument that will in some respects challenge comparison with the Cathedral of Christendom in Rome? But in truth the Cathedral will stand not so much as the symbol of work done, great as that has been, as of the opportunity that now lies in the hands of British Catholics to make this land once again a substantially Catholic country.

A few years ago such an ideal seemed to be little more than a pious hope, but to-day we can see that it is a practical possibility. To be sure, it is not all our doing. The rapid decline of vital and rational Faith in other Christian bodies has tended of itself to make Christianity and Catholicism identical terms once again not only in our eyes but in the eyes of the world. Ever since the Reformation one attempt after another has been made to divorce the two, and, in particular since the Enlightenment, the idea of separating what are called the values and inner meanings of Christianity from dogma and history has found favour. Catholicism, to the scandal, it must be said, of some of its own disciples, has steadily refused even to glance in that tempting direction. On the contrary, it has entrenched itself even deeper in its own apparently out-of-date defensive works, and as a result it stands before the world to-day stronger than it has ever been. Year by year, more and more anxious souls are faced by the choice: Catholicism or nothing. To the close student of the history of the Church it may well appear that the Divine protection and authority of the Church were never more apparent than during the last two centuries. The whole of the educated world threw off the so-called shackles of superstition and authority and as rapidly became the willing victim

of a host of new superstitions and authorities. The Church alone remained unperturbed, slowly, almost painfully distilling from this mass of novelty the little that was enduring and worth-while, and to-day it offers to a perplexed, disappointed, nerve-ridden world the same salvation that it offered a thousand, two thousand years ago. By all the laws of probability it ought to have been swept aside. Instead, in the motherland of the greatest Empire in history, in a country most closely identified with all the material values of our era, in the home of "progress", the first stone of a monument destined to outlive our children and our children's children is laid—and millions by means of one of the great inventions of our modern world are spiritually present at the ceremony!

How long this great Cathedral will take in the building, no one can say; by the time it is completed, many undreamt-of changes may have come over our Western world; but we know that within its walls the same salvation will be preached, the same ceremonies will be performed, the same sacrifice will be offered up as in the humblest Church in Christendom to-day and a thousand years ago. It is for our generation to see that by the time that it is finished it will not be a wondrous and awe-inspiring stranger in our midst, but the heart of Northern England.

GERMANY AND COMMUNISM The Nazi movement is not popular outside Germany. Had Hitler been less of a Nationalist extremist, or had he been able to gather his followers about him with a more moderate appeal, it might have been. There is no doubt that "the drift towards the Left" which has characterized social history during the last fifty years is being checked. Unfortunately the only alternative to class-war as a popular cry appears to be "war against the foreigners". And so Hitler in repressing Communism has been forced to indefensible measures like the persecution of the Jews, the burning of un-German literature, and "sabre-rattling" speeches. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that one may without hypocrisy condemn evil and yet

accept with thanks the good that in the long run comes out of evil. Hitler has succeeded for the time at least in preventing the spread of Russian Communism in Germany, and Germany is the high road between Russia and the Western world. It may be that the first chapter in the decline of Communism is being written, and that Hitler is the author.

Those of us who still cling to the political and social ideals of Christian democracy should not forget that it is impossible to deal with Russia as though she herself shared or even pretended to share those ideals. A Christian saint might convert her; a liberal statesman certainly will not. Until the Saint appears we shall have to reconcile ourselves to cruder methods, and thank Heaven that men as resolute as Hitler and Mussolini exist. Communism as preached in Russia is a definitely militaristic conception; it has deliberately separated itself from the community of ideas and values which are the accepted standard of action in the West. The problem which Russia presents to-day is similar to the problem which faces the moral philosopher enquiring about the origin of morality. Hobbes, for example, who has been accused of founding morality on self-interest, was forced to this position by the nature of the question he was asking himself: "In a society without any moral values, what is the good man to do?" If he is to survive at all, it is no use being good: he must somehow induce his neighbours to accept his standard, and meanwhile accept theirs. No doubt the question which Hobbes asked himself was an absurd one as among individual people, for the State of Nature as he conceived it has never existed. But, as Hobbes himself reminded us, is it absurd as among States? In particular is it absurd to-day when one great Power is avowedly bent on the destruction of those Christian ideals which still provide the Western world with such morality as it possesses? If our standard is to survive, we may or may not have to fight Russia, but we shall certainly have to take measures not unlike those of Hitler and Mussolini if we are to prevent the peaceful dissemination of Communistic ideas and values in our own world. The diehards of

Liberalism will protest, but they will protest not in the name of true Liberalism which flows from the Christian teaching about the eternal value and individual responsibility of the human soul, but in the name of a negation which stands for nothing but the so-called right to refuse to see the truth and to refuse to do the good. To tolerate Communism amounts to denying the value of Christianity and the civilization built on it. If we are prepared to go so far, well and good—if not, let us have the courage of our convictions, and by living up to what is best in our own culture render the Communistic alternative unattractive even as a temptation. In Britain, where the Communist menace seems rather remote, we have plenty to do in this latter direction.

CATHOLICISM AND THE NEXT WAR Catholics are not pacifists, for a pacifist is a man who considers peace to be the highest good. A Catholic—and indeed most intelligent and moral men—holds that there are values even greater than the blessing of peace. The existence of Russia alone is enough to remind us of this. For that very reason it is of the utmost importance that Catholics should have a right idea of the nature of modern warfare. For on that nature must depend to a large extent the time when the evil of war may be resorted to. In the days when war was a professional affair and weapons were comparatively crude and safe, the appeal to it might be made without very grave misgivings. The experience of the last war is enough to show that we dare not again resort to war in that cavalier manner. But it appears that the difference between the next war and the last will be hardly less great than the difference between the latter and the wars of the eighteenth century. Under these circumstances, Messrs. Gollancz have rendered a public service in republishing for 5s. a report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union of Geneva called *What would be the character of a New War?* It was not written to sell by its sensational revelations. It is nothing but a collection of papers soberly written by sober experts for such readers as

are obtainable for a 16s. official report. But in spite of the writers the matter about which they treat is as sensational as the most lurid best-seller. It is impossible even to attempt to condense here the matter of these papers, but the reader will be unable to resist the general conclusion that the next war *must* mean the end of our civilization. The possibilities of aerial, chemical, bacteriological, wireless-controlled weapons are such that it is safe to predict that man will only survive by living underground. No distinction between combatants and non-combatants will be possible. Every single resource of every nation engaged will be mobilized for the destruction of his enemy. It is indeed a *reductio ad absurdum*, except that in real life, as opposed to logic, the absurd can happen.

What then are we to make of the apparently sound doctrine that a purely defensive war with a just reason and a right object is legitimate? May we risk the total destruction of our civilization for *anything*? The Catholic doctrine is of course saved by the teaching of moral theologians that war must be carried on in the right way, within the limits of justice and love. It is saved in theory, but what is to be done in practice? For, in spite of all international efforts to order and limit armaments, it is evident that this condition is now beyond the bounds of any practical possibility. The terrible risk of what would happen were one of the combatants to disregard international armament agreements would suffice to determine all the combatants to be "first in" in ruthlessness. It would seem to follow that to-day a Catholic should be a pacifist. Yet to be a pacifist, as we have seen, involves the practical denial of the supreme values of Christian morality. Only a few weeks ago the war-blood of some of us began to boil at the thought of the fate of some British engineers under the administration of Soviet justice. It is a terrible dilemma, and its only practical conclusion is that another war *must be prevented*.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

THE CATHOLIC FAITH. By Paul Elmer More. (Princeton University Press, 1931. \$4.)

IT is so easy for a reviewer to take advantage of his position and act like a sergeant-major on parade that he is rarely justified in showing anger and abusing the writer. I am tempted however, to make an exception on this occasion, and my excuse would be that the title of this book is misleading, that Mr. More is constantly harsh and dogmatic, and that he has had opportunities in the past of correcting the numberless mistakes he makes when he attempts to criticize the Catholic Church. I say that this is not a book about the Catholic faith; it is instead a criticism of it and an expression of what Mr. More would like that faith to be; and, as no one I know would dream of following his idiosyncrasies, the title of this book is worse than a misnomer—to many it may well appear to be an insult.

The best that Mr. More has to say is contained in the first chapter in which the comparative merits of Buddhism and Christianity are examined. The balance is here fairly well kept, and the verdict in favour of the latter seems convincing until in the later chapters we learn more fully in what, according to Mr. More, the good points of Christianity consist. We learn that the Creeds are to be understood symbolically, that the rascally Scholastic theology must be jettisoned, that the supposed development on Eucharistic doctrine in the Middle Ages was in fact a disgusting corruption, and that between the demon of absolutism, in other words, Rome, and the sorcery of Christian mysticism Christianity is sorely in need of Mr. More's prescriptions. It may be well at this point to substantiate my summary with a few examples of the criticisms and improvements suggested by Mr. More. In the chapter on the Creeds he prefers "some indefinable dualism in the Godhead" to what some of us thought to be the established doctrine of the Trinity; on the truths of the Resurrection and Ascension he remarks rhetorically: "Can any Christian of to-day believe that those events so occurred as the makers of the Creed

believed?" And when "the legend" contained in the article "Born of the Virgin Mary", "leads on to the virtual deification of the Virgin as the Theotokos, Mother of God, it runs into a superstition which, to some minds at least, can only be described as repulsive". Let us say to the Catholic mind, at any rate, of Mr. More.

Writing on the Holy Eucharist as historian, philosopher, and Catholic, he says: "Scholasticism is not an escape from, but a disguise of, the raw credulity of the Dark Ages; there is no radical break between the crude formula forced on Berengar by Rome in 1059 and the ultra-metaphysical formula of Thomas Aquinas." Mr. More has forgotten, perhaps, to look up what St. Thomas has to say on this Berengarian formula, but no matter, for the sentence quoted will suffice to show his qualities as historian, philosopher, and Catholic. As in the next chapters on the Church, Rome is unmistakably the villain of the piece, dogmas and anathemas hurtle about, and for a while the "demon of absolutism" seems to have escaped from the Vatican and found a more congenial lodging. But while Mr. More has had to serve up again Dr. Salmon and the old, old arguments and cases from history to disprove the infallibility of Popes, his own infallibility seems to rest on no surer basis than an unshakable assurance. When counter-arguments are presented to him he dismisses them as just Scholastic and subtle and even dishonest.

Lastly we come to Christian mysticism. Many of us could have borne patiently the professorial judgments of the earlier chapters. We have heard such things before, and good men have not been ashamed to argue in like fashion; but it is almost infuriating to hear Mr. More lecturing the Christian mystics as if they were a group of sophomores. They must stop talking of renunciation and union with God, because that is "merely a Christian cosmetic applied to the grey-haired One of Plotinus". He is shocked by St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross because they use terms of sensuous love. "Is it quite decent to deck the Uranian Aphrodite in the seductive garments of her Pandemian sister?" Let me add that this mystifying if not mystical comment is

made upon the most beautiful and well known of St. John's poems, and then in order to make his fairness clear Mr. More goes on to say that he "would not insinuate any carnal impurity in the heart of the saintly Spaniard himself". To escape from this disease of mysticism, from the gross materialism of Scholastic thought and from the demon of absolutism, Mr. More retires to his Plato. There in the *Timaeus* is true Catholicism, in the vision of the Ideas, separate and substantial, a world to which even God must look for guidance because it is on their pattern that He creates or rather shapes the apparently everlasting void.

I will leave Mr. More without further comment, as criticism is superfluous. This book is not, thank God, altogether typical of his work. He has done much in America to bring before his countrymen a noble conception of culture and of the part which religion must play in it. All the more pity is it that he should have been betrayed into an attitude which is known as "Middle-West" when he comes to look at the truth of the Catholic faith.

M. C. D'ARCY, S.J.

THE PASSION AND DEATH OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.

By the Most Reverend Alban Goodier, S.J. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 10s. 6d.)

HIS GRACE Archbishop Goodier has here fulfilled the hope, so often repeated by many who read his *Public Life of Our Lord*, in a very royal way. No treatise or comment could so satisfy mind and heart alike, for wherever the reading is begun thought is stimulated and devotion helped. There is not a barren page or profitless phrase in any chapter of the book.

An Introduction was necessary, and there is a most enlightening one of admirable conciseness. It is far more than an explanation or an apology, it bears to the volume something of the relationship that the "sex puncta" of St. Ignatius have to his Third Week of the *Exercises*. Thus there are two guiding principles stated at once. These are essential to the right understanding of and, it must be added, to the deriving of solid spiritual profit from these pages. In the first place the author's

method of treatment is made clear. He accepts "the details of the Passion, the material surroundings and circumstances, from others, though tested, most of them, on the spot." It is a method that has well justified itself in the two preceding volumes. The second principle is the great fact that "understanding of the Passion demands active compassion, such compassion as cannot be expressed in words. It demands not only a power of deep sympathy, but actual suffering of one's own." We are forcibly reminded of St. Ignatius' earnest words "et hic incipere magno nisu, et conari excitare me ad dolendum, tristandum, et plangendum ; et eodem modo *laborando* per cetera puncta quae sequuntur" (4° puncto). Such is the spirit, a reverent, prayerful spirit, in which the subject must be approached. Soon it will become apparent what an intensely *personal* witness it is to "Him round whom the story is gathered."

As to the "Central Figure" of that story, no phrase seems more fitted to describe the impression left by the portrayal of His Sacred Character, as we follow Him scene by scene throughout, than the *su divina majestad* of St. Theresa or the equally well-known *vuestra sanctissima majestad* of the *Spiritual Exercises*. This "majesty" is apparent from the opening to the closing chapter. It is stressed by the desertion of the Apostles, by the designing malice of the Priests and Pharisees, in the very attitude of Pilate, as well as by the release of Barabbas. There is the majesty of benignity in the Supper Room, followed by the majesty of loneliness in the Garden of the Agony. Thus, describing the capture of Jesus at Gethsemane, Archbishop Goodier writes :

He would show that even at this moment He was what He had always been ; nay, more, for here was a wound received on His own account, from one of His own disciples, He went forward to the wounded man. He put his hand on the stricken ear, thereby, it may have been, mingling the sufferer's blood with His own. He took away His hand and the wound was healed.

Such was the first act of Jesus in His Passion ; strong and masterful, tender and gentle, every word and deed worthy of a king, yet in perfect harmony with that other side of Him which would gather men to Him "as a hen gathers her little ones under her

wing". Then He turned once more to the multitude before Him (p 181).

There is the silent majesty of reparation at the Crowning with thorns and before Herod, the supreme majesty of merciful suffering from the cross on Calvary, whilst every word and act of His Passion, with a simple and prayerful reverence, is made to show forth to us the tender majesty of His most merciful love. Witness the author's conception of the response to the Good Thief.

Jesus turned His aching head towards His companion in suffering. He spoke with that emphatic introduction which He had always been wont to use whenever He proclaimed a solemn truth. From His throne on Calvary He spoke and acted and bestowed His largess like a King. . . . It was a language worthy of a conqueror, spoken on a field where a battle had been won; it was a reward worthy of Jesus Christ, the King of Israel, the Son of God. From a criminal, in an instant, to a saint, the first of the New Dispensation; with this unique distinction granted to no other, that he was canonized before his death (p. 346).

Seldom is the word used, rarely is the attention directly called to this feature of "majesty", nevertheless, as these glimpses into the text reveal, the reverence of *su divina majestad* and *vuestra sanctissima majestad* makes fragrant as myrrh this most beautiful work.

Many who read this volume will make it their storehouse for Lenten reading and meditation year by year. They will be led to do so in the very spirit in which St. Paul wrote to the Hebrews: "Let us run by patience to the fight proposed to us; looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, who, having joy set before Him, endured the cross despising the shame, and now sitteth on the right hand of the throne of God." (xii, 1, 2).

His Grace has, indeed, merited the deepest gratitude of all who would learn straight from the Crucified those lessons of wise detachment, of hidden strength and of victorious love so essential to ever-increasing understanding of and ever closer union with Him along the hard ways of our earthly pilgrimage.

W. PEERS SMITH, S.J.

THE COMMON READER. Second Series. By Virginia Woolf. (Hogarth Press, 10s. 6d.)

MRS. WOOLF holds a unique position among contemporary writers. Unlike most of them she does not allow the present chaos to intrude upon new works, and diminish them into tracts for the times. Her style, the method of her expression, the subtle portrayal of the individual by the description of the ever moving procession of his thoughts and images, is modern indeed, and she has a modern's sensitivity to the flight of time, to the dread mortality of things. But she is not a sceptic; life rushes by, but she lays hold of it. It is transient, but it is real, and it is this reality that she seizes, "what remains over when the skin of the day has been cast into the hedge", crystallizes it and makes it permanent in her art. Able to see the great issues, joy and sorrow, love and death, in and through the externals of the passing scene, she can, or rather must concentrate upon them and neglect the turmoil of opinions and events. Had she lived in the early nineteenth century she would probably, like Jane Austen, have never mentioned the Napoleonic wars. Thus a singleness of purpose-achievement gives to her work a purity and that *étonnant pouvoir d'apaisement* which M. Maritain attributes to all great art.

Although more particularly applicable to her novels, these remarks have, nevertheless, a direct bearing on the present volume of essays. They are essays in criticism no doubt, but it is neither the didactic criticism of Mathew Arnold nor the austere analysis of Mr. Eliot. It is a novelist's criterion; each writer is observed as a character, as a living person, in his social life and against the background of his age. Mrs. Woolf has carried out the process recommended in her last essay "How to read a book?"; opened her mind as widely as possible to the "multitudinous impressions" from her subjects, and out of these reincarnated the life they once enjoyed. She rescues Gabriel Harvey from the impersonality of the Elizabethan age. Donne is summoned to repeat his passionate career. Dorothy Osborne fills "her great sheets by her father's bed or by the chimney corner"

and sketches "the solemn Sir Justinian Isham—Sir Solomon Justinian she calls him—the pompous widower with four daughters and a great gloomy house in Northamptonshire who wished to marry her." Swift writes to Stella who was "wearing away the flower of her youth in Ireland with Rebecca Dingley, who wore hinged spectacles, consumed large quantities of Brazil tobacco, and stumbled over her petticoats as she walked". Lord Chesterfield writes letters to his son and dies disillusioned but urbane. Parson Woodford lives capaciously in the country, and Parson Skinner commits suicide because of the cruelty of his parishioners and the indifference of his sons. The élite of the eighteenth century meet Dr. Johnson at Dr. Burney's stormy evening party. Thus the figures pass before us—we come to Meredith, "who sat with the head of a Greek poet on his shoulders in a suburban villa beneath Box Hill, pouring out poetry and sarcasm and wisdom in a voice that could be heard almost on the high road", and finally to the great personage of Hardy.

A glorious pageant of our English inheritance, without the stiffness and archaism of pageantry, but fresh and glowing and intimate as if actually observed. And, in addition, each member of the pageant is really criticized. Mrs. Woolf stands aside from the person she has summoned, looks him up and down, and passes judgment. "The chief fault about the *Sentimental Journey* comes from Sterne's concern for our good opinion of his heart. Gissing "is one of those imperfect novelists through whose books one sees the life of the author faintly covered by the lives of fictitious people. With such authors we establish a personal rather than an artistic relationship." In spite of the "intermittent brilliancy" of some of Meredith's scenes "he was not a poet-novelist wholly and completely as Emily Brontë was a poet-novelist. He did not steep the world in one mood." In the essay on Hardy—a splendid vindication of his tragic genius against the superficial charge of pessimism there is this fine conclusion: "It is no mere transcript of life at a certain time and place that Hardy has given us. It is a vision of the world and of man's lot as they revealed

themselves to a powerful imagination, a profound and poetic genius, a gentle and human soul." These are but scraps of a new criticism ; they may serve, however, to indicate that intellectual act of judgment by which each person is given a finality and a meaning, and each essay made objective and a unity. What would have been merely a brilliant and moving impression becomes a new reality of gemlike hardness, reflecting the eternal order of things and receiving position and outline and structure in a hierarchy of values.

ÆLFRIE MANSON, O.P.

SAINT JEROME. By Paul Monceaux. Translated by F. J. Sheed. (Sheed and Ward, 1933, 6s.)

A GLORIOUS Saint, a discerning critic, and an erudite scholar, Saint Jerome has dominated Christian thought in the pages of his Vulgate, in his brilliant letters and in his profound Scriptural exegesis, to an extent that has never been surpassed and but seldom equalled in the history of the Catholic Church. Even the scholars of the Renaissance who looked askance at so many of the Fathers of the Church respected Saint Jerome ; while the admiration which Erasmus professed for him is well known. But, great as the influence of Saint Jerome has been on Christian thought, the details of his life have for long been obscured by the mists of myth and legend. Even among scholars the greatest confusion has existed as to the place of his birth and chronology of his life, while the average reader has remained in almost complete ignorance of even the most elementary facts of his career. It is therefore with great pleasure that we welcome this short account of the early years of Saint Jerome.

M. Monceaux is one who can speak with authority, and within the compass of a very small volume he has given us much very valuable information ; he has fixed the date of the Saint's birth at A.D. 347, and his remarks on his nationality, about which, owing to the obscurity of the Saint's own words, the greatest diversity of opinion has existed, are important. Saint Jerome declares that he was born at Stridon, a "confinium" of Dalmatia and Pannonia ; and most scholars, including Cavallera in

his *Vie de Saint-Jérôme*, have taken this to mean "the borders of Dalmatia and Pannonia", and almost every country in that part of the world has put in a claim to be the native land of the Saint. But M. Monceaux points out, on the authority of Du Cange, that the word "confinium" in the Latin of the fourth century can mean a neck of land or territory. Hence he concludes that the Stridon of Saint Jerome's birth was situated at the foot of the Julian Alps, an outlying province of Venetia-Histria, previously the Tenth Region of Italy. We may be forgiven if we doubt whether the last word has yet been said in this matter.

Admirably written, and a model of what such a translation should be, this short account of Saint Jerome's early years will not only be valuable to the student of patristics but may also be read with profit and pleasure by the general reader. As soon as it is begun the fascinating personality of the Saint grips our imagination as it gripped the imagination of his contemporaries, and one can hardly lay the book aside until the last page is reached. At the same time we think that a ground for complaint might well be found in the numerous pictures with which the book is adorned. Illustrations would seem an unnecessary encumbrance in a work of this kind, and one could wish that the space sacrificed to describing them had been devoted more profitably to a critical survey of the Saint's works or even to completing the life itself. It is somewhat tantalizing and disappointing that such a learned and gifted writer as M. Monceaux should concern himself only with Saint Jerome's first thirty years which are not after all the most fruitful or the most interesting period of his life.

BRUNO SCOTT-JAMES, I.

THE LIFE OF JOHN COLET. By Sir J. A. R. Marriott.
(Methuen, 6s.)

JOHN COLET is an outstanding figure in English religious and educational history. With Sir Thomas More, William Grocin, and a few others, he introduced the Italian Renaissance to England. But he was only concerned with the New Learning as it applied to religion

and education. When, in the closing years of the fifteenth century, he returned to Oxford from his Continental studies, the teachers of divinity in the University were in lethargy, content to wrangle interminably over Pierre Lombard and Duns Scotus. He at once began lecturing in favour of a return to life. For wrangling he asked that there should be substituted practical obedience, and for the study of the *Sentences* the study of the message of St. Paul. He declared too that the allegorical, the tropological, the anagogical senses might all safely be neglected; the literal sense was enough. And Duns, too, he suggested, might well be replaced by, as he thought, Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Paul's disciple. Like Wiclif more than a century before him, and the Tractarians more than three hundred years after him, he made a great stir. Not only did the masters and the pupils in Oxford crowd to hear him, but abbots and priests from afar wrote to him or came to see him. Then he was appointed Dean of St. Paul's: Oxford was exchanged for London and lecturing on divinity for preaching. And as a preacher he was as earnest and eloquent. Convocation was astounded to hear him affirm from the pulpit that even bishops should try in their lives to imitate the Master. Henry VIII, fresh from the blood of battle, was disturbed to find him denouncing all war; though, when Henry asked him privately if he really meant it, he answered like a gentleman. Then he came into a fortune from his father and with that founded St. Paul's School, a step which constituted a turning-point in English education. But his bishop, who may have been a gentleman, but who had little use for Christians, harried him, and he retired to a Charterhouse at Sheen, where, in 1519, he died of dropsy. On learning of his death, Erasmus, who had enjoyed rather a wide acquaintance throughout Western Europe, said that in all his life he had met only two saints, and one of them was Colet.

It is thus fitting that his name and his deeds should be known to the multitude, and Sir John Marriott was well inspired to wish to produce a short and popular biography of him, especially since, as Sir John says, Lupton's standard *Life* is out of print. Moreover, by prefacing the account

of the chief events of his life with a brief description of his times and concluding with a short chapter on his place in history, Sir John gives what at first sight appears to be an admirable narrative and one that is fluently written and extremely readable.

Yet because a book is designed to be popular is no reason why it should be inaccurate, and, unfortunately, this book is marred by the neglect of its author—who is known as a teacher of modern history—to consult the latest authorities, or, in some cases, any authority at all. The native town of Alexandre de Villedieu was not Dol, as Sir John asserts on page 56 (incidentally mis-spelling it “Dôl”), but Villedieu, farther north, near Avranches. It cannot be affirmed categorically, as it is affirmed here, that Erasmus was born in 1467, since nobody knows in which year Erasmus was born. Erasmus did not go to Oxford “for the first time in the winter of 1497-8”, but for the only time in the autumn of 1499. Nor did he learn Greek from Grocin there, for Grocin was not there and Erasmus taught himself Greek—not in Oxford, but in Paris, Orleans, Louvain, and Bologna. It is idle to speculate whether or not Colet read the Epistles of St. Paul in Latin, for, as he himself said, he knew no Greek. It was not in 1519, as is stated on page 30, that Luther nailed up his ninety-five theses, but in 1517. And it really will not do at this day to speak of Savonarola without qualifications as a saint. In short, it is not enough to pay tribute, as Sir John does, to the erudition of such scholars as the late President of Corpus, Oxford; it is also necessary and even more important to have glanced at their work.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

AESCHYLUS : PROMETHEUS BOUND. Edited with Introduction, Commentary, and Translation by George Thomson. (Cambridge University Press, 12s. 6d.)

MR. THOMSON is the author of an interesting and original book on Greek lyric metre, and his edition of any Greek play could not fail to contain valuable material. His choice of *Prometheus Bound* is particularly welcome. The play is a superb example of the Aeschylean grand

style, and has added attraction for the modern reader through its influence on Milton and Shelley and its unusual ending on a full climax—Prometheus sinking into the earth amid storm and whirlwind as he utters his last words of defiance.

Mr. Thomson's first contribution to the appreciation of the play is a metrical analysis of the choruses in accordance with his newly expounded principles. As one would expect, the work has been extremely well done; and though many may not accept his interpretation of details, everyone must admire his knowledge and sensibility. Then the preface and notes provide a full and alert discussion of many problems—the date of the play, its general significance, details of staging, the probable contents of the lost *Prometheus Unbound* and *Prometheus the Firegiver*. The reconstruction here is very ingenious; most scholars, I think, will agree that *Prometheus the Firegiver* must have been the last play of the trilogy; and Mr. Thomson brings forward strong reasons for making *Prometheus Bound* the last in date of the extant plays, composed between the production of the *Oresteia* in 458 and the poet's death in 456.

On the main issue of justice between Zeus and Prometheus Mr. Thomson is convinced and clear. "The ruler of the gods is a tyrant, the champion of mankind is guilty of pride. Both are diseased. The world is out of joint, and only a change in both antagonists can set it right." I am still not sure that this is the poet's meaning. The more I read of Aeschylus and Euripides, the more elusive I find the theology of both. Did Aeschylus intend a Miltonic justification of Zeus? Was he "of the Devil's party without knowing it?" I can see no answer, just as I can see no answer to the problem of *Hamlet*; but there is one neglected passage in the *Prometheus* which seems to me to favour the claims of Zeus. In the dialogue with the chorus (ll. 208-278) we are given the following chain of events. When the Titans rebelled, Prometheus took the side of Zeus and helped to establish his throne. Afterwards, in his triumph, Zeus wished to extinguish mankind and beget a new race; Prometheus alone opposed him, and bade him preserve

mankind. That, says Prometheus, was the cause of his punishment. But this clearly was not so. Had Zeus been angered by the request he would have destroyed mankind as he intended, and punished Prometheus at once for his presumption. Actually, he preserved the race (doubtless in gratitude for Prometheus' help), and Prometheus remained in heaven till he stole the sacred fire. The chorus seem to suspect this, for when Prometheus gives the rescue of man as the cause of his downfall, they ask him, "But didst thou go no further?" and he confesses at length the theft of fire, at which they exclaim, "Seest thou not that thou hast sinned?"

Mr. Thomson's text embodies some good emendations of Headlam's; he would have done well to include also Zakas' *προσέμενός* in l. 255. The Cambridge Press continue to do good service in making a classical text book a truly civilized thing.

THOMAS HEYWOOD, PLAYWRIGHT AND MISCELLANIST
By A. Melville Clark. (Blackwell, 21s.)

ONE or two pleasant songs, one or two still reprinted plays, commend unobtrusively to the general reader the name of Thomas Heywood. Partly perhaps for his deserts, but more through the accidents of his date and acquaintance, he has become to students of English drama a figure of greater consequence. To such students Dr. Melville Clark addresses his large, well printed, and learned study. The author's preface sufficiently shows the scope of the work. "Among the points on which I have been able to throw light are the following: Heywood's parentage and Lincolnshire home, his Cheshire ancestry and his family arms, his relations, marriage(s), and descendants . . . his relations with Shakespeare, Jonson, Webster, Dekker, James and Henry Shirley, William Rowley, Richard Brome, and William Prynne; the dating of his plays and other works; wrong identifications of plays . . .; his connection with the Navy; contemporary and posthumous allusions, plagiarisms by one Austin, Edward Phillips, and others; adaptations and modern revivals. . . ." All this and more Dr. Clark discusses patiently, quoting relevant documents

and showing the most amazing knowledge of minor literature of the period. Reluctantly, one asks the ungracious question. Was this labour worth while? Scholarship, admirable in itself, may be worthily or unworthily used. One is grateful to Robert Bridges for the months of study which gave us a small and lucid textbook of Milton's prosody; grateful to Mr. Norman Ault for the search through thousands of books and manuscripts which restored to sight and knowledge a few such exquisite lyrics as "Alas, dear heart! what hope had I?". But for all its learning and all its thoroughness Dr. Clark's elaborate book does not easily justify its publication. There are refreshing quotations (too few) of Heywood's fine masculine prose; there are interesting though inconclusive discussions of Heywood's share in *The Jew of Malta* and his authorship of *A Yorkshire Tragedy*. But Heywood's Cheshire ancestry, his family arms, his connection with the Navy? Lovers of literary history may cheerfully spend a guinea upon the book; lovers of literature will remember that two more volumes of Mr. Waley's *Genji* are overdue, and that a guinea will buy them both.

W. H. SHEWRING.

THE MEN WHO LEFT THE MOVEMENT. By Gertrude Donald. (Burns Oates & Washbourne.)

To the Catholic, perhaps even more interesting than the reasons why the hundred and thirty Tractarian clergymen left that Movement in the first ten years of its existence are the reasons why the remainder did not. For after all, the Catholic Church has many open doors through which all who will may enter: and of the three essential steps in full belief—the Existence of God, the Incarnation, and the Authority of the Catholic Church—the last is incomparably the easiest of achievement to born Catholics, while, as Miss Donald shows, it is one of the chief obstacles in the way of others when reinforced by inherited affections. What, then, were the closed doors on the Tractarian side which so many were unable to open? In her *Men Who Left the Movement*—studies of Newman, Allies, Manning, and Maturin—a book

adorned by acute perception, discriminating erudition, and a pleasant style, the author goes far towards answering both questions; and so, as a sort of by-product, towards showing the form of the "closed doors" that still exist.

But she does more even than that. In the first place, she destroys for ever the legendary Newman of High Anglican Apologetics—that querulous tortured Tractarian reed shaken only too successfully by a Roman wind—and shows him as he really was. She is not alone, of course, in doing this. But she does it with outstanding clarity, and it is a thing which will need assertion and re-assertion as long as Anglo-Catholicism continues its inconclusive course. For it was an ingenious move on the part of those apologists. They had Newman, the vanished corner-stone of their own Movement, a giant in intellect, a soul "naturally Catholic". They had themselves, compact of, to us, incredible inconsistencies. They painted Newman's portrait in their own colours, and by the subtle legerdemain of criticism managed to imply that Newman's proper colours rightly pertained to themselves. But the author has shown again, and with unanswerable learning, that it was the High Anglicans who were shaken and are still quivering in search of an impossible equilibrium, and that it was Newman who, seeing clearly through the fog of controversy that a "Via Media" was a road not a dwelling-place, "moved" finely along that road.

With the somewhat obtuse and humourless Thomas Allies, the author undertook what was in a sense a more difficult task. In the case of Newman, she had to repaint a portrait and deal with one who, though gigantic, was a very human giant. With Allies, she was dealing with what is, to most of us, an oddly alien state of mind—with a man who could solemnly write that he delayed his "moving forward with unfaltering step to the Catholic Church" till he could do so "holding the retraction due to the truth in my hand", and then, equally solemnly, dedicate that retraction to Mr. Gladstone! To his fellow Tractarians, Allies must have seemed, as Dr. Pusey wrote in an unpublished exhortation to another

convert, merely one of the "pious minds which are shaken" and which ended by being actually "shaken out". But for us it requires a kind of mental gymnastics only comparable to looking at an object with one eye shut when standing on one's head to understand clearly the point of view of this badly "shaken" Vicar of Launton. Miss Donald not only enables one to adopt that attitude without too much dizziness, but she makes clear a point which is too seldom adequately realized, or at any rate acted upon, by those who conduct our controversies: that the most fantastic apparent inconsistency is not necessarily exclusive of inviolable sincerity; for, as she writes, "it is hard for those brought up to love and defend the shadow to leave it for the substance."

In dealing with Manning, the author, though almost necessarily limited by what "Purcell's tune lets tread to", gives a masterly exposition of the freakish imagination of that biographer, and finally places Lytton Strachey's well-known essay in its proper position as a Victorian fairy-tale for jaded Georgians.

Her "Maturin", too, is more than adequate. She shows how the troubled waters of High Anglican controversy, like a tide receding from a submerged rock, exposed to Maturin as they flowed back the Rock to which he and his fellows clung. "My motive simply is that I believe the Roman Church to be true," Newman wrote, and that any Church which expected its members to be "in the way to fraternize with Protestants of all sorts, Monophysites, half-converted Jews, and even Druses", could not possibly be so. The Papacy was that Rock, as Allies saw, "the key to the whole controversy, the centre of the whole position."

The writer of this book shows herself the possessor of a pretty wit which she keeps rigidly subservient to her purpose. What could be nicer, for instance, than to quote Allies' remark about the use of vestments, holy water, and the Crucifix becoming more and more common throughout England, and add, "in spite of Mr. Kensit's apparent conviction that the whole country is his parish, and that he has a right to act 'the aggrieved parishioner' wherever he pleases?" Her book can be wholeheartedly

recommended to any who should wish to gain a heightened appreciation of those who led the way, and at the same time a clearer and more sympathetic understanding of the difficulties which still beset the "separated".

M. TRAPPES-LOMAX.

ADVENTURES OF IDEAS. By Professor A. N. Whitehead.
(Cambridge University Press, 12s. 6d.)

WHEN Professor Whitehead publishes a new book, a great part of the thinking world at once downs tools to attend to what he has to say. A number of reviewers have commented on this, and wondered how it comes about that any philosopher has attained such reputation. In part, the remarkable position he has achieved is the result of his earlier work *Science and the Modern World*, in which the inadequacy of scientific thought was so ably demonstrated. The world always enjoys what the Americans call the "debunking" of the experts by one of their own number, and the age was perhaps just ripe for the "debunking" of the scientists.

But that alone would not account for the public interest aroused by Professor Whitehead's works. Others have done the same sort of thing—Wolfgang Köhler, for instance, has, I think, dealt as successfully with the behaviourist psychology, but has not caught the popular imagination. To explain Professor Whitehead's position we must look in part at least, if not chiefly, to his power of generalization about life, his broad grasp of the things that we feel really count, and a sense that life is bigger than any departmental study can show. There is patent sincerity, and a power to stimulate or at least to provoke.

In these respects the reader will find him at his best in the first half of the present volume, *Adventures of Ideas*. The work is divided into four books, of which the first two are entitled "Sociological" and "Cosmological". The former is the longest of the four parts, and the one which will make most appeal to the general reader. If it does not discuss that fascinating subject "life in general" it at all events discusses "history in general", which is only a degree less fascinating. It is not easy to sum it up,

but the general effect that lingers with one will perhaps be that history shows one continued struggle for dominance between force and persuasion—and these terms may be taken roughly to stand for barbarism and civilization.

The second part of the work, headed "Cosmological", is likewise historical, but it is the history of scientific thought. Here also there are two general ideas contrasted—speculation and scholarship. Speculation is the characteristic of the Athenian mentality, scholarship of the Alexandrian. It is the contrast of the Hellenic and the Hellenistic contribution to culture. The contrast must appeal to all of us, even though we may not agree with the author, that the Athenian tone of mind prevailed in Europe at no time except between the years 1414-1527, nor even that it did prevail then.

The third and fourth parts of the work are definitely philosophical. They show how his general theory of the world, as expounded in earlier books, notably *Science and the Modern World* and *Process and Reality*, works out in dealing with human personality, consciousness, truth, art, and so forth. Obviously one is constantly forced back to consider the metaphysical foundations laid in the earlier books. For instance—and it is the most important instance—human personality as an enduring entity is shown in the present volume to be a delusion. For all idea of substance and enduring entity has long ago been abolished by him. What we are pleased to call a person or an enduring thing is really a succession of many different entities. This is certainly only the logical carrying out of his general theory. For him the world is made up of actual entities, each one of which, so far as I understand him, results from the casual influence of other entities whether past, present, future, actual, or possible. The influence from any of the entities received into a given one is called a "prehension". An actual entity therefore consists of many "prehensions" fused into a unity. But among the entities which influence, and therefore give rise to, the given actual entity there is one most important one—namely, the influence exerted by that entity which we in our naïve way would call the past state of the same entity. But according

to him it is nonsense to speak of two successive stages of one entity—they are really two distinct successive entities. Some of these straight line successions of entities are persons, those, namely, in which each successive entity includes in itself a certain degree of self-consciousness.

This is, at the best, explaining away rather than explaining our most cherished and fundamental convictions. And Professor Whitehead is, of course, far too candid not to recognize that we always do regard things as substances or persons which endure and undergo change.

But the primary difficulty with which anyone is faced, when trying to understand his philosophy as a whole, is to see what metaphysical sense there can be in his general conception of an entity. If, for instance, each of three entities is nothing but the result of the influence of the remaining two, then metaphysically the total result of them all amounts to nothing. We may multiply such entities indefinitely; and still, whatever answer mathematics may give, metaphysics makes them just nothing. It is hard to see that we have been given more than "a beggarly account of empty boxes". It appears like a metaphysical rendering of the well-known economic system of the island people earning a precarious living by taking in one another's washing.

It may be that I misunderstand his general theory; for I confess that, while I find Professor Whitehead marvellously lucid in expounding difficult scientific questions, I do not find him easy to follow in matters metaphysical. Philosophy is bound to ask what were those ultimate realities which originally suffered the influence of the other realities and which originally exercised the influence. One would expect a writer expounding the theory to concentrate on that before all else, and to make sure that if nothing else was understood at least that much should be.

There may be some explanation, which has escaped me; but I can never accept a position which says that A is nothing but the influence of B, and B is nothing but the influence of A, even though this be multiplied indefinitely. What we want to know about is the original A and B, why they were there and what they were.

In *Science and the Modern World*, or *Religion in the Making* it was possible to think that God was brought in for salving the situation. Professor A. E. Taylor, writing in the DUBLIN REVIEW in 1927, was certain that Professor Whitehead was a theist. His article was written before the appearance of *Process and Reality*. I doubt if this last-named book will bear a theistic interpretation. He there tells us (p. 9) that in respect of the Absolute his philosophy approaches nearer to Eastern than to Western thought. In the last chapter he distinguishes between his "primordial God" who is unconscious and his "subsequent God" who is conscious. It looks to me to be a sort of God-in-the-making theory. An important passage in *Adventures of Ideas* (p. 303) bears this out.

If one might hazard a suggestion, this is what has happened. Plato distinguishes between God and the world of eternal forms or ideas. Professor Whitehead, who is such a keen Platonist, has drawn a like distinction. St. Augustine and many others would say that Plato had not intended the distinction literally. At all events Christian theology and philosophy, in so far as it derives from Greek thought, could only do so by identifying the world of eternal forms with the Divine Mind. God is not before truth, nor truth before God: God *is* truth. Now Professor Whitehead has gone another way to work. Keeping his God distinct from the world of eternal forms, he has let him get caught up into the machinery of the physical universe, and become so horribly mangled in the process that practically there is no God left save what is turned out by the world process.

There is space to call attention to one other point. In earlier works Professor Whitehead used such phrases as "simple physical feeling", "act of perception", "conceptual prehension", when treating of ordinary physical realities, so that a careless reader might have thought at first that he meant that these physical realities were conscious. The reason he did so was because he felt that we ought to interpret the non-conscious reality through the conscious and better-known reality rather than *vice versa*. It seemed that we were thus bridging the

chasm between consciousness and materiality ; but it turns out that this was not so ; for we are told on p. 347 of the present volume that "it [consciousness] is just itself and must be experienced". It seems then that nothing has been gained by learning to speak of physical realities as having conceptual feelings, prehensions, and so forth, nor yet by our getting rid of substances. We are left with the old chasmic distinction between consciousness and the non-conscious reality. Aristotle, who comes in for a deal of abuse because he not only thought in terms of substance, but thought that he was bound so to think, did better than that. He bridged the gulf, at least in the opinion of St. Thomas. So that it is true to say that no one can be a genuine Thomist who does not believe in at least the theoretic possibility of the generation of conscious beings out of unconscious material realities.

The value of Professor Whitehead's contribution to philosophy lies chiefly in the temper of mind he brings to bear on philosophic discussion, in the breadth of his interest and sympathy, and in his clear recognition that philosophy is outside the scope of any departmental science and must ultimately interpret all such sciences. But it may be questioned whether his own positive metaphysical conceptions will be received by philosophers as of much value. While he fully recognizes the inadequacy of the empiricist philosophy which tries to get on without metaphysics, he himself nevertheless writes as though the great school of metaphysical speculation which has descended from the immediate successors of Kant had never existed. However much one may disagree with their conclusions, one is forced to recognize that these speculations constitute the main stream of modern non-Catholic philosophy.

H. R. WILLIAMS, O.S.B.

INTERPRETING THE UNIVERSE. By John Macmurray.
(Faber & Faber.)

PROFESSOR MACMURRAY, the "philosopher-in-ordinary to the B.B.C.", as we may well call him, may or may not be a profound thinker ; he is certainly an original one.

To genuine originality we may forgive many faults, if only because the reader or student is forced to react with the fullness of his critical powers, and this is an excellent philosophic discipline. In less than 40,000 words the professor expounds to the world the essence of his philosophic meditations. No one who reads him will deny the fearlessness of his thought. No one will, I imagine, succeed in escaping entirely from the spell which the author's clarity of style, sweep of mental activity and vigour of imagination cast on him. No one will read and forget. The Catholic reader will probably be struck by the comparative orthodoxy of the author's final position and the unorthodoxy of the steps which lead him thither. If he be a scholastic, the undoubted pain which he will experience in trying to follow the intellectual leaps and bounds in which the professor delights will be to some extent alleviated by the final discovery that not only do all roads lead to Rome, but that even "no road" leads in that direction.

Let us try to expound the quintessence of Professor Macmurray's thought. We hasten to add for the benefit of the suspicious reader who may doubt the accuracy of this summary that five shillings will procure for him the original work.

Reality is *known* in immediate experience, in acting, in "getting the feel" of any activity, not in *thinking*. Thinking only comes into play when we meet unsurmountable obstacles in acting or are faced with alternative ways of acting. Then we pass from real activity to "symbolic activity or an activity of the imagination". We play with images or ideas (the two words seem to be used interchangeably), fit them together, unfit them again within the limits of some unity-pattern, that is, some categories, chosen according to the special purpose of the reflecting. Thus we reach conclusions or hypotheses which we apply to the practical problem which started us out on our course of symbolic activity. If they are verified in the test of experience, we move on; if not, we try again. At this stage Professor Macmurray naively remarks: "The wonder is that our judgments are ever true." And again: "The truth of no con-

clusion whatsoever can be completely guaranteed." But this is not to be taken as an admission of scepticism, since we obtain our grip on reality, not by the conclusions reached through thought, but by the immediate knowledge which is prior to thought and shapes and tests it. (It follows that all knowledge must be of the hypothetical or the particular.) Applied to the history of philosophy, this view shows us that for centuries life was adapted to thought instead of thought being adapted to life. It followed that logic and philosophy were barren, that men were content to live as their ancestors had lived. Then, a few centuries back, thought began slowly to be regarded as "an instrument of control". It was seriously applied to the problem of overcoming the obstacles in the way of better activity. At first men made use of the unity-pattern of mathematical thought, the most obvious unity-pattern according to which the given is regarded as an infinite number of identical units, each one passive and material, to be added together according to the formula "one plus one equals two". But instead of being limited to the purpose for which it was used, it was taken absolutely with the inevitable consequence of a mechanistic materialism. This, however, involves a contradiction in terms, and in any case is obviously not applicable to active, living things. So, beginning with Kant, a new unity-pattern had to be invoked, the unity-pattern of biological thought with its central conception of the organism. Hegel and the idealists again attempted to apply this abstraction absolutely, but without success, and for three reasons: "the different elements in the organic unity-pattern cannot themselves be organic wholes"; an organism points to maturity and completion and we know that the process of life "has no final stage"; an organism demands an environment, "and the universe, by definition, can have no environment". Thus we reach the third unity-pattern, the unity-pattern in which personality is represented. Here, however, we are up against the difficulty that such a unity-pattern has not yet been worked out. That is the task for modern philosophy. But Professor Macmurray suggests a clue or two. He suggests that the essence of personality is

"mutuality", and "reason is the capacity for objectivity . . . the capacity to stand in conscious relation to that which is recognized as not ourselves". To the predominance of these three unity-patterns correspond three stages of sociological activity. To the mathematical unity-pattern correspond the emergence of science and its application to economic productivity; to the organic unity-pattern corresponds the adaptation of society in such a way that it may control and make use of the new wealth. But then comes the insistent question, "*Cui bono?*" "The activity itself is an activity carried on by persons. It must therefore have a personal significance for each of them if the incentive is not to disappear, and the effort with it." This is "the emergent problem of the contemporary world." This is where the personal unity-pattern will serve.

We cannot help feeling that Professor Macmurray emerges, somewhat tattered and torn, at the point where St. Thomas begins. That is no mean achievement, for if a man *can* start again with St. Thomas, he will certainly be carried along further by him. "Reason is the capacity for objectivity", is very much the same as "*Cogito, ergo ens est*", which may be taken to express the pith of Thomism. After all his labour Professor Macmurray is forced to the conclusion that the good of the individual can alone justify action; unlike St. Thomas, however, he is very uncertain in what that good consists. And one reason why he finds it so hard to reach the summit of his philosophical mountain is the unwarranted divorce he makes between experience and thought. Thinking is not playing with images within an imaginary pattern, but the discovering of the order which exists in the object of experience. No doubt it will remain a superficial, abstract order and presuppose a more direct and intimate knowledge which in fact is not given to human beings, except, perhaps, in flashes. But that is no reason to dismiss it as pragmatic and utilitarian, especially since its pragmatic value must depend on the truth which it contains. We shall never find objectivity unless we start from it in thought as well as in experience.

MICHAEL DE LA BÉDOYÈRE.

IL CICLO DELLA CREAZIONE. *Tetralogia Cristiana.*
Dramatic Poem in a Prologue and Four Acts.
By Don Luigi Sturzo. (Bloud et Gay, Paris.)

WORTHY of Dante is the theme which has inspired his compatriot. And it is nobly handled. From the dawn of created being to the Last Judgment the drama of creation and redemption pursues its awful course amid a splendour of music and colour. Though the literal music for which Don Sturzo has written still waits for the master, it will not be easy to find; the imagination stirred by the verbal melody supplies the missing orchestration. The majesty of God, skilfully suggested by a concealment which admits no revelation more direct than a mysterious voice or triple flash of light, penetrates the entire poem, being reflected even in the classical majesty of the (free) verse. And with infinite height a suggestion of immeasurable space. On the far boundary of the stellar universe opens the cosmic struggle between good and evil whose final issue is concentrated upon the Valley of Jehosaphat. Where imagination must stagger beneath a theme too vast for its powers, as at the birth of creatures, Don Sturzo does not hesitate to ask his reader for an intellectual concentration, "una concentrazione meditativa", on the unimaginable conception. But the imagination is sustained throughout by a scenario of ever-changing vistas and ever-shifting lights. A ceaseless conflict of light and darkness, as on a day of sunshine and storm, mirrors the spiritual struggle of cosmic and human history. Sublimity is the essential quality of the poem. Even the evil has a negative sublimity in its capacity for the infinite good it refuses.

With the discretion of a consummate art, Don Sturzo will not depict the Crucifixion. Instead, amid the obscurity of Limbo, Isaiah tells the expectant souls of the scene as it is enacted on earth. Then the Shulamite, in words of ecstatic rapture taken from the Song of Songs, sings the epithalamium of the wedlock between humanity and God being accomplished on the Cross. Her song ends in a darkness and silence broken by a voice crying out the *Dereliquisti* and the *Consummatum*

est. The concluding Apocalypse is not perhaps so satisfactory. But I do not think it possible to present a satisfactory Apocalypse to the imagination. The canonical Apocalypse is pure symbolism. I hope it will not be long before this magnificent piece of sacred literature appears in a worthy English dress.

NICOLAI DE CUSA OPERA OMNIA. Jussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis. Tom. i, "De Docta Ignorantia", Ediderunt Ernestus Hoffmann et Raymundus Klibansky. Tom. ii, "Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae" Edidit Raymundus Klibansky. Lipsiae in Aedibus Felicis Meiner, MCMXXXII.

THE most important figure in fifteenth-century philosophy, or rather—since philosophy in that decadence of scholasticism was at so low an ebb that this is insufficient appreciation—an outstanding figure in the history of European metaphysics, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, has hitherto been known to most students of philosophy only at secondhand. The magnificent edition begun by these Heidelberg scholars under the patronage of the University should bring many into direct contact with Nicholas. The typography of the edition is in itself a delight. It invites reading. The standard of scholarship is excellent. There is an elaborate *apparatus criticus*, references direct or indirect to other writers are as far as possible traced down, and the use made by later writers of any particular passage in Cusa is pointed out. [N.B. Perhaps the editors have been on occasion too faithful to the MSS. tradition so carefully sifted out. For example on p. 16, i, 1 of vol. i ("De Docta Ignorantia") I cannot understand the genitive *posterioris*. Surely we should read either the ablative *posteriore* or *i*, or, with the Paris edition to which the note refers, add *effectu*. On p. 27, i, 20, the singular *est* is surely incorrect after the plural *ea* and the Paris edition justified in correcting? On p. 86, i, 14, grammar surely demands the active *perducit* not the passive *perducitur*? And on p. 122, i, 10, does not the sense require *a magnitudine* and not *ad magnitudinem*?]

The publication of this critical edition should make

easier that critical study of Nicholas of Cusa's thought which must be carried out before we can be sure of correctly interpreting an exceptionally difficult thinker*

The difficulty arises at bottom from Nicholas' position between the mediaeval and modern worlds. At least in intention faithful, if in a more Platonic form, to the fundamental Platonist-Aristotelian metaphysics which the Catholic Church has always found the only system compatible with her religious belief, indeed with a genuine theism, the Cardinal undoubtedly felt the pull of currents of thought which would carry modern thinkers very far from the old moorings. Not new ideas—how should they be in a science whose possibilities and solutions are really so few?—but tendencies of thought integrated in the traditional *philosophia perennis*, but here ready to break away and pursue a one-sided and excessive growth. Of such I remark in Nicholas of Cusa mathematicism, agnosticism, and idealistic pantheism. Not indeed in the pure state. The Cardinal corrects all three by reference to a wider and more adequate body of truth. But there remains an excessive emphasis which occasions ambiguities if not actual contradictions of language and is disquieting at least for its augury of the future. Yet in the very exaggeration there are brilliant anticipations of the positive truth of later developments. Let us see.

From the Platonists Nicholas learnt to regard mathematics as the ideal science. For only in mathematics and the sciences in so far as they can be stated mathematically, can we obtain clear accurate ideas. And the entire development of modern thought and achievement was to be based upon the construction of a rigidly mathematical and quantitative body of knowledge. What is of peculiar interest here is that Nicholas of Cusa anticipates—though of course he cannot state it so clearly (here as elsewhere he gives the impression of a man groping his way along paths of which he is dimly but powerfully aware)—M. Meyerson's account of human thought as essentially the identification of diversity—the establish-

* As Prof. Bernhard Jansen, S. J. urges in his study of Cusa: *Zum Nicolaus-Cusanus Problem. Philosophia Perennis*, vol i, pp. 269 sqq.

ment of equations.* And since like M. Meyerson he sees that the diversity can never be wholly eliminated, he concludes that human knowledge can never be more than approximate—the agnosticism to which I referred above, an agnosticism which reinforces the religious Dionysian “agnosticism” as to the Nature of God, the negative theology which possessed, and with good reason, such an attraction for the Cardinal.

And this perception that perfect likeness or sameness between creatures was impossible—since some difference must necessarily remain—led Nicholas to anticipate in astronomy, another modern position, the principle of relativity. Nowhere is there or can there be an absolute centre or poles of the universe, any point absolutely fixed.† It was not on strictly astronomical grounds that Nicholas denied the fixity of the earth—his astronomy is still naïf and a priori—but influenced by these metaphysical considerations, which led him to anticipate Einstein.

Of the pantheistic trend in Nicholas of Cusa, already objected against him by contemporaries, I shall speak in my remarks on his philosophy of God and the Universe as expounded in the “Learned Ignorance”.

The entire treatise owed its origin to an idea which on his return journey from Constantinople suddenly flashed into the Cardinal’s mind and which he regarded as a divine inspiration of truth—the principle of the *Coincidentia Oppositorum*, the Coincidence of Opposites in God. The absolutely greatest Being than which there can be nothing greater cannot be limited or “opposed” by anything. Therefore it is all things—the sum of being, and “since nothing is opposed to it, the least being coincides with it”. (*D.I.*, bk. i, ii.) Later Nicholas illustrates the principle by representing God as the absolutely greatest circle in which centre, circumference and diameter coincide.

The principle seems to me a fatal misstatement of a profound truth. In God all the forms of limited positive

* *D.I.*, bk. i, ch. iii; bk. ii, ch. ii; etc. Cf. M. E. Meyerson, *Du Cheminement de la Pensée*.

† *D.I.*, bk. ii, chs. i, xi.

being which by reason of their limitations exclude and "are opposed to" one another are one. This is a fundamental principle of metaphysical theism, though it was, of course, not peculiar to Nicholas of Cusa. But it does not follow, as the Cardinal maintained, that all opposites coincide in God. For many are not oppositions of two finite positive entities. Some are reducible to the opposition of nonentity to positive being. The least finite being does not as such differ from the greatest by any positive character—but simply by greater defect of being. But non-being is as such excluded from and opposed to God. Therefore the least being, far from coinciding in God with the greatest, differs from the greatest finite being precisely in its greater remoteness from God—the absolute maximum of being. The illustration from the circle, to which as to his other mathematical illustrations Nicholas tends to ascribe more argumentative weight than they can carry, does not prove the coincidence of opposites. A centre equal to the circumference could not be the centre of a circumference. Such an infinite circle would not be a circle. Elsewhere to illustrate the coincidence of opposites Nicholas argues, using a diagram to make his argument plainer, that the circumference of the greatest circle is a straight line. "So that curvedness is not opposed to the infinite straight line since in that line curvedness is straightness." (*D.I.*, bk. i, ch. xiii.) The illustration in reality displays the mistake involved by Nicholas' principle. Curvedness is precisely departure from the straight line, as he himself says in another passage.* The wider the circumference the less curved. If the curvedness represents the defective being of creatures, the straight line God—the being of creatures only coincides with God when it ceases to be defective, as the circumference becomes a straight line only when all curvedness is lost. But circularity is also lost at the same time; for the circle as such must be bounded by a curved line. Similarly being without deficiency could not be created. Indeficient created being is a contradiction

* "A curve *qua* curve is nothing, since it is a departure from the straight line." *D.I.*, bk. i, ch. xviii.

in terms, like a straight curve. Therefore being *qua* created and deficient does not coincide with God any more than a curved line with a straight. And as a very curved line departs more from the straight than a less curved line, so does lesser being depart more from God by reason of its greater defect of being than greater. Cusa did not indeed deny this view of the relation between creatures and God. Many passages state or imply it.* He is not a pantheist, does not confuse the being of creatures with God, and explicitly allows that some creatures are more Godlike than others. But the coincidence of opposites is refuted or rendered meaningless.

Though Nicholas does not really prove the doctrine of the Trinity, his treatment of the mystery is highly suggestive. While rejecting the economic view for which the distinction of persons in God is relative to creatures, he seems to regard the Divine Word as constituted by the relation of the Divine Unity to the multiplicity of ideas, some of which creatures have actualized *ab extra*, though He is at the same time their absolute identification with the Divine Unity—the “equality of unity” in the Cardinal’s rather awkward terminology.

The ignorance to which the second book of the “Learned Ignorance” is devoted is what Nicholas calls a contraction of the Absolute Infinity. As the divine Being is contracted into the being of the universe, so the universe in turn is contracted into genera and species, and these in turn into the individuals which compose them. It is not altogether easy to understand what Nicholas means by contraction. I take him to mean presentation under a limited form. The universe presents God’s Being limited by the inherent limitation of creatureliness, the individual the specific essence limited by that particular individuality. And the universe also “unfolds” what exists in God “complicated”, so that God is the “*complicatio*” the complication of the universe, the universe the “*explicatio*” the unfolding of God. This has a pantheistic sound, and the impression is deepened when we are told that the universal is the *complicatio* of the particulars it subsumes, the particulars the *explicatio*

* e.g. *D.I.*, bk. i, ch. xviii.

of the universal. But Nicholas is at pains to point out that the two instances are not altogether parallel. The pantheistic colouring is only in language and emphasis. The second and third chapters of book ii contain a profound discussion of the relationship of creatures to God. They are perhaps the two most valuable chapters in the entire work. I do not know of any clearer statement of the difficulties apparent, the anomalies involved by the existence and origin of being which is other than the Absolute. But the difficulties do not lead the Cardinal to cut the knot by denying the former and reducing creatures to modes of the Absolute. He is content to bow before a mystery beyond our grasp. All that can be said is that the strong Oriental trend towards an idealistic pantheism which seems to be endemic in Germany, had appeared already in the language at least of Eckhart*, and was to culminate in Hegel, led Nicholas of Cusa to dwell on that aspect of theism in which it approaches pantheism the closest—that God is the fullness of all positive Being, so that all created being, when the essential defect of its creatureliness is removed, is in its positive aspect, God. In that sense and in that sense only does he say “God is all things”. But the unfortunate way in which the *coincidentia oppositorum* is formulated has not only damaged what would otherwise be a masterly statement of metaphysical theism, but encourages a hasty reader to believe that for Nicholas God is the indeterminate unity of all things, identical with all alike, a doctrine which he explicitly rejects. Moreover, Nicholas does not, I would suggest, distinguish with sufficient clearness between the unit as the material of the numerical series constituted by its multiplication and the unit as the sum of a numerical series from which it arises by division. He therefore appears at times to compare God to the unit in the former sense. It should rather represent the minimum degree of created being, the bricks whose combination builds up the foundation of the universe—the opposite pole to God. For the same

* Nicholas of Cusa was acquainted with the writings of Eckhart and understood him in an orthodox sense, but points out how liable his language was to misinterpretation. (*Apologia pro Docta Ignorantia*, pp. 24-5).

reason it seems misleading to compare God to the mathematical point found everywhere in a geometrical figure.* Nor does Nicholas prove that the universe cannot be greater than it actually is† “because it exhausts the passive potency of matter.‡ But why should we suppose it does? Nor is the universe a hierarchy of ascending and descending genera and species.§ Though you can roughly range the kingdoms and set kingdoms in order of ascending and descending value and being—mammals, e.g. above other vertebrates, vertebrates above invertebrates, animals above plants, plants above minerals—there is no ground whatever for ranking the canine above or below the feline genus or in the vegetable kingdom monocotyledons above or below dicotyledons. Here the Cardinal belongs to the prescientific school which imposes on natures the arrangements of a preconceived orderliness. Yet it was Nicholas who rejected the neat Ptolemaic view of the universe, and who insisted that “*precise truth*” on any subject was unattainable. In fact, he has a foot in both worlds—the mediaeval and the modern, and passes alternately from one to the other. Hence, though in essentials he holds fast the metaphysical synthesis built up by the Platonist-Aristotelian philosophy, alike for good and for evil, he gropes in other directions, though always returning to philosophical and theological orthodoxy. He did not construct a synthesis which would combine the results of the specialized scientific investigations of modernity with the fundamental truths reached by the metaphysical speculation of the past. How could he in the fifteenth century? But his writing is full of brilliant and fruitful suggestions, lightning flashes of insight. And in the history of philosophy his niche is assured and unique.

MATERIALISM. By J. S. Haldane, C.H., M.D., F.R.S.
(Hodder and Stoughton.)

THIS collection of essays is a very able and timely statement of a half-truth. To anyone disposed to accept as “scientific” that materialism which is the official creed

* *D.I.*, bk. ii, ch. iii.

‡ *Id. ibid.*

† *D.I.*, bk. ii, ch. i.

§ *D.I.*, bk. iii, ch. i.

of Soviet Russia, no better book could be given. Dr. Haldane shows that the phenomena of life and still more of consciousness and purpose are unamenable to a purely physico-mechanical explanation. Nor yet can they be explained by the intervention *ab extra* of a vital force or soul into an otherwise purely physical system. The physical phenomena represent a particular aspect abstracted from a biological or physiological whole—"of which it is the nature to express itself in each of the details". In short, as Dr. Haldane himself points out, his conclusion is substantially the Aristotelian doctrine of the entelechy-form—though these terms are never employed. And beyond the human personality is the Absolute Personality—God.

We must [writes Dr. Haldane] revise the current conception of God as a mere individual person. If our universe is the manifestation of God, it is evident that God is no mere individual person among other persons, but includes within Himself all that is ultimately real in individual persons. Our conception of God becomes thus wider, deeper, and closer to us than in traditional theology.

Here is the parting of the ways—when Dr. Haldane's truth is found to be, after all, but a half-truth. Some confusion also and misunderstanding. Traditional Catholic theology does not regard God *as* but one supreme individual "*among* other persons". He is more real than they, and does "include in Himself all that is ultimately real" in them. Not, however, as Dr. Haldane understands those words—as denying the distinct reality of creatures. For him the creature is but a subordinate aspect of the absolutely One Person, God, human spirit an abstraction from the Divine, as the biological and the inorganic in turn are further less adequate abstractions from the same Deity. Such a doctrine is an exclusive immanentism which leaves no room for the Divine Transcendence to which philosophy and religion alike testify. Dr. Haldane is attracted by the conclusion that God must thus participate in the suffering of the world. But on the same hypothesis He must equally parti-

cipate in its sin. Of course there is no place for human immortality. An unnecessary, even an irreligious belief, retorts Dr. Haldane. All that is valuable in me and in those I love is immortal in God. Why then did this appearance of individual existence originate? If after my death the entire value of my life and being abides in God; it was already in Him before my life began. True, my life cannot increase the absolute value in God, but for that very reason it must possess a distinct value for myself and my fellow creatures, a value which in turn presupposes my distinction from God, and which can be immortal only if I am not annihilated by bodily death. Again a purely immanent "holism", as Lossky shows, introduces the relativity of its parts into the Absolute conceived as no more than their sum total, a relativity inconsistent with its absolute character. But religion essentially demands and implies an Absolute. And if the lower forms of being are but aspects artificially abstracted of the higher and supreme, whence the conflict between them? Why does the body resist as well as serve the purposes of mind? Can we conceive an Absolute Person who expresses Himself not simply in and through the murderer and his victim but actually *as both*? Nor do we see why Dr. Haldane should restrict cause and causal explanation to the mechanical interaction studied by physics. No, we cannot stop where Dr. Haldane stops. This spiritual pantheism, though far more adequate than materialism, is insufficient. We must go forward to the genuine theism which embraces the complementary and even more essential truth of the Divine Transcendence.

THE BOOK OF SAINTS. A Dictionary of Servants of God Canonized by the Catholic Church: extracted from the Roman and other Martyrologies. Compiled by the Benedictine Monks of St. Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate. New edition, with Appendix of Additional Names. (A. & L. Black.)

THIS new edition of a useful and comprehensive work brought up to date by an appendix including the recent beatifications and canonizations is in itself very welcome.

But its usefulness would be enormously increased if it were a little more critical. At least the notices given should not conflict with the generally accepted results of hagiographical research. Mgr. Holweck's *Dictionary of the Saints* made a praiseworthy attempt to take these into account. Not so the present work. To take a few examples. St. Felicitas appears as the mother of seven martyred sons—though the martyrs of July 10 have no other connexion with her than proximity of burial. St. Laurence is roasted on the gridiron. Martha Mary and Lazarus travel to Provence after the Ascension. This extremely late legend (see Butler [Thurston and Attwater] July 22) is actually called "the constant belief of the West". The journey of St. James the Greater to Spain, and his burial at Compostella are treated as facts though rejected by all competent scholars outside Spain itself. The miraculous cure of St. John Damascene's right hand is stated as sober fact. And Barlaam and Josafat, actually non-existent save as figures in a romance which christianized the legend of Buddha, are regarded as historical saints to whom "some of the legendary doings of Buddha" have been attributed. This complete disregard of scientific criticism gravely detracts from the value of the work. One does not expect original research from compilers, but one does expect them to bring their statements into conformity with the facts ascertained by the scientific historian. This is particularly the case in a work whose preface points out that the Bollandist *acta* need "extensive revision on account of the results of modern historical research." Such a pronouncement must lead readers to expect that this account has been taken in the work thus introduced. The sub-title also is misleading. None of the saints previous to the tenth century were formally canonized.

THE GOLDEN SEQUENCE. A Fourfold Study of the Spiritual Life. By Evelyn Underhill. (Methuen and Co.)

THIS is a beautiful book, with the genuine beauty which is not due to sentimentalizing but arises from the profound contemplation of truth. The peace and the power

of the Holy Spirit—the energy which, because it is perfect, is also rest—brood over Miss Underhill's book. It is a book not just to read through—so read it will yield little—but on which to ponder with a loving thoughtfulness. The essence of religion is God, the soul and their communion. Social religion, if it is to be more than a sentimentalized social service, is the secondary though inevitable implication of this primary triad. It is this essential religion which is the theme of this study. First the foundation is laid by a consideration of the Divine Spirit as immanent and transcendent, power and personality. Then the spiritual life, the principles which underlie and condition man's relationship with God. Finally the two fundamental aspects of man's communion with God and ascent to Him, Purification and Prayer. Not an easy book to review, for every page contains thoughts to which one would gladly call attention beautifully expressed, and where all is so good there is little to choose. We may remark the valuable emphasis on transcendence, the otherness of God; the twofold character of religious communion—"this double action of the soul standing away from the Perfect in contemplation and seeking union with it in love"; and the magnificent exposition of the night of the soul (pp. 115-17). Anyone to whom the purification of the mind from image and concept as prescribed so relentlessly by St. John of the Cross seems a stultification of the intellect—a Buddhistic nihilism—will not do better than meditate on this passage, in which by a most apposite and subtle comparison with physical night Miss Underhill shows how the night of spirit, in obscuring the outer forms of religious belief, reveals their inner significance and life. "They loom up at us, dim, huge, half-realized, and yet more deeply living than before; like forest trees before the rising of the moon." The comparison may remind us that actually St. John of the Cross meditated his wisdom gazing out from the window of his cell over the dim expanses of a nocturnal landscape. If Miss Underhill concedes too much to the modern phobia of emotion in religion, forgetting that even so austere a mystic as St. John of the Cross poured

out through the Canticle of the Soul rhapsodic descriptions of a unitive ecstasy, delicious even to the senses, she implicitly returns to a truer perspective when she writes: "The soul's innate *passion* for Reality *flames* out, in awed and *delighted* worship of the holy *loveliness* of God". Here surely is the ardent *emotion* which normally to invest the love-union with God as the "*fascinosum*". I find it not altogether easy to harmonize the passage in which Miss Underhill accepts as valid and valuable "mystical auditions" (p. 80), though mediated by the subject's "own mind" and an apparent total rejection of all audible and visible communications (128-130). It seems to me that in the latter passage she has again yielded too much to the intellectual fashion of the day—the constant danger of a delicately receptive mind—and that the former more balanced passage represents better her personal conviction. One more remark. "Our limited minds refuse to combine the ideas of the personal and the universal. We set them in opposition: but that is *almost* certainly a mistake." As her entire book—indeed her work as a whole—amply proves, it is quite certainly a mistake. An Absolute less than personal is condemned by philosophy and religious experience alike. Here also Miss Underhill is too timid of contemporary opinion. No one need regard it less than she whose life has been given to the wide study and profound exploration of those eternal truths which no fashions of passing scepticism can distort or overthrow. Yet these dissents seem captious, in face of such an achievement of spiritual wisdom as Miss Underhill's book. And how apposite the exquisite illustration ("The Creation of Adam," from Chartres Cathedral), which sums up in pictorial form the quintessence of the book!

E. I. WATKIN.

LA VIE DE DOM SIMPLICIEN GODY, POÈTE ET ÉCRIVAIN MYSTIQUE. Par Jean Godefroy. ("Moines et Monastères".) Abbaye Saint-Martin de Ligugé.

A CHARMING side-chapel built on to the cathedral of French seventeenth-century spirituality erected by the Abbé Bremond. Yet another of that Turba Magna of

mystics of which M. Bremond speaks and which exceeds even the scope of his monumental work to compass. Dom Gody, in whom the Berullian devotion described by the Abbé Bremond in his volume on the École Française reinvigorates the traditional Benedictine piety, is an entirely sympathetic figure. Neither as poet nor as a writer on mystical prayer a man of peculiar eminence, he is the more representative of that band of mystics who were inspiring new life into the religion of seventeenth-century France. A venerable trunk—in this case the Benedictine Order—puts out new leaves in the spring of the mystic revival. How completely “theocentric” Dom Gody’s spirituality is M. Godefroy makes abundantly clear. And as a poet Dom Gody links the *humanisme dévot* of M. Bremond’s first volume with the mysticism of its successors. It is interesting to find (p. 23) the echo conceit so dear to contemporary English poetry and worked out elaborately by Webster in his *Duchess of Malfi*. But the green meadows of Paradise do not, as his biographer suggests, tell us anything of Dom Gody’s personal tastes. “Il ne trouve rien de mieux pour peindre le paradis”, writes M. Godefroy, “que de le placer dedans ces prés lumineuses”. These heavenly meadows are traditional—the “*paradisi semper amoena virentia*” of the *Commendatio Animae*. And already in St. Peter Damian’s hymn, “*Virent prata, vernant sata*”.

Nor is his macabre dwelling on the physical details of death a personal anticipation of “a note that will not be sounded again till two centuries later”. The seventeenth century delighted in the contemplation of death. Witness the tombs of the period—Donne’s famous shrouded effigy—or the verses of Austin in his *Devotions*. We must not expect originality from Dom Gody. Sufficient that he reflects so clearly in a singularly limpid spirit the conjoined lights of humanism and mystic spirituality.

E. I. WATKIN.

REBUILDING THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND. By the Archbishop of Liverpool and Other Writers. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1933).

THOSE who were present at the magnificent ceremony

at Liverpool last Whit-Monday, or who listened-in to Fr. Martindale's simple but eloquent description of the proceedings, cannot but have felt that an event of the gravest significance in the history of our country, and of the Church in our country, was taking place. After the hideous set-back to civilization and the spiritual nature of man given by the first third of the twentieth century the second third opens with the laying of the foundation-stone of a huge Catholic Cathedral in the midst of Protestant England dedicated to Christ the King, the Prince of Peace. *Sunt lacrymæ rerum*, and a note of sadness mingled with the joyful sounds of psalm and benediction. It had been hoped up to the last minute—and by no one more than by himself—that our beloved Cardinal Archbishop and Primate would have been present as Papal Legate visibly embodying the sanction and blessing of undying Peter. This was not to be, and the Cardinal Primate of all Ireland, bringing with him the blessing of S. Patrick, took his place. This book, edited by His Grace the Archbishop of Liverpool, contains eleven papers by himself and ten other writers whose names are household words among us. Where all is first-rate, it is invidious to select. I found most interesting the essays by Fr. Manson, O.P., Dom Bede Camm, Mr. Denis Gwynn, Abbot Hunter-Blair and, above all, Mr. Chesterton's epilogue, which is a pure masterpiece of thoughtful and imaginative writing. The writers treat of different aspects of the "Second Spring". No public or private library will willingly be without this book, so significant on account of the great event in honour of which it has been produced, so outstanding through its own intrinsic excellence.

ALGAR THOROLD.